Analysis
-
max time kernel
154s -
max time network
45s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20220812-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
13-10-2022 18:28
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul7.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul7.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220901-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul7.exe
-
Size
666KB
-
MD5
c89dd8098bb565ffbca2b015fa3a862e
-
SHA1
c7163968518d5a7d86c5fce07d05141c646ef6f6
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SHA256
6a973119a7c1cb0151cd94b34d24e963260a000da3e3a8df4b96e2430ffa409e
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SHA512
02338017b14bc34eb9caf0486ffc4b2f1917e6e071571eb995171b410f13415b7af0789d6992759906a4f623f150d64c091b88e1012604d55680972a27a612f4
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAIC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omlC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
\??\Z:\Boot\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
8301B0C49D1B4681172ED0B3E6461AAB373F9D13DE37338A9DA0B615246FA0893152F039D3CBD63A812656CA5F45C30D3DA903B1287E962D29DB558DE9DF7FA6<br>8D2CE711E891A8140EBB9E1E397250F27FBA870C7A05F0D4A0614EB3936FF59048E69A9C4D3D391E714002CCC506CB7A8EACB17C1F2FE02808D83D89FA16<br>91F1AF387017C7738B5919C8D13B43DDD154AE6FB1B727A655C4AB71C7B18680103A1D33A43E6486B2A7F2EED7F99A1FD7DFDEE8CF739400B2F90E59D906<br>B903C032E2DB3D93A910FCC19AA86D4D0A6F4C621BB857A3E5846E26C609EA81503558334DE09385108DC6D8985D6B991B00CAB9A540B8623EEA116F8E6C<br>0A89522AB60FED0A81755089A553032A2716E4E38152BCBD3F8B2D9BB10C89187E05B9C0D1A602C50984C7EBEBE1F0C6CD47F57084A9592327AEA77F82D1<br>4AD51BBABB7C1B2C224C0B419329E72420C99AB0CC422E2CB7C9277422CB3A694FEAA6125F6E39C46C2B048F35634ED0285524CDCD6DD4CF4D664BB72669<br>6F7BFAC42BAD9BE277C8904E687A64EE3F9123A249B99F9D4BB68C6A799D1AEF5EA23FC3A6CF9E86EB8FD2D322DD3F3BE89493F332BC91B2A248D4D4368F<br>105819C7DBE7176514EC8C27B63286023C1019D3A02BB5D938E3B1EA56CB9B271A9941269FC0C638F64674B9933FB322EEAFD06BF2896B1502A3EE4CAFDC<br>324AF04329A560B6AEB435C6EA71
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
-
MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-61.dat family_medusalocker behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-63.dat family_medusalocker -
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exedescription ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul7.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul7.exe -
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-61.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral1/files/0x0007000000005c50-63.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
Processes:
svhost.exepid Process 1884 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 9 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exedescription ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddPush.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddPush.tif.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertToRequest.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertToRequest.tiff.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReceiveInvoke.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReceiveInvoke.raw.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockUninstall.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockUninstall.png.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnlockLock.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnlockLock.raw.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompressInstall.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompressInstall.tif.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertToRequest.tiff 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InvokeExport.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InvokeExport.raw.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RemoveConfirm.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RemoveConfirm.tif.bulwark7 64ME_bul7.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
-
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exedescription ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul7.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exedescription ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-999675638-2867687379-27515722-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul7.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exedescription ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul7.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul7.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
Processes:
vssadmin.exevssadmin.exevssadmin.exepid Process 1916 vssadmin.exe 1792 vssadmin.exe 2016 vssadmin.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exepid Process 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 1472 64ME_bul7.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
Processes:
vssvc.exewmic.exewmic.exewmic.exedescription pid Process Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2040 vssvc.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2040 vssvc.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2040 vssvc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1280 wmic.exe Token: 33 1280 wmic.exe Token: 34 1280 wmic.exe Token: 35 1280 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1464 wmic.exe Token: 33 1464 wmic.exe Token: 34 1464 wmic.exe Token: 35 1464 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1944 wmic.exe Token: 33 1944 wmic.exe Token: 34 1944 wmic.exe Token: 35 1944 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exetaskeng.exedescription pid Process procid_target PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1792 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 27 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1792 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 27 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1792 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 27 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1792 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 27 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1280 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 30 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1280 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 30 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1280 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 30 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1280 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 30 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 2016 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 32 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 2016 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 32 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 2016 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 32 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 2016 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 32 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1464 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 34 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1464 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 34 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1464 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 34 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1464 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 34 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1916 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 36 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1916 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 36 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1916 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 36 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1916 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 36 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1944 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 38 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1944 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 38 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1944 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 38 PID 1472 wrote to memory of 1944 1472 64ME_bul7.exe 38 PID 676 wrote to memory of 1884 676 taskeng.exe 41 PID 676 wrote to memory of 1884 676 taskeng.exe 41 PID 676 wrote to memory of 1884 676 taskeng.exe 41 PID 676 wrote to memory of 1884 676 taskeng.exe 41 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
64ME_bul7.exedescription ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul7.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul7.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul7.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul7.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul7.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:1472 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1792
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1280
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:2016
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1464
-
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1916
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1944
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2040
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C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {40E3B635-6040-4E0B-B326-88ABE1FB32F2} S-1-5-21-999675638-2867687379-27515722-1000:ORXGKKZC\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:676 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1884
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD5c89dd8098bb565ffbca2b015fa3a862e
SHA1c7163968518d5a7d86c5fce07d05141c646ef6f6
SHA2566a973119a7c1cb0151cd94b34d24e963260a000da3e3a8df4b96e2430ffa409e
SHA51202338017b14bc34eb9caf0486ffc4b2f1917e6e071571eb995171b410f13415b7af0789d6992759906a4f623f150d64c091b88e1012604d55680972a27a612f4
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Filesize
666KB
MD5c89dd8098bb565ffbca2b015fa3a862e
SHA1c7163968518d5a7d86c5fce07d05141c646ef6f6
SHA2566a973119a7c1cb0151cd94b34d24e963260a000da3e3a8df4b96e2430ffa409e
SHA51202338017b14bc34eb9caf0486ffc4b2f1917e6e071571eb995171b410f13415b7af0789d6992759906a4f623f150d64c091b88e1012604d55680972a27a612f4