Analysis
- max time kernel
127s - max time network
151s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20220812-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
20/12/2022, 06:02
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
tmp.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
16 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
tmp.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
14 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target tmp.exe
- Size 666KB
- Sample221220-grsaragh28
- SHA256 e5d819fd969d6bc913698c44beb5c8f763a6d6f07b7cdb3514c4b61a68a1d747
- MD5 6e1f9df1a8a359bc82f5288139ac8d70
- SHA1 53fbdde8d2f45f0a09a269ba4fc1eb84c55343bf
- SHA512 72df4fce5b78409ec2762a3ee0002721693026f3285ab804b2dbc58d55c3cce40efbdff34c7cfe415e3715b12b8e9418d78d3af19f23381aa4d7a0e2480a9ab2
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulASC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omHC9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
-
C:\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
- <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset='utf-8'> <meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'> <title></title> <style> html, body { background-color: #1a1a1a; } body { padding-top: 1rem !important; font-size: 1.3rem; color: white; } #text h2 { font-size: 2rem; font-weight: 600; line-height: 1.125; } .container { max-width: 1152px; flex-grow: 1; margin: 0 auto; position: relative; width: auto; } .box { background-color: #242424; display: block; padding: 1.25rem; border: 1px solid #303030; } a { color: #00b4d8; text-decoration: none; } a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } li { margin-bottom: 10px; } </style> </head> <body> <div class='container'> <div class='box'> <div id='text'> <h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2> <p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p> <p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p> <p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p> <p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p> <p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p> <p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p> <p> Contact us by email:<p> <h2>[email protected]</h2> </p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p> <h2>[email protected]</h2> </p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p> </p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p> <h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2> <ul> <li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li> <li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li> <li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li> <li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li> </ul> <h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2> <ul> <li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches. Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li> <li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage. You will violate laws about private data protection.</li> <li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li> <li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li> <li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li> </ul> <h2>Why pay us?</h2> <p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p> <p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and avoid this kind of situations in future.</p> <h2>Your personal ID</p> AA82D03F5DE8593282CE6407E1B81586647FB8F696A401AE1DC95F530599DDC247A7B07FC9F143824E65B75D523D9391FFFA683B3831F035D69F0930884B0FB0<br>04BFE82858A57970F631EBF2A3A5D550472217E9596C459AC1FEC387F3D64D8AA93BAB6245CD5B9A83EF5676B0379257A44B634166BEAC44A3DD49178140<br>29FDC0F27BF5C93FF5753139E1A564A7D16FA85DEABCA99FC8BAE73A8CF1AA64626B3518B1CA55602F5A3DFD41E1056E3597689A3F948F9D5BF579890AFA<br>2554B08AFBECA38B2B6EB15C64D4DEC0A7C338EFB63B34ABEBD4A76A2C04C284B45DBA9581ED3EF77BAAC7D8307659922246E98029413407054125E7364B<br>0C72D75B3C1359F0563945B043BDA8B384AAE7AF9024996F35A79F6AF70739C8841F945CFE561C7BE3A73AA62B641FB6E9C44F654669C4274582B1545B46<br>9B8545E18760F12CC0B0B69EAADA07064A029B8751005CF4AC4BF66B31742E4E5C48FB2455BA8759478263E5437271D87F1CCCD2C45C9BD5F66E4F36EF84<br>83FD6322E054872BF3E07EC2ADE1E6519085BD28AB98B1214E0A88C9C6C7F15F3B94ED7DDF8174E2E260AC0DEEA7EE1643B9F3A7480D5181044589A84471<br>A9D62A80A76C0E784B7D2399C8F4667E2E6C956F87CF87E788AF7FB689644FAB39913F753C9D71174D637996F94AA8622A0F92C24EC3F74611F6E9DF2C2E<br>9CF95D51B0C2AD8041D32F495D98
Emails
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<h2>[email protected]</h2>
-
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
Signatures
- MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
- MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x0009000000022e07-135.dat family_medusalocker behavioral2/files/0x0009000000022e07-136.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" tmp.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" tmp.exe - Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 4824 svhost.exe - Modifies extensions of user files 8 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromSet.tiff tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromSet.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertFromSet.tiff.bulwark5 tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CopyRepair.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\CopyRepair.crw.bulwark5 tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\FormatOut.raw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\FormatOut.raw.bulwark5 tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GetMount.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GetMount.tif.bulwark5 tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RestartDismount.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RestartDismount.png.bulwark5 tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ShowPop.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ShowPop.tif.bulwark5 tmp.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WriteRestart.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WriteRestart.tif.bulwark5 tmp.exe - Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
-
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" tmp.exe - Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2629973501-4017243118-3254762364-1000\desktop.ini tmp.exe - Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\G: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: tmp.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: tmp.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe 4988 tmp.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 556 wmic.exe Token: 33 556 wmic.exe Token: 34 556 wmic.exe Token: 35 556 wmic.exe Token: 36 556 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4888 wmic.exe Token: 33 4888 wmic.exe Token: 34 4888 wmic.exe Token: 35 4888 wmic.exe Token: 36 4888 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4740 wmic.exe Token: 33 4740 wmic.exe Token: 34 4740 wmic.exe Token: 35 4740 wmic.exe Token: 36 4740 wmic.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4988 wrote to memory of 556 4988 tmp.exe 81 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 556 4988 tmp.exe 81 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 556 4988 tmp.exe 81 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 4888 4988 tmp.exe 83 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 4888 4988 tmp.exe 83 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 4888 4988 tmp.exe 83 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 4740 4988 tmp.exe 85 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 4740 4988 tmp.exe 85 PID 4988 wrote to memory of 4740 4988 tmp.exe 85 - System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" tmp.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" tmp.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" tmp.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:4988 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:556
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4888
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4740
-
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:4824
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe
- Size 666KB
- SHA256 e5d819fd969d6bc913698c44beb5c8f763a6d6f07b7cdb3514c4b61a68a1d747
- MD5 6e1f9df1a8a359bc82f5288139ac8d70
- SHA1 53fbdde8d2f45f0a09a269ba4fc1eb84c55343bf
- SHA512 72df4fce5b78409ec2762a3ee0002721693026f3285ab804b2dbc58d55c3cce40efbdff34c7cfe415e3715b12b8e9418d78d3af19f23381aa4d7a0e2480a9ab2
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulASC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omHC9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe
- Size 666KB
- SHA256 e5d819fd969d6bc913698c44beb5c8f763a6d6f07b7cdb3514c4b61a68a1d747
- MD5 6e1f9df1a8a359bc82f5288139ac8d70
- SHA1 53fbdde8d2f45f0a09a269ba4fc1eb84c55343bf
- SHA512 72df4fce5b78409ec2762a3ee0002721693026f3285ab804b2dbc58d55c3cce40efbdff34c7cfe415e3715b12b8e9418d78d3af19f23381aa4d7a0e2480a9ab2
- SSDEEP 12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulASC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omHC9+
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP