Analysis
- max time kernel
153s - max time network
157s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20220812-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
13/10/2022, 18:27
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul6.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul6.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target 64ME_bul6.exe
- Size 666KB
- Sample221013-w39rhaghcr
- SHA256 abbaff145b18d26db84d52669d1279e928d51f1f571f686cb100d7893cb69295
- MD5 c4154e2c1eb85e12e4c3795dcd3cb63f
- SHA1 ae90c9193f6059f87a8cba89675922789797aa46
- SHA512 8bf3892ff9d5adfd43a52b9d4a0999cf74c07e6e5d0f1457120eb009e47f198d3a271540f045c818751e27aa63998824bc1245a40f6f585059dc2b50254d17d3
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAZC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omkC9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
-
C:\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
- <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> <meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'> <title></title> <style> html, body { background-color: #1a1a1a; } body { padding-top: 1rem !important; font-size: 1.3rem; color: white; } #text h2 { font-size: 2rem; font-weight: 600; line-height: 1.125; } .container { max-width: 1152px; flex-grow: 1; margin: 0 auto; position: relative; width: auto; } .box { background-color: #242424; display: block; padding: 1.25rem; border: 1px solid #303030; } a { color: #00b4d8; text-decoration: none; } a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } li { margin-bottom: 10px; } </style> </head> <body> <div class='container'> <div class='box'> <div id='text'> <h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2> <p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p> <p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p> <p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p> <p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p> <p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p> <p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p> <p> Contact us by email:<p> <h2>[email protected]</h2> </p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p> <h2>[email protected]</h2> </p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p> </p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p> <h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2> <ul> <li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li> <li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li> <li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li> <li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li> </ul> <h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2> <ul> <li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches. Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li> <li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage. You will violate laws about private data protection.</li> <li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li> <li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li> <li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li> </ul> <h2>Why pay us?</h2> <p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p> <p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and avoid this kind of situations in future.</p> <h2>Your personal ID</p> 70A33D68826A88CC605FD7084A567D7279E4A8993DD6EB9F9FA02A277FB897B54B60C04931A40C5E3CAF0BC99A8321DF24ACBD37ADCC99002796A77A3612B844<br>30F0CDC54F49B37875B2DE9D026B0EB5CBAF36C6436D0DAEE42C9B671B92C63107B643B7ADA864E2B7C7E4B63391428529EA2553378B143A4CEBD42BFED9<br>539DD73E324FCD0836B7151731ED2A0D0ED89EA4738C43D8CE8385B3A73071274C72DD5A05A1B420F222447B00AAFB53869286819FD0F1FEEAD9109E1960<br>FDE5198508AC6F3C12E77B14A5C7C114DFA45307EC24F7C058A1CFDF43CE164708A83FE03497A38CBD75B0800062B037EF3C81C8C5F7B97C8C64435F0E3B<br>5C5790E17B6D53C21FC11D5CF3804593FB87F1573855FC25CBAB7C182DC2F36CE46BCD5244CD96D832388A2A272A64DC6C9D6162112D4C7624486AEAFD04<br>501CA3BFB5647C3FDB868DBB26AD8EF3FDCBF0EEBBA126EC8C6BF6301E9F6EE246FCC2D66088B3524F1C3E2C53456DAD0B6A64BBF69E5449C2C9FCAD9A46<br>EE44FE502FE3B8590EE76670A021FE86380F02FBEA7D23A512410A23F8A3B55F7A3CC346018FF8E3D99719233854590A5B7C80AE5A4A312FFF0C88C975B6<br>A30D8069AC33C39D0D7FF2FDF9D1EC41CC6834E25B6D34DF5A32DB0E004B9DD80A00D3A36EAD2FA2222C32894FE009819BC7038F3F2FB24278E6FF50A6C4<br>BD556582A7F4276AE79A001DA51B
Emails
-
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
-
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
Signatures
- MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
- MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000b000000022e30-135.dat family_medusalocker behavioral2/files/0x000b000000022e30-136.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul6.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul6.exe - Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000b000000022e30-135.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral2/files/0x000b000000022e30-136.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker - Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1568 svhost.exe - Modifies extensions of user files 5 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompareEnable.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompareEnable.png.bulwark6 64ME_bul6.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LockResize.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LockResize.raw.bulwark6 64ME_bul6.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectRedo.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectRedo.png.bulwark6 64ME_bul6.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockSet.tiff 64ME_bul6.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockSet.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockSet.tiff.bulwark6 64ME_bul6.exe - Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
-
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul6.exe - Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2295526160-1155304984-640977766-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul6.exe - Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul6.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul6.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 5044 64ME_bul6.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2068 wmic.exe Token: 33 2068 wmic.exe Token: 34 2068 wmic.exe Token: 35 2068 wmic.exe Token: 36 2068 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 520 wmic.exe Token: 33 520 wmic.exe Token: 34 520 wmic.exe Token: 35 520 wmic.exe Token: 36 520 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1240 wmic.exe Token: 33 1240 wmic.exe Token: 34 1240 wmic.exe Token: 35 1240 wmic.exe Token: 36 1240 wmic.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5044 wrote to memory of 2068 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 84 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 2068 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 84 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 2068 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 84 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 520 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 87 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 520 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 87 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 520 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 87 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 1240 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 89 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 1240 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 89 PID 5044 wrote to memory of 1240 5044 64ME_bul6.exe 89 - System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul6.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul6.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul6.exe
Processes
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul6.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul6.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:5044 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2068
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:520
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1240
-
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1568
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe
- Size 666KB
- SHA256 abbaff145b18d26db84d52669d1279e928d51f1f571f686cb100d7893cb69295
- MD5 c4154e2c1eb85e12e4c3795dcd3cb63f
- SHA1 ae90c9193f6059f87a8cba89675922789797aa46
- SHA512 8bf3892ff9d5adfd43a52b9d4a0999cf74c07e6e5d0f1457120eb009e47f198d3a271540f045c818751e27aa63998824bc1245a40f6f585059dc2b50254d17d3
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAZC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omkC9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe
- Size 666KB
- SHA256 abbaff145b18d26db84d52669d1279e928d51f1f571f686cb100d7893cb69295
- MD5 c4154e2c1eb85e12e4c3795dcd3cb63f
- SHA1 ae90c9193f6059f87a8cba89675922789797aa46
- SHA512 8bf3892ff9d5adfd43a52b9d4a0999cf74c07e6e5d0f1457120eb009e47f198d3a271540f045c818751e27aa63998824bc1245a40f6f585059dc2b50254d17d3
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAZC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omkC9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP