General

  • Target

    892f87699be7df7c984c2c0973e2052b780f00c25eee93f5a81f4151e3cfed83.bin

  • Size

    987KB

  • Sample

    240618-2wvlwssgkj

  • MD5

    440b3701ab7d41c43fa14ed9e74ffbb3

  • SHA1

    5469c4d055dde51d086b9855eb8c7151dc2bdb70

  • SHA256

    892f87699be7df7c984c2c0973e2052b780f00c25eee93f5a81f4151e3cfed83

  • SHA512

    39e150e3445b3e6de6f8f4d8ee00f054299e059b678bcf0b73353645685568e959289199e7c479faf5569d56ab90953877e1be42def6ddc7826a719a7a23f8e4

  • SSDEEP

    12288:I6rOKoRC8/jcd57jrSZGI2VbydyK/BT0dgxmwOAkASwuop3dS+gicjgA4qDXroc/:I6SK38/oBMyCZ0+kjhozSR/jg/Koc/

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://94.156.8.11:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      892f87699be7df7c984c2c0973e2052b780f00c25eee93f5a81f4151e3cfed83.bin

    • Size

      987KB

    • MD5

      440b3701ab7d41c43fa14ed9e74ffbb3

    • SHA1

      5469c4d055dde51d086b9855eb8c7151dc2bdb70

    • SHA256

      892f87699be7df7c984c2c0973e2052b780f00c25eee93f5a81f4151e3cfed83

    • SHA512

      39e150e3445b3e6de6f8f4d8ee00f054299e059b678bcf0b73353645685568e959289199e7c479faf5569d56ab90953877e1be42def6ddc7826a719a7a23f8e4

    • SSDEEP

      12288:I6rOKoRC8/jcd57jrSZGI2VbydyK/BT0dgxmwOAkASwuop3dS+gicjgA4qDXroc/:I6SK38/oBMyCZ0+kjhozSR/jg/Koc/

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

    • Requests enabling of the accessibility settings.

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks