babuk | 678bfbf5d73d6cf38532e11b11dbed17668d94711e2e2ea27311dd46490201b7

General

Target

e_win.exe
Size

79KB
MD5

ebe7bf69eceb80d155d7a16b8c61e15c
SHA1

5c8b0a23360420c33fb89e100fb996215a795a1f
SHA256

678bfbf5d73d6cf38532e11b11dbed17668d94711e2e2ea27311dd46490201b7
SHA512

76b0bb1a5a0fb0e90c06a8f6448a3116789788c5c35fab9f64a9122665a5a579d8336699a90cdb1db540395d6a37f107171440a4be6a84b6afa34fe69cecbbff

Score

10^/10

babuk ransomware

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\How To Restore Your Files.txt

Ransom Note

############## [ babuk ransomware greetings you ] ############## Introduction ---------------------------------------------- Congratulations! If you see this note, your company've been randomly chosen for security audit and your company haven't passed it. Unfortunately your servers are encrypted, backups are encrtypted too or deleted. Our enctyption algorythms are strong and it's impossible to decrypt your stuff without our help. Only one method to restore all your network and systems is - to buy our universal decryption software. Follow simple steps that discribed down below and your data will be saved. In case you ignore this situation, the consequences could me much serious, than you can imagine. Guarantees ---------------------------------------------- The hack and system encryption wasn't compromised by your competitors or any other 3rd party, this is just and only our initiative and only thing we interested is profit. Accurding the previous sentence We are very much value of our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests. All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We guarantee full support and help through the all decryption process. As the proof of our abilities and honesty, we can decrypt few small files for free, check the link provided and ask any questions. Data leakage ---------------------------------------------- We have copied some quantity of data from your servers. Check those proofs and estimate the seriousness of consequences which can occur in case you ignore us: http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/blog/c9daf42fcfa6aca8432ecb7ffeff7f5e4e75f4ddd75f428c629bf6aa6a108a08/ This link is private and only you can see it. Use tor browser to open link. Ignoring the interaction with us brings you the publishing your data in our public blog http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/ Contact ---------------------------------------------- 1) Download tor browser: https://www.torproject.org/download/ 2) Open it 3) Follow this link in tor browser: http://tsu2dpiiv4zjzfyq73eibemit2qyrimbbb6lhpm6n5ihgallom5lhdyd.onion/3eb91fac85bb0db5dde432443e998a3863f0f1c76e3449319178e6b78f5d3f44 * 6 simple steps do minimize harm from ransomware. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thousands of companies around the world are struggling on ransomware these days, and the most of companies are making the same mistakes again and again. Let’s figure out how to minimize harm and do not be a dumb and pathetic donkey which will make fun for journalists and so on.. 1. If you see small fella malicious .exe file never load it to virustotal.com or any other virus researching website. Otherwise the info about the hack is not a secret anymore. The fact that your company is under ransomware attack is already known by filthy predators data security agents who will post in their pity twitters the fresh known news “OMG ANOTHER RANSOMWARE NOW IT’S “Your company name LLC!!!!! We are all gonna die aaaaaa halp” 2. No any public announcements about the hack or data leakage. And do not applicate to law enforcement. If you commit this actions, more serious consequences can occur and you pay much more than a ransom amount. Law structures like GDPR in this case can oblige you to pay huge fine. 3. As soon as you see your network compromised, follow the link inside any note and follow instructions. 4. Calm your employees. Explain them that this is a drill. And you test your network security systems. 5. If you decide to hire the data recovery company, obligate them to do not inform anyone and any third party about details of the attack. We strongly do not recommend to cooperate with data recovery company, because they do absolutely nothing that you can do by yourself and take money for it. all communications with hackers could be conducted by your it department indipendently without any extra payments. 6. Do not try to decrypt your data via 3rd party software. Most of ransomware use strong encryption algorthm and you can harm your files by using 3rd party decryption software.

URLs

http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/blog/c9daf42fcfa6aca8432ecb7ffeff7f5e4e75f4ddd75f428c629bf6aa6a108a08/

http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/

http://tsu2dpiiv4zjzfyq73eibemit2qyrimbbb6lhpm6n5ihgallom5lhdyd.onion/3eb91fac85bb0db5dde432443e998a3863f0f1c76e3449319178e6b78f5d3f44

Signatures

Babuk Locker
RaaS first seen in 2021 initially called Vasa Locker.
ransomware babuk
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
ransomware

File Deletion
T1107

Inhibit System Recovery
T1490

Modifies extensions of user files 17 IoCs

Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.

ransomware

description	ioc	Process
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddDebug.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddDebug.crw.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideAdd.tiff.babyk	e_win.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectWrite.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectWrite.raw.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectWrite.raw.babyk	e_win.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReceiveWait.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReceiveWait.tif.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideAdd.tiff	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SetInstall.tiff.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitSelect.tiff	e_win.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromStart.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromStart.crw.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromStart.crw.babyk	e_win.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideAdd.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideAdd.tiff.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReceiveWait.tif.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SetInstall.tiff	e_win.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SetInstall.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SetInstall.tiff.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddDebug.crw.babyk	e_win.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitSelect.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitSelect.tiff.babyk	e_win.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitSelect.tiff.babyk	e_win.exe

Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs

Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

Query Registry

T1012

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

System Information Discovery

T1082

description	ioc	Process
File opened (read-only)	\??\U:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\F:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\H:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\K:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\X:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\N:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\Q:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\W:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\I:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\L:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\Z:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\B:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\M:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\T:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\Y:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\O:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\A:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\G:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\V:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\E:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\R:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\P:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\S:	e_win.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\J:	e_win.exe

Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.

System Information Discovery
T1082

Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.

ransomware

File Deletion

T1107

Inhibit System Recovery

T1490

pid	Process
1964	vssadmin.exe
696	vssadmin.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 1 IoCs

pid	Process
1096	e_win.exe

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs

description	pid	Process
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	1724	vssvc.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	1724	vssvc.exe
Token: SeAuditPrivilege	1724	vssvc.exe

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 14 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 1100	1096	e_win.exe	26
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 1100	1096	e_win.exe	26
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 1100	1096	e_win.exe	26
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 1100	1096	e_win.exe	26
PID 1100 wrote to memory of 1964	1100	cmd.exe	28
PID 1100 wrote to memory of 1964	1100	cmd.exe	28
PID 1100 wrote to memory of 1964	1100	cmd.exe	28
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 384	1096	e_win.exe	35
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 384	1096	e_win.exe	35
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 384	1096	e_win.exe	35
PID 1096 wrote to memory of 384	1096	e_win.exe	35
PID 384 wrote to memory of 696	384	cmd.exe	37
PID 384 wrote to memory of 696	384	cmd.exe	37
PID 384 wrote to memory of 696	384	cmd.exe	37

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\e_win.exe
"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\e_win.exe"
1⤵
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1096
- C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
  "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
  2⤵
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:1100
- - C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
    vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
    3⤵
    - Interacts with shadow copies
    PID:1964
- C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
  "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
  2⤵
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:384
- - C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
    vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
    3⤵
    - Interacts with shadow copies
    PID:696