Analysis
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max time kernel
139s -
max time network
151s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20221111-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20221111-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
26-12-2022 19:27
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul1.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
windows7-x64
16 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul1.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20221111-en
windows10-2004-x64
14 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul1.exe
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Size
666KB
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MD5
9691c8164fa6fbfbbf44d92dcfc2a023
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SHA1
d36db5874f39688324518088059273a4f2e9d33f
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SHA256
2e9fceb91d4378a4e67250f0cb633a020be6eb1c57237272a50cb4db36997db7
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SHA512
bae06060177b983be888d7882849acdd31659162a1631ca88bdf10398fbdf19f54637ffe117b3a6f3583d06c365e31c7e92c276627cc49617c3bbd76f83769ea
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulAuC9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5ombC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
72FB9A4CC6A801E6006C194C80AA69561A51CD0FC552AE46C3C98852DE2DD19E0A9EB9D543B532A65989EC4AE5FC5861B5C345F28B032683E25BAEE68FC34D05<br>2DC6C8561D52217A0111F0040845840865071251DB240DFA6CB2A1F464EC63BD2FEB014FBE4C924AA7DF205D83634664E841A23D307E14E876A0B09554E8<br>5697305EAC758D96751269989730B43FDF271B12F7B2964DDD0C99BBD5291CAB58067C6CE61F95971070BD7985C7E40F747EC63C06A9AB19754C8034AF01<br>61304D09166C3090C66C4E3EC23E3C7110A073E345C360C2A3A31153958242B5A30960D4D569856CA351A1556C64CAA27FB6AC12293975EA019AD958402C<br>BF19292DFE3474DC4C5817A87411490893B4757721D3C5D041FEE00FF589D512414F9901BDAE851D02A4B74254B539AB7A64E4C5326ACC05E2C9B5229EB0<br>9490340364F0FEDF938013F108081B8D94C75FFCC6CFF64DE9415CD7BD7D2E989D12D3B382A95A32206A4FD2F1C9C36CABAF9CC8664AD8232C05F7669EA1<br>0711C1EFA8506D8565DB0E82AF97C29AB16E134D3C5166B00A5B0CB3C402EDA6C39F0013E3AF2CAA5D10C6D933B24F8CE9E019F04AFB233FF83C88D75F1A<br>AC4EA0592C75E8FF302239A3DDAEEA2102D987150C90E1E5FFCC0106A41AE3CE9CC136021091F3D776532C26D88BCE730BFA860F7DFBBCD7E9C0DB8F3428<br>A65F60F071A594FCC100AE20C38B
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x0007000000022e5a-135.dat family_medusalocker behavioral2/files/0x0007000000022e5a-136.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1836 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 6 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\PushRename.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\PushRename.png.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddConvert.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\AddConvert.tif.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\DisconnectConfirm.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\DisconnectConfirm.tif.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EnterStart.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\EnterStart.tif.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\NewDebug.tiff 64ME_bul1.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\NewDebug.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\NewDebug.tiff.bulwark1 64ME_bul1.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2386679933-1492765628-3466841596-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul1.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul1.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul1.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 5080 64ME_bul1.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4480 wmic.exe Token: 33 4480 wmic.exe Token: 34 4480 wmic.exe Token: 35 4480 wmic.exe Token: 36 4480 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4216 wmic.exe Token: 33 4216 wmic.exe Token: 34 4216 wmic.exe Token: 35 4216 wmic.exe Token: 36 4216 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4832 wmic.exe Token: 33 4832 wmic.exe Token: 34 4832 wmic.exe Token: 35 4832 wmic.exe Token: 36 4832 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 9 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4480 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 83 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4480 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 83 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4480 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 83 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4216 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 85 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4216 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 85 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4216 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 85 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4832 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 87 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4832 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 87 PID 5080 wrote to memory of 4832 5080 64ME_bul1.exe 87 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul1.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul1.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul1.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul1.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:5080 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4480
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4216
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4832
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1836
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
-
Filesize
666KB
MD59691c8164fa6fbfbbf44d92dcfc2a023
SHA1d36db5874f39688324518088059273a4f2e9d33f
SHA2562e9fceb91d4378a4e67250f0cb633a020be6eb1c57237272a50cb4db36997db7
SHA512bae06060177b983be888d7882849acdd31659162a1631ca88bdf10398fbdf19f54637ffe117b3a6f3583d06c365e31c7e92c276627cc49617c3bbd76f83769ea
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Filesize
666KB
MD59691c8164fa6fbfbbf44d92dcfc2a023
SHA1d36db5874f39688324518088059273a4f2e9d33f
SHA2562e9fceb91d4378a4e67250f0cb633a020be6eb1c57237272a50cb4db36997db7
SHA512bae06060177b983be888d7882849acdd31659162a1631ca88bdf10398fbdf19f54637ffe117b3a6f3583d06c365e31c7e92c276627cc49617c3bbd76f83769ea