General

  • Target

    537504bf9c2fa42d1facd51d2f5f6261508c5dd69fbe01bed020bda16c2e138b.bin

  • Size

    1.1MB

  • Sample

    240410-1yah3afg31

  • MD5

    5b3a809660ca73851ebe0e4576fe402a

  • SHA1

    647844f54aca49e1274d48e3b16b153c9b1c7ce2

  • SHA256

    537504bf9c2fa42d1facd51d2f5f6261508c5dd69fbe01bed020bda16c2e138b

  • SHA512

    4bb17f35b043ea576562470dd8054ec26a973fcf19e38613e9913f6f907fbf54e23654bd5f91b43b4f6f4555756a9b819405f819cbbc86f04665195994022957

  • SSDEEP

    24576:A+Dg/shD/5kvJ921d5yGpqGB2VkoZJaAP+Ce/ycFN9sJCTXgl9o+:JDg/E5kvJ9aFpCtaAW/ycF7s4jgl9H

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://173.212.219.194:3434

AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      537504bf9c2fa42d1facd51d2f5f6261508c5dd69fbe01bed020bda16c2e138b.bin

    • Size

      1.1MB

    • MD5

      5b3a809660ca73851ebe0e4576fe402a

    • SHA1

      647844f54aca49e1274d48e3b16b153c9b1c7ce2

    • SHA256

      537504bf9c2fa42d1facd51d2f5f6261508c5dd69fbe01bed020bda16c2e138b

    • SHA512

      4bb17f35b043ea576562470dd8054ec26a973fcf19e38613e9913f6f907fbf54e23654bd5f91b43b4f6f4555756a9b819405f819cbbc86f04665195994022957

    • SSDEEP

      24576:A+Dg/shD/5kvJ921d5yGpqGB2VkoZJaAP+Ce/ycFN9sJCTXgl9o+:JDg/E5kvJ9aFpCtaAW/ycF7s4jgl9H

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Checks CPU information

      Checks CPU information which indicate if the system is an emulator.

    • Checks memory information

      Checks memory information which indicate if the system is an emulator.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks