Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
49s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20220901-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20220901-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
13-10-2022 18:28
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul9.exe
Resource
win7-20220901-en
windows7-x64
17 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul9.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220901-en
windows10-2004-x64
15 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul9.exe
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Size
666KB
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MD5
5b780f32105ff92593db7b30ea2ac9ed
-
SHA1
6054922a051ce8d25d5d39565a9ad23575b7fe7f
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SHA256
aa4cd5e9ff8ef8e4a72601c03154231631a5179167400a5478ca4282188b1163
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SHA512
c93d9eee0cd547d513d3920f6fa5d3e22adaf6e4e7285f196ba4001d512f9ac05452e0243c526c713a880981249dbbad31947b08edf22f5eb53c6c77fb69d13d
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAWC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omDC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\MSOCache\All Users\{90140000-0011-0000-0000-0000000FF1CE}-C\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
92C920128501CCF75BF3656CB21776519EAB6643BB09704DD77091BE001668DF52249E889CDE3C9B7B8A89D7759E75DF8B31399D66083ABDBF10E46B8EABD82D<br>4C541BE1D5CB41A57894CB7F98AFA57115DC5A969AE4069220367A475C89D361F8A12F85C9B7C1A5FCE458A73307244B3625F844096021723CB850A8D519<br>07F3016699045F2415000890B6BB05CC5D67AC8EFC6ACCC188BAC04EF659319B4DC93A7CF1099872C51351104151089AB13D8931539587D03B926A26AA9D<br>9321DA82B25E13E30D2C384741463204DDEC0560B658678EF5028283064AE153B5626FE989A71234A7ED2B9807BADA9B04AF7166A1D677DAC76C1E51AA2A<br>3FE4032FC1841045F1A30A52B4D92E7375197B2296B33B8ADE57A078F80D29259E73EA73389DCA9B5DAA02AC854652F0409A299A5CE862E9B4452D62613B<br>0662626D26B2C639CB58B6F17CF0A0204FB1B57870DFE6293CB4B53B412BFEF2B41437008E2A34883E9ADF46F674CF2598AE3398520D0EF860AF0AA3A6F1<br>2FE2E12011B0F6D153578CDAA6EF57DCB5313AA55BFF5697D5D7C1CC76094ECA8BB83943C86BF30086C25810EBBCCC4F75C333EA61BBC0D57B578C81EA2C<br>74F05991AB37AB8ABD7C1B76BF42822FF64A148EB56B0B81645C4C49BC2AD444517FF9DBE02E39FCF857BDC7DB2040E76630E1DB3055F047356C133FA1DF<br>6C8E672C92782F81AA1006F02010
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0008000000005c51-63.dat family_medusalocker behavioral1/files/0x0008000000005c51-61.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul9.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul9.exe -
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Detects MedusaLocker ransomware 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0008000000005c51-63.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker behavioral1/files/0x0008000000005c51-61.dat MALWARE_Win_MedusaLocker -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 336 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 18 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UninstallLock.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UninstallLock.raw.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LimitImport.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LimitImport.tiff.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockLock.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnblockLock.crw.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UndoRegister.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UndoRegister.png.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RenameSet.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RenameSet.raw.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SyncOpen.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SyncOpen.crw.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConnectAssert.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConnectAssert.tiff.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ImportLimit.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ImportLimit.raw.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RegisterSplit.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RegisterSplit.tif.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LimitImport.tiff 64ME_bul9.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OpenWatch.tiff 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OpenWatch.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\OpenWatch.tiff.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConnectAssert.tiff 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EnterWrite.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EnterWrite.raw.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\FindRead.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\FindRead.tif.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UninstallRename.tiff 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UninstallRename.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UninstallRename.tiff.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnpublishStart.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UnpublishStart.tif.bulwark9 64ME_bul9.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul9.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-4063495947-34355257-727531523-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul9.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul9.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul9.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
pid Process 1780 vssadmin.exe 1724 vssadmin.exe 540 vssadmin.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 2028 64ME_bul9.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeBackupPrivilege 524 vssvc.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 524 vssvc.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 524 vssvc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1440 wmic.exe Token: 33 1440 wmic.exe Token: 34 1440 wmic.exe Token: 35 1440 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1788 wmic.exe Token: 33 1788 wmic.exe Token: 34 1788 wmic.exe Token: 35 1788 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1956 wmic.exe Token: 33 1956 wmic.exe Token: 34 1956 wmic.exe Token: 35 1956 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1724 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 26 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1724 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 26 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1724 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 26 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1724 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 26 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1440 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 30 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1440 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 30 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1440 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 30 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1440 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 30 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 540 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 32 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 540 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 32 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 540 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 32 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 540 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 32 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1788 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 34 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1788 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 34 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1788 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 34 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1788 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 34 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1780 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 36 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1780 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 36 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1780 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 36 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1780 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 36 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1956 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 38 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1956 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 38 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1956 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 38 PID 2028 wrote to memory of 1956 2028 64ME_bul9.exe 38 PID 992 wrote to memory of 336 992 taskeng.exe 42 PID 992 wrote to memory of 336 992 taskeng.exe 42 PID 992 wrote to memory of 336 992 taskeng.exe 42 PID 992 wrote to memory of 336 992 taskeng.exe 42 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul9.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul9.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul9.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul9.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul9.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:2028 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1724
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1440
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:540
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1788
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1780
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1956
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C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:524
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C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {32156F14-D14C-4625-B4A4-FF475980A049} S-1-5-21-4063495947-34355257-727531523-1000:RYNKSFQE\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:992 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:336
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD55b780f32105ff92593db7b30ea2ac9ed
SHA16054922a051ce8d25d5d39565a9ad23575b7fe7f
SHA256aa4cd5e9ff8ef8e4a72601c03154231631a5179167400a5478ca4282188b1163
SHA512c93d9eee0cd547d513d3920f6fa5d3e22adaf6e4e7285f196ba4001d512f9ac05452e0243c526c713a880981249dbbad31947b08edf22f5eb53c6c77fb69d13d
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Filesize
666KB
MD55b780f32105ff92593db7b30ea2ac9ed
SHA16054922a051ce8d25d5d39565a9ad23575b7fe7f
SHA256aa4cd5e9ff8ef8e4a72601c03154231631a5179167400a5478ca4282188b1163
SHA512c93d9eee0cd547d513d3920f6fa5d3e22adaf6e4e7285f196ba4001d512f9ac05452e0243c526c713a880981249dbbad31947b08edf22f5eb53c6c77fb69d13d