General
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Target
RIP_YOUR_PC_LOL.exe
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Size
22.5MB
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Sample
230620-wd3a5aee9z
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MD5
52867174362410d63215d78e708103ea
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SHA1
7ae4e1048e4463a4201bdeaf224c5b6face681bf
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SHA256
37d8e1ce3b6e6488942717aa78cb54785edc985143bcc8d9ba9f42d73a3dbd7a
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SHA512
89e17e147d3f073e479e85d0b0321f6264bbc2aa84c930ed645e8f5cde3f1e58812c3db1ba0f10bee6ce7ac0731e1e3de6747a9b3c4d63a564dd8d904bd726ab
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SSDEEP
393216:HJLgf7BPkdKzrZciLxv8naSNtPr5rn57M84UTB9xO5/VWvJKJPkwdnfZ4y5SDkFV:poBPQwxMR7pn5qUTB9xOFVWvJKJPkwd9
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
RIP_YOUR_PC_LOL.exe
Resource
win7-20230220-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
RIP_YOUR_PC_LOL.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20230220-en
Malware Config
Extracted
Protocol: ftp- Host:
files.000webhost.com - Port:
21 - Username:
fcb-aws-host-4
Extracted
asyncrat
0.5.7B
Default
gfhhjgh.duckdns.org:8050
AsyncMutex_6SI8OkPnk
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delay
3
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install
false
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install_file
system32.exe
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install_folder
%AppData%
Extracted
nanocore
1.2.2.0
172.98.92.42:58491
127.0.0.1:58491
c5a0b6d8-d1f7-45cd-943b-d5fda411e988
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activate_away_mode
true
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backup_connection_host
127.0.0.1
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backup_dns_server
8.8.4.4
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buffer_size
65535
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build_time
2021-09-20T02:48:09.651743436Z
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bypass_user_account_control
false
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bypass_user_account_control_data
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clear_access_control
true
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clear_zone_identifier
false
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connect_delay
4000
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connection_port
58491
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default_group
Default
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enable_debug_mode
true
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gc_threshold
1.048576e+07
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keep_alive_timeout
30000
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keyboard_logging
false
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lan_timeout
2500
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max_packet_size
1.048576e+07
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mutex
c5a0b6d8-d1f7-45cd-943b-d5fda411e988
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mutex_timeout
5000
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prevent_system_sleep
false
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primary_connection_host
172.98.92.42
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primary_dns_server
8.8.8.8
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request_elevation
true
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restart_delay
5000
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run_delay
0
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run_on_startup
false
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set_critical_process
true
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timeout_interval
5000
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use_custom_dns_server
false
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version
1.2.2.0
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wan_timeout
8000
Extracted
njrat
im523
mediaget
kazya1.hopto.org:1470
a797c6ca3f5e7aff8fa1149c47fe9466
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reg_key
a797c6ca3f5e7aff8fa1149c47fe9466
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splitter
|'|'|
Extracted
fickerstealer
80.87.192.115:80
Extracted
redline
@zhilsholi
yabynennet.xyz:81
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auth_value
c2d0b7a2ede97b91495c99e75b4f27fb
Extracted
raccoon
1.8.3-hotfix
5781468cedb3a203003fdf1f12e72fe98d6f1c0f
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url4cnc
http://194.180.174.53/brikitiki
http://91.219.236.18/brikitiki
http://194.180.174.41/brikitiki
http://91.219.236.148/brikitiki
https://t.me/brikitiki
Extracted
oski
prepepe.ac.ug
Extracted
azorult
http://195.245.112.115/index.php
Extracted
pony
http://londonpaerl.co.uk/yesup/gate.php
Targets
-
-
Target
RIP_YOUR_PC_LOL.exe
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Size
22.5MB
-
MD5
52867174362410d63215d78e708103ea
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SHA1
7ae4e1048e4463a4201bdeaf224c5b6face681bf
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SHA256
37d8e1ce3b6e6488942717aa78cb54785edc985143bcc8d9ba9f42d73a3dbd7a
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SHA512
89e17e147d3f073e479e85d0b0321f6264bbc2aa84c930ed645e8f5cde3f1e58812c3db1ba0f10bee6ce7ac0731e1e3de6747a9b3c4d63a564dd8d904bd726ab
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SSDEEP
393216:HJLgf7BPkdKzrZciLxv8naSNtPr5rn57M84UTB9xO5/VWvJKJPkwdnfZ4y5SDkFV:poBPQwxMR7pn5qUTB9xOFVWvJKJPkwd9
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Azorult
An information stealer that was first discovered in 2016, targeting browsing history and passwords.
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DcRat
DarkCrystal(DC) is a new .NET RAT active since June 2019 capable of loading additional plugins.
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Detect Blackmoon payload
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Gh0st RAT payload
-
Process spawned unexpected child process
This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.
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RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
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RedLine payload
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Async RAT payload
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Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
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NirSoft MailPassView
Password recovery tool for various email clients
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NirSoft WebBrowserPassView
Password recovery tool for various web browsers
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Nirsoft
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XMRig Miner payload
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Drops file in Drivers directory
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Modifies Windows Firewall
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Sets DLL path for service in the registry
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Sets service image path in registry
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Checks BIOS information in registry
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
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Checks computer location settings
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
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Drops startup file
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Executes dropped EXE
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Loads dropped DLL
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Uses the VBS compiler for execution
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Accesses Microsoft Outlook accounts
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Adds Run key to start application
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Looks up external IP address via web service
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
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Drops file in System32 directory
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Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
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MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v6
Persistence
Modify Existing Service
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
3Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
Bypass User Account Control
1Disabling Security Tools
1Modify Registry
5Scripting
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
1