General

  • Target

    SpyHunter-Installer.exe

  • Size

    6.9MB

  • Sample

    241015-w588rathlr

  • MD5

    91205adee79859b7e4bf800aee7ba748

  • SHA1

    7a91f48b5527b08ddd43297fce9e83247af817fb

  • SHA256

    e970685b0dc7e9b8e44396cc04a7a7a9cef5cd2e297059543e5738b2950c2683

  • SHA512

    12fa87438fc4501e2c36f7bf084173052072a64f69b6dbfc8b296e97f0a105dcba65cd3ec565f64dc38ba3ebce1778b2d448816f32f2c11a16aca4e00ea69a00

  • SSDEEP

    98304:JruMv+uP00//6XN7c9y7w6y9GsYEEqwQt1H9G6P8BFswuzEk1c2bAbrZPbhHie:J3GuP0m69I6DQt1HZPAuzduV9Hie

Malware Config

Targets

    • Target

      SpyHunter-Installer.exe

    • Size

      6.9MB

    • MD5

      91205adee79859b7e4bf800aee7ba748

    • SHA1

      7a91f48b5527b08ddd43297fce9e83247af817fb

    • SHA256

      e970685b0dc7e9b8e44396cc04a7a7a9cef5cd2e297059543e5738b2950c2683

    • SHA512

      12fa87438fc4501e2c36f7bf084173052072a64f69b6dbfc8b296e97f0a105dcba65cd3ec565f64dc38ba3ebce1778b2d448816f32f2c11a16aca4e00ea69a00

    • SSDEEP

      98304:JruMv+uP00//6XN7c9y7w6y9GsYEEqwQt1H9G6P8BFswuzEk1c2bAbrZPbhHie:J3GuP0m69I6DQt1HZPAuzduV9Hie

    • Creates new service(s)

    • Drops file in Drivers directory

    • Patched UPX-packed file

      Sample is packed with UPX but required header fields are zeroed out to prevent unpacking with the default UPX tool.

    • Checks BIOS information in registry

      BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

    • Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager

      Suspicious access to Credentials History.

    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)

    • Enumerates connected drives

      Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

    • Maps connected drives based on registry

      Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

    • Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

      Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB).

    • Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR)

      Bootkits write to the MBR to gain persistence at a level below the operating system.

    • Drops file in System32 directory

    • Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking

      Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Tasks