Analysis
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max time kernel
146s -
max time network
156s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20220901-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220901-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
13-10-2022 18:28
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul8.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul8.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220901-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul8.exe
-
Size
666KB
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MD5
ac8d418b660f7c9585ac97fe524abe8f
-
SHA1
653ecc2e07739e59bd5500f535c3f5c6e3d27060
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SHA256
61c26b20a2b291252ccf1b2ae4319542df526e820f96ad4667478ab101b6ee1f
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SHA512
edf33e15bb1d8f97799d25281429451ece9df0ae8c9ead93c301beeac851d802d501d7362c86cee6afb0a2772d58dbef1b17afe9ba84b83324f3959cf2fa7b1c
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulA/C9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omqC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
C0F2EF495BAABEFD62428E46327ABCDCA5B58F38D61329436930047C191435A341CF979E08C7ACC1B1C4BADB259F633E89773A9F436ECFA3202442CB35FC5961<br>4EC8FD6311497C2B0ECBB2B950323786BFC46787481C662AD5EAE6DB82E73630BD5A4DB61C02AEE3008E44275367ADE30CCB7988D94EE7B78E95C6049D30<br>7A6F61FBD1B5083B4EDE0123B75D09339A722C052A6CF7898DB0771DACFC8367393F8EC62428515A1D018C87702C844ADA5F64E3E90962AE0D596FBE4D94<br>9B083B55D6AF3B07F6057493200854A665C4E74D2D55FDC6983CEFE15B72A0CE5AB5B5FA45D5FE420E1E547725C195F0F78529F7995A3BCF545045B5B2DB<br>AA980EBE237067D7E184BC0AC0176422C92D603E0DFC54A2EB6F860B43B5BF604532E80C11FA37C518188AFE3361F9F9E24F3AB7888D5D3D4EF8D596CB23<br>3147C3BBF1724CD5D7B4E8D597304867F93B8AFDD1C979EFDCFECBEC189AC4025BDDFF409887EC30BC538397A29F4290DED477E15824B574453CBA85C1D8<br>A1827D2DCC04BE80B8165201CDF0A5C8063D6431120CD991411CDE31D2B37A1515F7AE11E3D3A8649E411EF2C4AB8EF2C0A3931799DF882435943C93F678<br>04925D856B071F3C7171A91B11401D5AD557F5B797FE8486F53C9CC5AC1DE9B51ADAA57CEA5AF4734B18BCE4D8FAEE32241097DE2CF27961F607ADFE7B18<br>9724CA53A6BA5A67FE313FF43991
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x0003000000022dd4-135.dat family_medusalocker behavioral2/files/0x0003000000022dd4-136.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe -
Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x0003000000022dd4-135.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral2/files/0x0003000000022dd4-136.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 4688 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 9 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InstallPing.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InstallPing.tiff.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResizeCopy.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResizeCopy.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InitializeSkip.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InitializeSkip.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteWrite.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CompleteWrite.png.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertLock.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertLock.tif.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InstallPing.tiff 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MeasureInstall.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\MeasureInstall.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OptimizeShow.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OptimizeShow.png.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CheckpointEnter.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CheckpointEnter.raw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-929662420-1054238289-2961194603-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul8.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul8.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 2708 64ME_bul8.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3676 wmic.exe Token: 33 3676 wmic.exe Token: 34 3676 wmic.exe Token: 35 3676 wmic.exe Token: 36 3676 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2276 wmic.exe Token: 33 2276 wmic.exe Token: 34 2276 wmic.exe Token: 35 2276 wmic.exe Token: 36 2276 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1812 wmic.exe Token: 33 1812 wmic.exe Token: 34 1812 wmic.exe Token: 35 1812 wmic.exe Token: 36 1812 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2708 wrote to memory of 3676 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 85 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 3676 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 85 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 3676 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 85 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 2276 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 87 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 2276 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 87 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 2276 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 87 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 1812 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 89 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 1812 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 89 PID 2708 wrote to memory of 1812 2708 64ME_bul8.exe 89 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul8.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul8.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul8.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:2708 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3676
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2276
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1812
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:4688
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD5ac8d418b660f7c9585ac97fe524abe8f
SHA1653ecc2e07739e59bd5500f535c3f5c6e3d27060
SHA25661c26b20a2b291252ccf1b2ae4319542df526e820f96ad4667478ab101b6ee1f
SHA512edf33e15bb1d8f97799d25281429451ece9df0ae8c9ead93c301beeac851d802d501d7362c86cee6afb0a2772d58dbef1b17afe9ba84b83324f3959cf2fa7b1c
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Filesize
666KB
MD5ac8d418b660f7c9585ac97fe524abe8f
SHA1653ecc2e07739e59bd5500f535c3f5c6e3d27060
SHA25661c26b20a2b291252ccf1b2ae4319542df526e820f96ad4667478ab101b6ee1f
SHA512edf33e15bb1d8f97799d25281429451ece9df0ae8c9ead93c301beeac851d802d501d7362c86cee6afb0a2772d58dbef1b17afe9ba84b83324f3959cf2fa7b1c