General

  • Target

    dad17cab89c13ef2faf97bf721502c2bb58692f0320f7b906aa5d515e0a8e7f7.bin

  • Size

    2.4MB

  • Sample

    240612-tk3t5avdqr

  • MD5

    3c4d34eee407c37c138992b99d9cf46c

  • SHA1

    1ce0d29fe2b567ae6e944a6a5b398194dffbd745

  • SHA256

    dad17cab89c13ef2faf97bf721502c2bb58692f0320f7b906aa5d515e0a8e7f7

  • SHA512

    c3b687c58bb3055642e549108c88eb73e493abb5d4fe9852ba03ed4f793ee819a68a19acea58e060f71cff3841c4360148731d9e4bc0f0bbcf53c48feb16fafe

  • SSDEEP

    49152:Z9XThVQI4rGfrUfaoDXaHuxQTBMaUxYuesGLUndu0gpkdVZg/KE:HXTkI4KfrUfaGQuxi2uuX0Ukkd9E

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

https://portal.azure.com

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      dad17cab89c13ef2faf97bf721502c2bb58692f0320f7b906aa5d515e0a8e7f7.bin

    • Size

      2.4MB

    • MD5

      3c4d34eee407c37c138992b99d9cf46c

    • SHA1

      1ce0d29fe2b567ae6e944a6a5b398194dffbd745

    • SHA256

      dad17cab89c13ef2faf97bf721502c2bb58692f0320f7b906aa5d515e0a8e7f7

    • SHA512

      c3b687c58bb3055642e549108c88eb73e493abb5d4fe9852ba03ed4f793ee819a68a19acea58e060f71cff3841c4360148731d9e4bc0f0bbcf53c48feb16fafe

    • SSDEEP

      49152:Z9XThVQI4rGfrUfaoDXaHuxQTBMaUxYuesGLUndu0gpkdVZg/KE:HXTkI4KfrUfaGQuxi2uuX0Ukkd9E

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks