Analysis
- max time kernel
163s - max time network
169s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20220812-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
13/10/2022, 18:27
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul4.exe
Resource
win7-20220901-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul4.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target 64ME_bul4.exe
- Size 666KB
- Sample221013-w32e5aggb3
- SHA256 9555810647200a6eda75dfe1527c1d8720e929b19a6086e536fb4fce4d9db485
- MD5 3adfa0251f25bf5766d96ae7e080c9bc
- SHA1 346882da16b892462929e08e084e7fccf89c2afb
- SHA512 9c7e05c42bab4455556c7dec89ef8df274010a3cefcf59641a0f23b984826c373df364c5b59188e932136be87ec9b30dba11bf2b6bd9ad9ba4880679fa052622
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulALC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5om+C9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
-
C:\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
- <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> <meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'> <title></title> <style> html, body { background-color: #1a1a1a; } body { padding-top: 1rem !important; font-size: 1.3rem; color: white; } #text h2 { font-size: 2rem; font-weight: 600; line-height: 1.125; } .container { max-width: 1152px; flex-grow: 1; margin: 0 auto; position: relative; width: auto; } .box { background-color: #242424; display: block; padding: 1.25rem; border: 1px solid #303030; } a { color: #00b4d8; text-decoration: none; } a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } li { margin-bottom: 10px; } </style> </head> <body> <div class='container'> <div class='box'> <div id='text'> <h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2> <p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p> <p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p> <p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p> <p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p> <p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p> <p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p> <p> Contact us by email:<p> <h2>[email protected]</h2> </p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p> <h2>[email protected]</h2> </p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p> </p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p> <h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2> <ul> <li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li> <li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li> <li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li> <li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li> </ul> <h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2> <ul> <li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches. Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li> <li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage. You will violate laws about private data protection.</li> <li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li> <li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li> <li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li> </ul> <h2>Why pay us?</h2> <p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p> <p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and avoid this kind of situations in future.</p> <h2>Your personal ID</p> E4C19F951B959CB218B22DB261560331D7BBFD72C743D2F6681820BA26F8C85C725DAA360DC83C2984172B4859A8B86069A290F6EDF1C8F771A3C20B978592A5<br>C18F8278F52E76362753A65F9720FD2442F5615FE00DDB4D045512D04F78744A3D55334D8FDF968336A11C4FFE409CD6DDE60546732898B0D9B48D0275DC<br>9A0C4CD141D5AE9F0DB93ACB9DF700147E61201611CB8FCCA19B2F5534A2041EDBAD6E59737E90DA98A03EA544F2E0837B3FACCF4D86F5A4844ECDAF768A<br>F775F36D2394797EF150788DD2B6FEC1132C0ADCF625A8F32A2B1B0FFE20158B0C1910358DB24620C543C06FEE8D572D52C4652D6B1B0311C6E7F3A691A5<br>DAA1529B4B3F276111193AFE19E9A76B47C2EFE430749E69656E54435E65D89DA9C687F6CCD71240015206BA28A228D55FD0AD09ECA5AEB688C3F8F67807<br>57CCA78328CA8E5779E5F757511139F16012723AB1716FFB773F37B90E9A7E031AD386200EDDF27CF110814CF08B1065BC4657A2E498BD881A663270CB0B<br>C78088BB76F00E1B0DC7B136C80202A159A1253D3D06D5BA15C31CEB466096D9F333257D2F4651A6A6E5D8F040114D0DC02F68747264B6871A3B9B35967E<br>EB90BA7F3A191EFEE1D27611EFC50370730F0EEE0F18BFA90F2D560D61E6980E3FAE18ADFD9B85200BC0A95C87E3B9DCF495C08DBE0C271D0AD46DDA07B9<br>89BDAAE7D7EFB42ED3700F799346
Emails
-
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
-
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
Signatures
- MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
- MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000d000000022f4e-135.dat family_medusalocker behavioral2/files/0x000d000000022f4e-136.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul4.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul4.exe - Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000d000000022f4e-135.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral2/files/0x000d000000022f4e-136.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker - Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 2580 svhost.exe - Modifies extensions of user files 3 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\DisablePush.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\DisablePush.crw.bulwark4 64ME_bul4.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OptimizeGet.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OptimizeGet.png.bulwark4 64ME_bul4.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReadInitialize.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReadInitialize.raw.bulwark4 64ME_bul4.exe - Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
-
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul4.exe - Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2891029575-1462575-1165213807-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul4.exe - Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul4.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul4.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 1448 64ME_bul4.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1436 wmic.exe Token: 33 1436 wmic.exe Token: 34 1436 wmic.exe Token: 35 1436 wmic.exe Token: 36 1436 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3128 wmic.exe Token: 33 3128 wmic.exe Token: 34 3128 wmic.exe Token: 35 3128 wmic.exe Token: 36 3128 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1400 wmic.exe Token: 33 1400 wmic.exe Token: 34 1400 wmic.exe Token: 35 1400 wmic.exe Token: 36 1400 wmic.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1448 wrote to memory of 1436 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 82 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 1436 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 82 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 1436 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 82 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 3128 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 84 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 3128 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 84 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 3128 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 84 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 1400 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 86 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 1400 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 86 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 1400 1448 64ME_bul4.exe 86 - System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul4.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul4.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul4.exe
Processes
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul4.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul4.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:1448 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1436
-
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3128
-
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1400
-
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2580
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe
- Size 666KB
- SHA256 9555810647200a6eda75dfe1527c1d8720e929b19a6086e536fb4fce4d9db485
- MD5 3adfa0251f25bf5766d96ae7e080c9bc
- SHA1 346882da16b892462929e08e084e7fccf89c2afb
- SHA512 9c7e05c42bab4455556c7dec89ef8df274010a3cefcf59641a0f23b984826c373df364c5b59188e932136be87ec9b30dba11bf2b6bd9ad9ba4880679fa052622
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulALC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5om+C9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe
- Size 666KB
- SHA256 9555810647200a6eda75dfe1527c1d8720e929b19a6086e536fb4fce4d9db485
- MD5 3adfa0251f25bf5766d96ae7e080c9bc
- SHA1 346882da16b892462929e08e084e7fccf89c2afb
- SHA512 9c7e05c42bab4455556c7dec89ef8df274010a3cefcf59641a0f23b984826c373df364c5b59188e932136be87ec9b30dba11bf2b6bd9ad9ba4880679fa052622
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulALC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5om+C9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP