General

  • Target

    ace62901f4fec709fce73f50ccf823c79fb191b7b40f32e7fa9b2d1012982871.bin

  • Size

    276KB

  • Sample

    240623-a6gdgawgkk

  • MD5

    ab381d86748442735a395bb66356db5c

  • SHA1

    ccb7af1cfb3427b99b407e306755c629d2221acb

  • SHA256

    ace62901f4fec709fce73f50ccf823c79fb191b7b40f32e7fa9b2d1012982871

  • SHA512

    07ae615fe92c275314c451f8cdec644bd6bbfe35baa4bf08a3ac245b76eb9ea989c2c0bf4c2baf9e676e3fb0785c59258922b3b04b090a9a4ebce80cb81debd7

  • SSDEEP

    6144:IU74o0OT7W1PRt5eU2/Ge97gW0a3fISi6uJq1SRNFA2fvx7WL944vQ:IY4oqj5vne9z0swSDuJq1SbFA2fvx7B5

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

xloader_apk

C2

http://91.204.227.39:28844

DES_key

Targets

    • Target

      ace62901f4fec709fce73f50ccf823c79fb191b7b40f32e7fa9b2d1012982871.bin

    • Size

      276KB

    • MD5

      ab381d86748442735a395bb66356db5c

    • SHA1

      ccb7af1cfb3427b99b407e306755c629d2221acb

    • SHA256

      ace62901f4fec709fce73f50ccf823c79fb191b7b40f32e7fa9b2d1012982871

    • SHA512

      07ae615fe92c275314c451f8cdec644bd6bbfe35baa4bf08a3ac245b76eb9ea989c2c0bf4c2baf9e676e3fb0785c59258922b3b04b090a9a4ebce80cb81debd7

    • SSDEEP

      6144:IU74o0OT7W1PRt5eU2/Ge97gW0a3fISi6uJq1SRNFA2fvx7WL944vQ:IY4oqj5vne9z0swSDuJq1SbFA2fvx7B5

    • XLoader payload

    • XLoader, MoqHao

      An Android banker and info stealer.

    • Checks if the Android device is rooted.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries account information for other applications stored on the device

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect account information stored on the device.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Reads the content of the MMS message.

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Requests changing the default SMS application.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks