Analysis
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max time kernel
152s -
max time network
31s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20221111-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20221111-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
26-12-2022 19:27
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
64ME_bul8.exe
Resource
win7-20221111-en
windows7-x64
16 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
64ME_bul8.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
windows10-2004-x64
14 signatures
150 seconds
General
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Target
64ME_bul8.exe
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Size
666KB
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MD5
ac8d418b660f7c9585ac97fe524abe8f
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SHA1
653ecc2e07739e59bd5500f535c3f5c6e3d27060
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SHA256
61c26b20a2b291252ccf1b2ae4319542df526e820f96ad4667478ab101b6ee1f
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SHA512
edf33e15bb1d8f97799d25281429451ece9df0ae8c9ead93c301beeac851d802d501d7362c86cee6afb0a2772d58dbef1b17afe9ba84b83324f3959cf2fa7b1c
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SSDEEP
12288:ZYW1LNT35lDbK/LIVaN8+T7vwqyqhYMhWt918vulA/C9+m:dd35lDbKDIwWUDyqS5omqC9+
Malware Config
Extracted
Path
C:\MSOCache\All Users\{90140000-0011-0000-0000-0000000FF1CE}-C\!-Recovery_Instructions-!.html
Ransom Note
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset='utf-8'>
<meta name='viewport' content='width=device-width,initial-scale=1'>
<title></title>
<style>
html, body {
background-color: #1a1a1a;
}
body {
padding-top: 1rem !important;
font-size: 1.3rem;
color: white;
}
#text h2 {
font-size: 2rem;
font-weight: 600;
line-height: 1.125;
}
.container {
max-width: 1152px;
flex-grow: 1;
margin: 0 auto;
position: relative;
width: auto;
}
.box {
background-color: #242424;
display: block;
padding: 1.25rem;
border: 1px solid #303030;
}
a {
color: #00b4d8;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
text-decoration: underline;
}
li {
margin-bottom: 10px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class='container'>
<div class='box'>
<div id='text'>
<h2>If you get this message, your network was hacked!</h2>
<p>After we gained full access to your servers, we first downloaded a large amount of sensitive data and then encrypted all the data stored on them.</p>
<p>That includes personal information on your clients, partners, your personnel, accounting documents, and other crucial files that are necessary for your company to work normally.</p>
<p>We used modern complicated algorithms, so you or any recovery service will not be able to decrypt files without our help, wasting time on these attempts instead of negotiations can be fatal for your company.</p>
<p>Make sure to act within <span style='color:#f4a261;'>72</span> hours or the negotiations will be considered failed!</p>
<p>Inform your superior management about what's going on.</p>
<p> Contact us for price and get decryption software.</p>
<p> Contact us by email:<p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>If you will get no answer within 24 hours contact us by our alternate emails:</p>
<h2>[email protected]</h2>
</p>To verify the possibility of the recovery of your files we can decrypted 1-3 file for free.</p>
</p>Attach file to the letter (no more than 5Mb).</p>
<h2>If you and us succeed the negotiations we will grant you:</h2>
<ul>
<li>complete confidentiality, we will keep in secret any information regarding to attack, your company will act as if nothing had happened.</li>
<li>comprehensive information about vulnerabilities of your network and security report.</li>
<li>software and instructions to decrypt all the data that was encrypted.</li>
<li>all sensitive downloaded data will be permanently deleted from our cloud storage and we will provide an erasure log.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Our options if you act like nothing's happening, refuse to make a deal or fail the negotiations:</h2>
<ul>
<li>inform the media and independent journalists about what happened to your servers. To prove it we'll publish a chunk of private data that you should have ciphered if you care about potential breaches.
Moreover, your company will inevitably take decent reputational loss which is hard to assess precisely.</li>
<li>inform your clients, employees, partners by phone, e-mail, sms and social networks that you haven't prevent their data leakage.
You will violate laws about private data protection.</li>
<li>start DDOS attack on you website and infrastructures.</li>
<li>personal data stored will be put on sale on the Darknet to find anyone interested to buy useful information regarding your company. It could be data mining agencies or your market competitors.</li>
<li>publish all the discovered vulnerabilities found in your network, so anyone will do anything with it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Why pay us?</h2>
<p>We care about our reputation. You are welcome to google our cases up and be sure that we don't have a single case of failure to provide what we promissed.</p>
<p>Turning this issue to a bug bounty will save your private information, reputation and will allow you to use the security report and
avoid this kind of situations in future.</p>
<h2>Your personal ID</p>
7B7B0DA80264FE0692161E451E588D94EBE1FEA9632F754D1B4DFD25305B4437F5B13DB068307F53BD47EE8BF430AD2CB106AE76330C9A4150E8440E51258093<br>6224BDBC73782742528653B7C7244DBB11A6DF5EF43399BD1EFE509FA5EFA1D82B4EBDAC0AA2DB1709DEB2DEFA3EFDBC3784A3D9B6A1379B6C0BB93696A6<br>02218BCD32A92D94A9DBD3BFA611DD78EC9B34463DD25718E8E502EBA2D5641365AFFA277DD24B1D5E301F5236D0B813ED433D9C24BE68F8BA11C82ADC64<br>7ACE11D4DEF5D3846C0FA3942D4D662F86B7F5DC6EEEFAE6DF7D4DFDB8FC81B2CB164A776CE73C2AC883E89AFFF1F4D41689271CD022A8F62CFC817DFCA2<br>0BDCE0B868946A79762BC35611BE90C37AB409E1795409BF0BC10AC13F89EAC1FA666721D439375FB81483BD6ACC0925EFB14E7D60D194077DE583CE4578<br>98307F0EA29F1230780B9C78AA07B8969E2CAB25B72D2B661AF209B16BDA57317C3BAAAF10BC59DAB425B483823437F95EE5ED5451FF9A4B61C99963A7C0<br>762F14A08F2750FE975AB69DE6DF1473FDFF532F02BCAB30B7DC894B09ED453C044C4E2297A09EA9FFF8B2A55E6F03B9F9935CBA2AD1077AD1F118AF6DC6<br>D4D7DE45073CA5519ABCC4FAFE7F02E03752A868DEAC85B2C45744EFF3F9DE061A8085D6335FFBC31AAC14A702B92AC9B0A41D2C7D3DBA9DD984A7B9D921<br>36A0C704FAB52AC9A4F011D7E28D
Emails
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x000800000001483c-61.dat family_medusalocker behavioral1/files/0x000800000001483c-63.dat family_medusalocker -
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe -
Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1556 svhost.exe -
Modifies extensions of user files 17 IoCs
Ransomware generally changes the extension on encrypted files.
description ioc Process File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InvokeWrite.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InvokeWrite.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RemoveEnable.tiff 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResetTrace.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResetTrace.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveEnable.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveEnable.tiff.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RemoveEnable.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RemoveEnable.tiff.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RevokeCompress.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RevokeCompress.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertToClose.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ConvertToClose.png.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GrantWait.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\GrantWait.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InstallRegister.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\InstallRegister.tif.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LimitRename.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\LimitRename.tif.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReadConvertFrom.tiff 64ME_bul8.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ResolveEnable.tiff 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WaitInitialize.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\WaitInitialize.png.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\DebugLock.tif => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\DebugLock.tif.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReadConvertFrom.tiff => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\ReadConvertFrom.tiff.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RequestFind.png => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\RequestFind.png.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe File renamed C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SearchConvert.crw => C:\Users\Admin\Pictures\SearchConvert.crw.bulwark8 64ME_bul8.exe -
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe -
Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\Z:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-3406023954-474543476-3319432036-1000\desktop.ini 64ME_bul8.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\X: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\A: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\E: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\F: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: 64ME_bul8.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: 64ME_bul8.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s). Likely ransomware behaviour.
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
pid Process 1824 vssadmin.exe 692 vssadmin.exe 1456 vssadmin.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 2012 64ME_bul8.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1552 vssvc.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1552 vssvc.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 1552 vssvc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1976 wmic.exe Token: 33 1976 wmic.exe Token: 34 1976 wmic.exe Token: 35 1976 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1040 wmic.exe Token: 33 1040 wmic.exe Token: 34 1040 wmic.exe Token: 35 1040 wmic.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1808 wmic.exe Token: 33 1808 wmic.exe Token: 34 1808 wmic.exe Token: 35 1808 wmic.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1824 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 27 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1824 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 27 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1824 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 27 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1824 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 27 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1976 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 30 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1976 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 30 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1976 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 30 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1976 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 30 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 692 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 32 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 692 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 32 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 692 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 32 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 692 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 32 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1040 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 34 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1040 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 34 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1040 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 34 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1040 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 34 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1456 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 36 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1456 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 36 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1456 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 36 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1456 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 36 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1808 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 38 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1808 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 38 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1808 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 38 PID 2012 wrote to memory of 1808 2012 64ME_bul8.exe 38 PID 1944 wrote to memory of 1556 1944 taskeng.exe 42 PID 1944 wrote to memory of 1556 1944 taskeng.exe 42 PID 1944 wrote to memory of 1556 1944 taskeng.exe 42 PID 1944 wrote to memory of 1556 1944 taskeng.exe 42 -
System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = "0" 64ME_bul8.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections = "1" 64ME_bul8.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul8.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\64ME_bul8.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Modifies extensions of user files
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
PID:2012 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1824
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1976
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:692
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1040
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
PID:1456
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1808
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C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1552
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C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {0E6C603B-5628-4A03-A8E0-D9415703B220} S-1-5-21-3406023954-474543476-3319432036-1000:VUIIVLGQ\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1944 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1556
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
666KB
MD5ac8d418b660f7c9585ac97fe524abe8f
SHA1653ecc2e07739e59bd5500f535c3f5c6e3d27060
SHA25661c26b20a2b291252ccf1b2ae4319542df526e820f96ad4667478ab101b6ee1f
SHA512edf33e15bb1d8f97799d25281429451ece9df0ae8c9ead93c301beeac851d802d501d7362c86cee6afb0a2772d58dbef1b17afe9ba84b83324f3959cf2fa7b1c
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Filesize
666KB
MD5ac8d418b660f7c9585ac97fe524abe8f
SHA1653ecc2e07739e59bd5500f535c3f5c6e3d27060
SHA25661c26b20a2b291252ccf1b2ae4319542df526e820f96ad4667478ab101b6ee1f
SHA512edf33e15bb1d8f97799d25281429451ece9df0ae8c9ead93c301beeac851d802d501d7362c86cee6afb0a2772d58dbef1b17afe9ba84b83324f3959cf2fa7b1c