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Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
52s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240419-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240419-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
30/04/2024, 11:43
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
winPEASx64.exe
Resource
win7-20240221-en
General
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Target
winPEASx64.exe
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Size
2.3MB
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MD5
1f7f204d5ca9437dbb364b7d28eb71a5
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SHA1
5d79c1d2e799596f32a28bb68d966b4efcd608c8
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SHA256
39210402176e6bf813dbff36370978a66505dc7a25008841e5225603ccbcb8e6
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SHA512
b0782e6c4302fdc5349266adbfcd0865735dbff4874c69e0773deec2afea6062bb37df04d6db9ce46626b9e6fb4474c2e7858556ef6af09a45ca9d1a2d9890be
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SSDEEP
24576:ocQmqUZRcomnDIi/W7m/EsH1LsPlNKkThXHL5gZm3T:kmDXmn8i/WaE+El4kBHL5gk
Malware Config
Signatures
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RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
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Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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Checks installed software on the system 1 TTPs
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
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description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA winPEASx64.exe -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 1 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\F: winPEASx64.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 winPEASx64.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier winPEASx64.exe -
Gathers system information 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Runs systeminfo.exe.
pid Process 1848 systeminfo.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe 3984 winPEASx64.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 2 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3984 winPEASx64.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 332 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3984 wrote to memory of 1848 3984 winPEASx64.exe 91 PID 3984 wrote to memory of 1848 3984 winPEASx64.exe 91 PID 3984 wrote to memory of 3632 3984 winPEASx64.exe 94 PID 3984 wrote to memory of 3632 3984 winPEASx64.exe 94 PID 3984 wrote to memory of 332 3984 winPEASx64.exe 96 PID 3984 wrote to memory of 332 3984 winPEASx64.exe 96 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\winPEASx64.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\winPEASx64.exe"1⤵
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Enumerates connected drives
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3984 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\systeminfo.exe"systeminfo.exe"2⤵
- Gathers system information
PID:1848
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C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\netsh.exe"netsh" wlan show profiles2⤵PID:3632
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"powershell.exe" # Check if appcmd.exe exists if (Test-Path ('C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe')) { # Create data table to house results $DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable # Create and name columns in the data table $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('user') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('pass') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('type') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('vdir') $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add('apppool') # Get list of application pools Invoke-Expression 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name' | ForEach-Object { # Get application pool name $PoolName = $_ # Get username $PoolUserCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool ' + $PoolName + ' /text:processmodel.username' $PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd # Get password $PoolPasswordCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool ' + $PoolName + ' /text:processmodel.password' $PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd # Check if credentials exists if (($PoolPassword -ne '') -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) { # Add credentials to database $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName) } } # Get list of virtual directories Invoke-Expression 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name' | ForEach-Object { # Get Virtual Directory Name $VdirName = $_ # Get username $VdirUserCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir ' + $VdirName + ' /text:userName' $VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd # Get password $VdirPasswordCmd = 'C:\Windows\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir ' + $VdirName + ' /text:password' $VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd # Check if credentials exists if (($VdirPassword -ne '') -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) { # Add credentials to database $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA') } } # Check if any passwords were found if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) { # Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline #$DataTable | Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique $DataTable | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool } else { # Status user Write-host 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.' } }2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:332
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82