Analysis
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max time kernel
151s -
max time network
45s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20220812-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
13/10/2022, 18:26
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul1.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul1.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul1.exe
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Size
666KB
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MD5
9691c8164fa6fbfbbf44d92dcfc2a023
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SHA1
d36db5874f39688324518088059273a4f2e9d33f
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SHA256
2e9fceb91d4378a4e67250f0cb633a020be6eb1c57237272a50cb4db36997db7
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SHA512
bae06060177b983be888d7882849acdd31659162a1631ca88bdf10398fbdf19f54637ffe117b3a6f3583d06c365e31c7e92c276627cc49617c3bbd76f83769ea
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAuC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5ombC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\MSOCache\All Users\{90140000-0011-0000-0000-0000000FF1CE}-C\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
A4CBAF7913DCC09BA5471617E41A2C0253CCBF3EE8463D3A2464B21EBD1020D56DB4A6F124B57D72E9E3029CD8E65E2DCB385D1E7B8E230FAB6A15F0FA157C0F<br>AF14CDDBF7C9C426575DE4B02C742518BD1A5C6875E66D0978FD64684001FB5E9D0D309235F85781560CC1A9BB72A0637F915A36B823E6BC1C36397E8F82<br>4E7CA6D1C2CC46941303CE8DDDE8D20EADBFF3A842706BD54F67C24371FE5311A296359056B9DFB93627C8C789426B1FADA864EA86F1858366728A1B0B6C<br>C6E4F825056CD98989E1551B47B7DB885E9E74CA65CFEF536DB55F871968C2C8DACAE57B3958B65130E37C3EA06D9644BC8DD0E4F45394D87F1A541B5DA2<br>F04E9AC0905E8B017129940084301C568043EF687D4A188A55B62C12E65F96DB804DC66EA4709C952A7F84935B37BE9CC2AEE1E04D33AA63DDB45EA5FB37<br>04C98D9F1FC8DED04ABC3220F1D9EDF4B69B1F493DB065E55AEBEEEEECC724972F058973E2BDBC1391BC9E49069A998624B3B1B1415D7AA2794946908A2D<br>B046A369B6F07ED1599FBE0CB94FA1D7D4686B87FE160BB83DB9AE55D0CF39CBD032AE4BE38155608167138058D220936BD673666732DC450311983B4749<br>01789F00AB01C53FF1C616FCA068FF4C53A2F0BF5382B1D744495A2B17B031C74A4A9366AC3BBBAE5E7F0F7065BB5FE5E0947B08EA1202B945FFCFEF1E76<br>7C36B38F34713D4BD4C2920A4800
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x000c0000000054a8-61.dat family_medusalocker behavioral1/files/0x000c0000000054a8-63.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe -
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x000c0000000054a8-61.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral1/files/0x000c0000000054a8-63.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1052 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 13 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ShowGrant.tiff 64ME_bul1.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WatchStart.tiff 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ApproveHide.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ApproveHide.tif.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteBlock.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteBlock.tiff.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromStop.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromStop.raw.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\FindDismount.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\FindDismount.crw.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideStart.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideStart.crw.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RedoProtect.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RedoProtect.tif.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ShowGrant.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ShowGrant.tiff.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\StartResolve.tiff 64ME_bul1.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteBlock.tiff 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WatchStart.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WatchStart.tiff.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\StartResolve.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\StartResolve.tiff.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-3845472200-3839195424-595303356-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul1.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul1.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
pid Process 1108 vssadmin.exe 472 vssadmin.exe 1312 vssadmin.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 1784 64ME_bul1.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1976 vssvc.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1976 vssvc.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 1976 vssvc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1344 wmic.exe Token: 33 1344 wmic.exe Token: 34 1344 wmic.exe Token: 35 1344 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1152 wmic.exe Token: 33 1152 wmic.exe Token: 34 1152 wmic.exe Token: 35 1152 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 560 wmic.exe Token: 33 560 wmic.exe Token: 34 560 wmic.exe Token: 35 560 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1108 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 28 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1108 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 28 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1108 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 28 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1108 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 28 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1344 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 31 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1344 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 31 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1344 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 31 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1344 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 31 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 472 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 33 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 472 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 33 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 472 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 33 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 472 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 33 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1152 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 35 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1152 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 35 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1152 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 35 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1152 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 35 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1312 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 37 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1312 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 37 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1312 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 37 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 1312 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 37 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 560 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 39 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 560 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 39 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 560 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 39 PID 1784 wrote to memory of 560 1784 64ME_bul1.exe 39 PID 1888 wrote to memory of 1052 1888 taskeng.exe 43 PID 1888 wrote to memory of 1052 1888 taskeng.exe 43 PID 1888 wrote to memory of 1052 1888 taskeng.exe 43 PID 1888 wrote to memory of 1052 1888 taskeng.exe 43 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul1.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul1.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul1.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:1784 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1108
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1344
-
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:472
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1152
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1312
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:560
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C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1976
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C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {0248959C-AA5E-4247-AB03-E5A91A78D77D} S-1-5-21-3845472200-3839195424-595303356-1000:ZERMMMDR\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1888 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1052
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD59691c8164fa6fbfbbf44d92dcfc2a023
SHA1d36db5874f39688324518088059273a4f2e9d33f
SHA2562e9fceb91d4378a4e67250f0cb633a020be6eb1c57237272a50cb4db36997db7
SHA512bae06060177b983be888d7882849acdd31659162a1631ca88bdf10398fbdf19f54637ffe117b3a6f3583d06c365e31c7e92c276627cc49617c3bbd76f83769ea
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Filesize
666KB
MD59691c8164fa6fbfbbf44d92dcfc2a023
SHA1d36db5874f39688324518088059273a4f2e9d33f
SHA2562e9fceb91d4378a4e67250f0cb633a020be6eb1c57237272a50cb4db36997db7
SHA512bae06060177b983be888d7882849acdd31659162a1631ca88bdf10398fbdf19f54637ffe117b3a6f3583d06c365e31c7e92c276627cc49617c3bbd76f83769ea