Analysis
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max time kernel
153s -
max time network
43s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20220812-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
13-10-2022 18:27
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul3.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul3.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul3.exe
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Size
666KB
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MD5
d2b5f4ae78bc0538a03537a20203b354
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SHA1
48318e668b4f9f65ca0597cb3a82e8f8d7b88340
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SHA256
bdadf73a531421f832714078c438267a76fd5085596c86f2fa4b7341cb336da1
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SHA512
7a36f0fe8fed7aea940e0ee87405f94cbbc5cd1e1f99ae25f313b299fc7d2a0f8806916a3842bd821077ecb524df0e881be71f5744af0dcd0343a1773865c3b0
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAUC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5ompC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\MSOCache\All Users\{90140000-0011-0000-0000-0000000FF1CE}-C\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
8129E3F02EB9F6BBFB6A6E4D4F81387AC678B1488B101D0EF3EDD85E0047E1B1A81B11CE429BC2962D2799B70722B0B1128833DDF4048EEA8333495CEBB194B8<br>0E3C23F43768F17CDBB5D0BC393343894AF9448685C3F34685788C37DB3641FACAA968EAABB53954B34FC9771807A7EA7163266DEDF8379A0BDA9347B2DA<br>1C16F86A4BF44D0BD33694CA5CE549E5752B4C822579A6DDBAAE51F92EF7D5048DFF44CEFE8A20FD92F98E9767CF1EFD4A9665B4D96FF62C022B363AF5D0<br>630285F853C2EC8D91C00D0861A82C62074BC42D36D06F45D501A9F442EE4DFCEF379105F78A0020D7AD1E81334E4C50FAF55F0261AFC73C6D5E51888097<br>893BC8F543580FF8C272D05165003A8191D8CF331420F172912A6594D86BF67D0307046A894B1CCD8DF6FF9BB1F254C65BDF6F18A5A665CA1C52BCDB4D68<br>04E94CB3CFBE38CF4A3E0A9EC28EA145DF2B26E9B9D15C9A1C3C01EEFE32100FC7D79D34EFB45179B34CD9AD4A411AA2BDCCEC57B333A60C5BB3DACA499D<br>CBB4A3E3889A81C160770CFF9D2C152FF66C2D6827ABF8D9407A02F77BD386B60F26C44A7F1D22AC574195F1CD9828F8765B9EBD86F10C832C2319C5EB5B<br>D5DC791017599118B5BDC9ACDD374AF5D562B72A7CBA94C1C04781845AC0E119B83B4930F401232ABEDAAAFACCF7BBD7982E062F091AC0B7AB8631BBC4B6<br>D905A4443DDC989DE00BF0CBAA45
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-61.dat family_medusalocker behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-63.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul3.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul3.exe -
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-61.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-63.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1768 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 7 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideReceive.tiff 64ME_bul3.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideReceive.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\HideReceive.tiff.bulwark3 64ME_bul3.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectWatch.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ProtectWatch.crw.bulwark3 64ME_bul3.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WaitSelect.tiff 64ME_bul3.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WaitSelect.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WaitSelect.tiff.bulwark3 64ME_bul3.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompareJoin.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompareJoin.raw.bulwark3 64ME_bul3.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EnterRevoke.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EnterRevoke.raw.bulwark3 64ME_bul3.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul3.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-999675638-2867687379-27515722-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul3.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul3.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul3.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
pid Process 1956 vssadmin.exe 1772 vssadmin.exe 568 vssadmin.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 1644 64ME_bul3.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeBackupPrivilege 900 vssvc.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 900 vssvc.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 900 vssvc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 888 wmic.exe Token: 33 888 wmic.exe Token: 34 888 wmic.exe Token: 35 888 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1048 wmic.exe Token: 33 1048 wmic.exe Token: 34 1048 wmic.exe Token: 35 1048 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2012 wmic.exe Token: 33 2012 wmic.exe Token: 34 2012 wmic.exe Token: 35 2012 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1956 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 27 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1956 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 27 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1956 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 27 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1956 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 27 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 888 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 30 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 888 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 30 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 888 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 30 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 888 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 30 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1772 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 32 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1772 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 32 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1772 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 32 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1772 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 32 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1048 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 34 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1048 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 34 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1048 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 34 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 1048 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 34 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 568 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 36 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 568 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 36 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 568 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 36 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 568 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 36 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 2012 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 38 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 2012 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 38 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 2012 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 38 PID 1644 wrote to memory of 2012 1644 64ME_bul3.exe 38 PID 1724 wrote to memory of 1768 1724 taskeng.exe 41 PID 1724 wrote to memory of 1768 1724 taskeng.exe 41 PID 1724 wrote to memory of 1768 1724 taskeng.exe 41 PID 1724 wrote to memory of 1768 1724 taskeng.exe 41 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul3.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul3.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul3.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul3.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul3.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:1644 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1956
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:888
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1772
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1048
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:568
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2012
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C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:900
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C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {778F725B-6974-4595-862E-3A025CA8F832} S-1-5-21-999675638-2867687379-27515722-1000:ORXGKKZC\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1724 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1768
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD5d2b5f4ae78bc0538a03537a20203b354
SHA148318e668b4f9f65ca0597cb3a82e8f8d7b88340
SHA256bdadf73a531421f832714078c438267a76fd5085596c86f2fa4b7341cb336da1
SHA5127a36f0fe8fed7aea940e0ee87405f94cbbc5cd1e1f99ae25f313b299fc7d2a0f8806916a3842bd821077ecb524df0e881be71f5744af0dcd0343a1773865c3b0
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Filesize
666KB
MD5d2b5f4ae78bc0538a03537a20203b354
SHA148318e668b4f9f65ca0597cb3a82e8f8d7b88340
SHA256bdadf73a531421f832714078c438267a76fd5085596c86f2fa4b7341cb336da1
SHA5127a36f0fe8fed7aea940e0ee87405f94cbbc5cd1e1f99ae25f313b299fc7d2a0f8806916a3842bd821077ecb524df0e881be71f5744af0dcd0343a1773865c3b0