Analysis

  • max time kernel
    149s
  • max time network
    151s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20240508-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240508-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    18-06-2024 10:38

General

  • Target

    cf4d656f5c5d93c21b4957ed26322191afad3e2f9f29d7d33f27bfc2c35713c0.bin.exe

  • Size

    1005KB

  • MD5

    005c650353052ace090b2a56c2d0023b

  • SHA1

    2485ca16fe3f34926bc35ba402f29fea86054a67

  • SHA256

    cf4d656f5c5d93c21b4957ed26322191afad3e2f9f29d7d33f27bfc2c35713c0

  • SHA512

    50fc7e81e9c3b49e37c88c17d2a5eef241c030023e46e620f57e559a08ff071287150147656bd30c844e528caa6de82aa1dfbc74a8c3d0d6017296b239f9fbf8

  • SSDEEP

    12288:wbWIqB/A1gv9XQ7ZNlZDV3LEWI+Xx+uBW6y4qNmhL:wbyxv9XQ7B3oWI+XHW6y4j

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Program Files\7-Zip\akira_readme.txt

Family

akira

Ransom Note
Hi friends, Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption. Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know: 1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal. 2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help. 3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data. 4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion. 5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us. If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions: 1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/. 2. Paste this link - https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion. 3. Use this code - 8437-TQ-WWHC-ONHR - to log into our chat. Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
URLs

https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion

https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion

Signatures

  • Akira

    Akira is a ransomware first seen in March 2023 and targets several industries, including education, finance, real estate, manufacturing, and consulting.

  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Renames multiple (8386) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell command to delete shadowcopy.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 31 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cf4d656f5c5d93c21b4957ed26322191afad3e2f9f29d7d33f27bfc2c35713c0.bin.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cf4d656f5c5d93c21b4957ed26322191afad3e2f9f29d7d33f27bfc2c35713c0.bin.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops startup file
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:532
  • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject"
    1⤵
    • Process spawned unexpected child process
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2064
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2072
  • C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
    1⤵
      PID:2064

    Network

    MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

    Replay Monitor

    Loading Replay Monitor...

    Downloads

    • C:\Program Files\7-Zip\akira_readme.txt

      Filesize

      2KB

      MD5

      7ee7d94f7534deae42b10f796a826da5

      SHA1

      8ad4a7801110e1aaf95f7deefc5dd7f01467fb73

      SHA256

      6b50d198c93a0419385d4155e15829e8c9292df132cb991655465d0224509cb6

      SHA512

      feaef75da7e52779b9910bbb36c0f763bc36021f20b1eaa5072f9ab881087d0c85914c75fa87da6817195dd1c92e6a2b6ef1f8953d50579e3693a4b4cc49d8d3

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log

      Filesize

      3KB

      MD5

      b692c051f2af6c781080df90648d7f3b

      SHA1

      aff26c8cbd278ff408f4593c35ce618c2d3c1daf

      SHA256

      ae79dc6633ae5853450951635f9f3a2f911c4ef7c979c2fc46f8beaf25cd95ee

      SHA512

      24564a5e5907eb5c76b7c6961deae1ef7711223e7f7d5d4264e8694482a13adcf2d21585f79bdbaf0ff4dbb0c1fc7a43804aa511b5442daa3fb3847c2aa059bc

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_2kshhytq.hhc.ps1

      Filesize

      60B

      MD5

      d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

      SHA1

      6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

      SHA256

      96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

      SHA512

      5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

    • memory/2064-0-0x00007FFFAA110000-0x00007FFFAA1AE000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      632KB

    • memory/2064-1-0x00007FFFAA110000-0x00007FFFAA1AE000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      632KB

    • memory/2064-2-0x000001F37D620000-0x000001F37D642000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      136KB

    • memory/2064-14-0x00007FFFAA110000-0x00007FFFAA1AE000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      632KB