Analysis
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max time kernel
151s -
max time network
122s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20230831-en -
resource tags
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submitted
11-10-2023 14:55
General
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Target
1bc0575b3fc6486cb2510dac1ac6ae4889b94a955d3eade53d3ba3a92d133281.exe
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Size
235KB
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MD5
f6f120d1262b88f79debb5d848ac7db9
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SHA1
1339282f9b2d2a41326daf3cf284ec2ae8f0f93c
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SHA256
1bc0575b3fc6486cb2510dac1ac6ae4889b94a955d3eade53d3ba3a92d133281
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SHA512
1067c1a73cf891d651fa007f4ccc4452f32801fe3859933ef1bcc00985e35ce016fa6c601c0e3c10df2080fc9b8a776b2f18d40bd64dfb98177ab638c4b545bd
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SSDEEP
6144:c5vMUmRTTgwnfeP+Jx1cLNAIyBcc9WrEWUC4wQh/6BeX:/U8Tgufnx1cLNncgQWUUQh/+e
Malware Config
Extracted
C:\MSOCache\All Users\{90140000-0011-0000-0000-0000000FF1CE}-C\HOW_TO_RECOVER_DATA.html
Signatures
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MedusaLocker
Ransomware with several variants first seen in September 2019.
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MedusaLocker payload 8 IoCs
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UAC bypass 3 TTPs 2 IoCs
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Deletes shadow copies 2 TTPs
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Renames multiple (295) files with added filename extension
This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.
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Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
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Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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UPX packed file 12 IoCs
Detects executables packed with UPX/modified UPX open source packer.
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Checks whether UAC is enabled 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
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Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 24 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
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Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Interacts with shadow copies 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
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Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 63 IoCs
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Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 28 IoCs
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System policy modification 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
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Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API
The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1bc0575b3fc6486cb2510dac1ac6ae4889b94a955d3eade53d3ba3a92d133281.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1bc0575b3fc6486cb2510dac1ac6ae4889b94a955d3eade53d3ba3a92d133281.exe"1⤵
- UAC bypass
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Drops desktop.ini file(s)
- Enumerates connected drives
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- System policy modification
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vssadmin.exevssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet2⤵
- Interacts with shadow copies
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem\wmic.exewmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
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C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exeC:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
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C:\Windows\system32\taskeng.exetaskeng.exe {B920AF07-0233-4F96-8360-6580247C7222} S-1-5-21-607259312-1573743425-2763420908-1000:NGTQGRML\Admin:Interactive:[1]1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\svhost.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
1Bypass User Account Control
1Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
1Bypass User Account Control
1Impair Defenses
1Disable or Modify Tools
1Indicator Removal
2File Deletion
2Modify Registry
2Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
4KB
MD5f32a8716b7be0812b9b1acace7e5f695
SHA15bbb14250856bc27558e9dafc290687a0e69ce52
SHA256db909ba8b6e6f08d282a7be6a115f06897aa59d4d4b69df501c3d40e1e259930
SHA512afae03468a271227e47f335039d6353d664b971f39f54262b79518685cca9dfe21bbae9775564958b152c36efb514404627d7bd00cc591ab00ff910870fea0be
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Filesize
235KB
MD5f6f120d1262b88f79debb5d848ac7db9
SHA11339282f9b2d2a41326daf3cf284ec2ae8f0f93c
SHA2561bc0575b3fc6486cb2510dac1ac6ae4889b94a955d3eade53d3ba3a92d133281
SHA5121067c1a73cf891d651fa007f4ccc4452f32801fe3859933ef1bcc00985e35ce016fa6c601c0e3c10df2080fc9b8a776b2f18d40bd64dfb98177ab638c4b545bd
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Filesize
235KB
MD5f6f120d1262b88f79debb5d848ac7db9
SHA11339282f9b2d2a41326daf3cf284ec2ae8f0f93c
SHA2561bc0575b3fc6486cb2510dac1ac6ae4889b94a955d3eade53d3ba3a92d133281
SHA5121067c1a73cf891d651fa007f4ccc4452f32801fe3859933ef1bcc00985e35ce016fa6c601c0e3c10df2080fc9b8a776b2f18d40bd64dfb98177ab638c4b545bd
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Filesize
536B
MD5446296a67aeb526d2ddaaae9f5c0f7a2
SHA15308128241b8989e5597a215ba668dc52888fc3e
SHA256af77e4138f916dd5c278ac3c066cea114a69451be406cabd5e9325bf6aab2d85
SHA512325b43b7290c33d1d7b32954f32481ce5de7dae6cc9888820a6a6c7ae8c948f1bd4ad47cb66cdadff73263c7b544c89ad36cec3919a8ccb7f046aedbbdfb8a00
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
-
Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB
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Filesize
712KB