Analysis
-
max time kernel
152s -
max time network
47s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20220812-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
13-10-2022 18:27
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul2.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul2.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul2.exe
-
Size
666KB
-
MD5
b64ced51ca13ef75fa0347d3a638555a
-
SHA1
6a1a46a0de15e81a8157bf3d3e9e1cb498791e3f
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SHA256
a533f9ae8f269f97eeb35ddac6d1d955924f6eea1794b8a227457e95cf524d44
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SHA512
a12b84663ecdc89b30abe94ba49de3b3277e0bd9a8194787eb066abb6f2bc6328abdeb63341c71e5c8a6fe4459c5387b0480c93e0e3e786f3984f81fe890a4f7
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAVC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omYC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\MSOCache\All Users\{90140000-0011-0000-0000-0000000FF1CE}-C\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
DEC4D7EEBF7BCD775B3F3511842EDE9C9740D3F48C726117423D30133F94A7F61C5F7F3904C9DC2094523B8B6FEFEC78EA5F6D6FE462F3DB5328F796022D2171<br>91BF09B9258F0AE26CAF67C55A532B6F07CA5E9F3C2B32494E6E7EAD097A6A7F2401EB4B00AD955271156713F67FE92C927189597EF1F82ABE5A71E67B8D<br>D6467B3F36D05F947908FC7A8ECF3386DCA34F2EC44CAB5FE995C4351C659F6BEF3140B5B4EFA7231F807EF35935AD166438E4597E469F21C27DF887669A<br>2FDA3DDA7C4104C6209EDB431173576FBD66DF36C868751D504FBB3EC3D3DAC2D3E10F0C642C47DC4C75879E6289E4C5CA18A062337C4219014952673D92<br>318EF9314D8C2E7653FF5329695B684B6C5BF8442F4573DA14BEEBDB4CB637C52D8D4CDE96851327C0A6F8094E2F8EDDF1E559500C110208290ED5FBC10E<br>D2EDBEF47CD5C09CAE6D8B3928589AD74F7C0B25DCB65D35B292DD71DE63C3D18F177665D53F4134239A9E7C2D0FDCCD2928DB8E2CC9470430C474FFA526<br>C02EE335327A49AD14C76642A20571605D88A5F586BE1D892C0089A86A504886AB14B902D2412230EA4B7095FD8F71AFFC93E888CB8F11A9E1A244BC0300<br>00CDCD57FDA0B33F503074B20F8E45E2EDFA9B919FE472F8F4A3FBCE2A300C856012AC8F0D3045F22AA57BF0F4652EE32B094B99F474120CA74E23FF64EB<br>382438B92E1329E4993B543CAB47
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x00140000000054ab-61.dat family_medusalocker behavioral1/files/0x00140000000054ab-63.dat family_medusalocker -
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exedescription ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul2.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul2.exe -
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
-
Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x00140000000054ab-61.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral1/files/0x00140000000054ab-63.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
Processes:
svhost.exepid Process 1492 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 14 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exedescription ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExportUnblock.tiff 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RedoClose.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RedoClose.raw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CheckpointRemove.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CheckpointRemove.crw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompareSuspend.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompareSuspend.png.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExportUnblock.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ExportUnblock.tiff.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MeasurePop.tiff 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MeasurePop.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MeasurePop.tiff.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveGet.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveGet.tif.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\JoinDismount.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\JoinDismount.raw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConfirmShow.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConfirmShow.crw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MountRegister.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MountRegister.raw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RestartSkip.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RestartSkip.tif.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UpdateUndo.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UpdateUndo.crw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UseReset.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UseReset.crw.bulwark2 64ME_bul2.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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Processes:
64ME_bul2.exedescription ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul2.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exedescription ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2292972927-2705560509-2768824231-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul2.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exedescription ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul2.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul2.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
Processes:
vssadmin.exevssadmin.exevssadmin.exepid Process 1748 vssadmin.exe 2020 vssadmin.exe 1156 vssadmin.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exepid Process 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 1896 64ME_bul2.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
Processes:
vssvc.exewmic.exewmic.exewmic.exedescription pid Process Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1872 vssvc.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1872 vssvc.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 1872 vssvc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 776 wmic.exe Token: 33 776 wmic.exe Token: 34 776 wmic.exe Token: 35 776 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1828 wmic.exe Token: 33 1828 wmic.exe Token: 34 1828 wmic.exe Token: 35 1828 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1500 wmic.exe Token: 33 1500 wmic.exe Token: 34 1500 wmic.exe Token: 35 1500 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exetaskeng.exedescription pid Process procid_target PID 1896 wrote to memory of 2020 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 28 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 2020 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 28 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 2020 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 28 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 2020 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 28 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 776 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 31 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 776 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 31 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 776 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 31 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 776 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 31 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1156 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 33 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1156 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 33 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1156 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 33 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1156 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 33 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1828 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 35 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1828 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 35 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1828 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 35 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1828 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 35 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1748 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 37 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1748 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 37 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1748 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 37 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1748 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 37 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1500 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 39 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1500 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 39 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1500 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 39 PID 1896 wrote to memory of 1500 1896 64ME_bul2.exe 39 PID 1628 wrote to memory of 1492 1628 taskeng.exe 42 PID 1628 wrote to memory of 1492 1628 taskeng.exe 42 PID 1628 wrote to memory of 1492 1628 taskeng.exe 42 PID 1628 wrote to memory of 1492 1628 taskeng.exe 42 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul2.exedescription ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul2.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul2.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul2.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul2.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul2.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:1896 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:2020
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:776
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1156
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1828
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1748
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1500
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1872
-
C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {6A304AC1-8AF5-4FB0-B410-3B07D981F9F4} S-1-5-21-2292972927-2705560509-2768824231-1000:GRXNNIIE\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1628 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1492
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD5b64ced51ca13ef75fa0347d3a638555a
SHA16a1a46a0de15e81a8157bf3d3e9e1cb498791e3f
SHA256a533f9ae8f269f97eeb35ddac6d1d955924f6eea1794b8a227457e95cf524d44
SHA512a12b84663ecdc89b30abe94ba49de3b3277e0bd9a8194787eb066abb6f2bc6328abdeb63341c71e5c8a6fe4459c5387b0480c93e0e3e786f3984f81fe890a4f7
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Filesize
666KB
MD5b64ced51ca13ef75fa0347d3a638555a
SHA16a1a46a0de15e81a8157bf3d3e9e1cb498791e3f
SHA256a533f9ae8f269f97eeb35ddac6d1d955924f6eea1794b8a227457e95cf524d44
SHA512a12b84663ecdc89b30abe94ba49de3b3277e0bd9a8194787eb066abb6f2bc6328abdeb63341c71e5c8a6fe4459c5387b0480c93e0e3e786f3984f81fe890a4f7