General

  • Target

    5946fa3d979b348ba2a23b99ce2747850bae68efcf9d49b2b59821a232f40669.bin

  • Size

    4.1MB

  • Sample

    241229-1xagnsxrav

  • MD5

    2bdde773b9cc387d2925c4b0450c7e45

  • SHA1

    fbcecf57e40dcfd45e730c5f474fe2959cf14b0e

  • SHA256

    5946fa3d979b348ba2a23b99ce2747850bae68efcf9d49b2b59821a232f40669

  • SHA512

    17d37fbfcebc12c3b2d9bfd30f999a4946bf79b954a52768b1bad295cc81ee1a267bb9f6f548fe2a6c84e972eefde54595950513e3f091d7ad4842937539b34d

  • SSDEEP

    98304:YdSiLgOLybbV+nCtPtfbgbiDhak+rJcv/szqBcwDyfb83Umdwf8vamE:cvgOLybbV+nCtPtOiv+rJcv/sORi6JE

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.20.225:3434

DES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      5946fa3d979b348ba2a23b99ce2747850bae68efcf9d49b2b59821a232f40669.bin

    • Size

      4.1MB

    • MD5

      2bdde773b9cc387d2925c4b0450c7e45

    • SHA1

      fbcecf57e40dcfd45e730c5f474fe2959cf14b0e

    • SHA256

      5946fa3d979b348ba2a23b99ce2747850bae68efcf9d49b2b59821a232f40669

    • SHA512

      17d37fbfcebc12c3b2d9bfd30f999a4946bf79b954a52768b1bad295cc81ee1a267bb9f6f548fe2a6c84e972eefde54595950513e3f091d7ad4842937539b34d

    • SSDEEP

      98304:YdSiLgOLybbV+nCtPtfbgbiDhak+rJcv/szqBcwDyfb83Umdwf8vamE:cvgOLybbV+nCtPtOiv+rJcv/sORi6JE

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks