babuk | 6103e26f6f9d5fd895d9c06e1f5e141ce74d8ebda999cda6a58a4393de5ed094

General

Target

plast.exe
Size

79KB
MD5

cafe07d8c34108007372bd8df42d9ef9
SHA1

f137ab4384d071ab51c746f9de976aeea81fb2e6
SHA256

6103e26f6f9d5fd895d9c06e1f5e141ce74d8ebda999cda6a58a4393de5ed094
SHA512

acf2184efdb981e164028c0caf7fe5173db9f17a035c9d4c0c1cd78dfb819312b34f653ef83c718aa2b73646824cbed2d29d2edc6b2f21c9329b890fecfea90f

Score

10^/10

babuk ransomware

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\MSOCache\How To Restore Your Files.txt

Ransom Note

############## [ babuk ransomware greetings you ] ############## Introduction ---------------------------------------------- Congratulations! If you see this note, your company've been randomly chosen for security audit and your company haven't passed it. Unfortunately your servers are encrypted, backups are encrtypted too or deleted. Our enctyption algorythms are strong and it's impossible to decrypt your stuff without our help. Only one method to restore all your network and systems is - to buy our universal decryption software. Follow simple steps that discribed down below and your data will be saved. In case you ignore this situation, the consequences could me much serious, than you can imagine. Guarantees ---------------------------------------------- The hack and system encryption wasn't compromised by your competitors or any other 3rd party, this is just and only our initiative and only thing we interested is profit. Accurding the previous sentence We are very much value of our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests. All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We guarantee full support and help through the all decryption process. As the proof of our abilities and honesty, we can decrypt few small files for free, check the link provided and ask any questions. Data leakage ---------------------------------------------- We have copied some quantity of data from your servers. Check those proofs and estimate the seriousness of consequences which can occur in case you ignore us: http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/blog/d5c28d496f8ae8618894df9b4e142cf3e21ac9fc204f5ebb9ce0392e7bd43d89/ This link is private and only you can see it. Use tor browser to open link. Ignoring the interaction with us brings you the publishing your data in our public blog http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/ Contact ---------------------------------------------- 1) Download tor browser: https://www.torproject.org/download/ 2) Open it 3) Follow this link in tor browser: http://xrf3jd6k3eqcuhpewtfm52bt7tptc2swiskphdoa4tu4d2jl44osorad.onion/aaa778e6648e85918b5eac8fd16d80521957ba67ba61673f526398d33b702228 * 6 simple steps do minimize harm from ransomware. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thousands of companies around the world are struggling on ransomware these days, and the most of companies are making the same mistakes again and again. Let’s figure out how to minimize harm and do not be a dumb and pathetic donkey which will make fun for journalists and so on.. 1. If you see small fella malicious .exe file never load it to virustotal.com or any other virus researching website. Otherwise the info about the hack is not a secret anymore. The fact that your company is under ransomware attack is already known by filthy predators data security agents who will post in their pity twitters the fresh known news “OMG ANOTHER RANSOMWARE NOW IT’S “Your company name LLC!!!!! We are all gonna die aaaaaa halp” 2. No any public announcements about the hack or data leakage. And do not applicate to law enforcement. If you commit this actions, more serious consequences can occur and you pay much more than a ransom amount. Law structures like GDPR in this case can oblige you to pay huge fine. 3. As soon as you see your network compromised, follow the link inside any note and follow instructions. 4. Calm your employees. Explain them that this is a drill. And you test your network security systems. 5. If you decide to hire the data recovery company, obligate them to do not inform anyone and any third party about details of the attack. We strongly do not recommend to cooperate with data recovery company, because they do absolutely nothing that you can do by yourself and take money for it. all communications with hackers could be conducted by your it department indipendently without any extra payments. 6. Do not try to decrypt your data via 3rd party software. Most of ransomware use strong encryption algorthm and you can harm your files by using 3rd party decryption software.

URLs

http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/blog/d5c28d496f8ae8618894df9b4e142cf3e21ac9fc204f5ebb9ce0392e7bd43d89/

http://wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd.onion/

http://xrf3jd6k3eqcuhpewtfm52bt7tptc2swiskphdoa4tu4d2jl44osorad.onion/aaa778e6648e85918b5eac8fd16d80521957ba67ba61673f526398d33b702228

Signatures

Babuk Locker
RaaS first seen in 2021 initially called Vasa Locker.
ransomware babuk
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
ransomware

File Deletion
T1107

Inhibit System Recovery
T1490

Modifies extensions of user files 19 IoCs

Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.

ransomware

Processes:

plast.exe

description	ioc	Process
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RevokeSave.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RevokeSave.raw.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UseNew.tiff	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UseNew.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UseNew.tiff.babyk	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveSave.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveSave.tiff.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SendJoin.tiff.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveSave.tiff	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitTest.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitTest.tif.babyk	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GetWrite.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GetWrite.png.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExitTest.tif.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SendJoin.tiff	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RevokeSave.raw.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UseNew.tiff.babyk	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteDeny.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteDeny.tif.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GetWrite.png.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveSave.tiff.babyk	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SearchSet.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SearchSet.raw.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SearchSet.raw.babyk	plast.exe
File renamed	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SendJoin.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SendJoin.tiff.babyk	plast.exe
File opened for modification	C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteDeny.tif.babyk	plast.exe

Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs

Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

Query Registry

T1012

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

System Information Discovery

T1082

Processes:

plast.exe

description	ioc	Process
File opened (read-only)	\??\O:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\G:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\H:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\Z:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\X:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\V:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\R:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\T:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\B:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\N:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\F:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\J:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\K:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\L:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\Q:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\Y:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\P:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\A:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\S:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\W:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\I:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\M:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\E:	plast.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\U:	plast.exe

Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.

System Information Discovery
T1082

Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.

ransomware

File Deletion

T1107

Inhibit System Recovery

T1490

Processes:

vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe

pid	Process
1248	vssadmin.exe
1536	vssadmin.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 1 IoCs

Processes:

plast.exe

pid	Process
1948	plast.exe

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs

Processes:

vssvc.exe

description	pid	Process
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	1800	vssvc.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	1800	vssvc.exe
Token: SeAuditPrivilege	1800	vssvc.exe

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 14 IoCs

Processes:

plast.execmd.execmd.exe

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 1316	1948	plast.exe	26
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 1316	1948	plast.exe	26
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 1316	1948	plast.exe	26
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 1316	1948	plast.exe	26
PID 1316 wrote to memory of 1248	1316	cmd.exe	28
PID 1316 wrote to memory of 1248	1316	cmd.exe	28
PID 1316 wrote to memory of 1248	1316	cmd.exe	28
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 336	1948	plast.exe	35
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 336	1948	plast.exe	35
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 336	1948	plast.exe	35
PID 1948 wrote to memory of 336	1948	plast.exe	35
PID 336 wrote to memory of 1536	336	cmd.exe	37
PID 336 wrote to memory of 1536	336	cmd.exe	37
PID 336 wrote to memory of 1536	336	cmd.exe	37

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\plast.exe
"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\plast.exe"
1⤵
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1948
- C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
  "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
  2⤵
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:1316
- - C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
    vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
    3⤵
    - Interacts with shadow copies
    PID:1248
- C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
  "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
  2⤵
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:336
- - C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
    vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
    3⤵
    - Interacts with shadow copies
    PID:1536

C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1800

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6

Initial Access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion

File Deletion

2

T1107

Credential Access

Discovery

Peripheral Device Discovery

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

2

T1082

Lateral Movement

Collection

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Inhibit System Recovery

2

T1490

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Downloads

memory/336-62-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp

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memory/1248-61-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp

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memory/1316-60-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp

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memory/1536-63-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp

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memory/1948-59-0x0000000076691000-0x0000000076693000-memory.dmp

Filesize
8KB

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Analysis

Sharing

General

Malware Config

Extracted

Signatures

Processes

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6

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