Analysis
-
max time kernel
151s -
max time network
153s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20220812-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
13-12-2022 20:51
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul.exe
Resource
win7-20221111-en
windows7-x64
16 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
14 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul.exe
-
Size
666KB
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MD5
f07dc09a859321bca78c1d7da99ad181
-
SHA1
6d51174ce888641bc27d5ee968b19b472e014212
-
SHA256
f064dfde1338a45c76c9cbbe9d7c8b358884c32c21510df14ab9b72df9ead1ba
-
SHA512
c9597ef6570f0c806f74051ddeb85ac3a0fcd6fcee7815d7c64b29d474ee4894bb703796c01ebb700579cb938ef1a19cb7db36a3add470da4df717a419e3ef8e
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulARC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omYC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
FC09B0BFCADC1CE7063327F3563F0B5EBFF7A8E8BEDB15DC018A55CA51E7864B7B82C80541F415AB9327D304335E4B76B59D7D5C69BB18F5E882B04A7C240452<br>850FC09B8E4635B7948FFF957FFA0A5BCCE18DBED382282B59888618F3AA11584F88C4B7ABC6A5B26FB3F67810D8FDA6856B0D580B881241D91E746F240D<br>94A4A5AA78D8C9891DDD78F4C4FC4DB237A541FC6E16EC54B3F9A3015DE52041A32E4418DB814475D192170E42A88F83DFD46C7C8F60F8CCB86B130E2EB5<br>3C2023176CEDFB827EF081042A341CDF9F5F7FE889EBA8A21A1EBF57A99D9967DC06E6C55158ED38867836C19F7B8C088D87FDDB7D591309E809817C38AA<br>388019F510093948896E3A140D3B8C4A3878F7792CD80AE67208EA50E442705F3D0C154A82E2B30917691214D60F60B14BF9D3F505C8362C924F0CF6DF47<br>318010D892160DDC020C3437D6C3DB838F185515BE875341FA5728B668E095178B3F1EB11E7B42231146C64ECDD656CA4B4A61B61D719F7E2E8E825917FC<br>96352BA08009D474F2BDD20FEAFECE79387FBE95BDB01F673A6DDEE7A0C299414C1900D9A6042BE15515523BE13B6CDF5F73F81C4F0FA6A4EC484E972613<br>DBF7523C8B5E6CCD3C94541A90B14EEA724C51F0D2F53215D7260917F2FDE9AC9C41E6F4F9E6190382AA99750C007E7CED1C92F47115567026FC53B51545<br>FAE1F029BF1B19EA83E4EB76B217
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x0008000000022f71-135.dat family_medusalocker behavioral2/files/0x0008000000022f71-136.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 996 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 5 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EditSearch.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EditSearch.crw.bulwark 64ME_bul.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GrantExpand.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GrantExpand.raw.bulwark 64ME_bul.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RegisterRename.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RegisterRename.raw.bulwark 64ME_bul.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\StartGrant.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\StartGrant.tif.bulwark 64ME_bul.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UpdateAssert.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\UpdateAssert.crw.bulwark 64ME_bul.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2891029575-1462575-1165213807-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe 5036 64ME_bul.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 936 wmic.exe Token: 33 936 wmic.exe Token: 34 936 wmic.exe Token: 35 936 wmic.exe Token: 36 936 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4560 wmic.exe Token: 33 4560 wmic.exe Token: 34 4560 wmic.exe Token: 35 4560 wmic.exe Token: 36 4560 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 428 wmic.exe Token: 33 428 wmic.exe Token: 34 428 wmic.exe Token: 35 428 wmic.exe Token: 36 428 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5036 wrote to memory of 936 5036 64ME_bul.exe 82 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 936 5036 64ME_bul.exe 82 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 936 5036 64ME_bul.exe 82 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 4560 5036 64ME_bul.exe 84 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 4560 5036 64ME_bul.exe 84 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 4560 5036 64ME_bul.exe 84 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 428 5036 64ME_bul.exe 86 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 428 5036 64ME_bul.exe 86 PID 5036 wrote to memory of 428 5036 64ME_bul.exe 86 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:5036 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:936
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4560
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:428
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:996
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
-
Filesize
666KB
MD5f07dc09a859321bca78c1d7da99ad181
SHA16d51174ce888641bc27d5ee968b19b472e014212
SHA256f064dfde1338a45c76c9cbbe9d7c8b358884c32c21510df14ab9b72df9ead1ba
SHA512c9597ef6570f0c806f74051ddeb85ac3a0fcd6fcee7815d7c64b29d474ee4894bb703796c01ebb700579cb938ef1a19cb7db36a3add470da4df717a419e3ef8e
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Filesize
666KB
MD5f07dc09a859321bca78c1d7da99ad181
SHA16d51174ce888641bc27d5ee968b19b472e014212
SHA256f064dfde1338a45c76c9cbbe9d7c8b358884c32c21510df14ab9b72df9ead1ba
SHA512c9597ef6570f0c806f74051ddeb85ac3a0fcd6fcee7815d7c64b29d474ee4894bb703796c01ebb700579cb938ef1a19cb7db36a3add470da4df717a419e3ef8e